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ABSTRACT 
 
 
UTILIZATION OF OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS  
IN THE STUDY OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Zugaj, Julita Anna 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı 
June 2010 
 
Operational code analysis constituting a framework for systematic study ap-
pears to inaugurate a long-waited approach aiming at understanding, unfolding 
and potentially anticipating the motivational and behavioral constitutions of 
non-state terrorist organizations. However, operational code constructs known 
so far do not appear to be compact in respect of the methodology, which could 
be utilized within the studies of operational codes of organizations different than 
governmental. Into the bargain, the scholarly evolution of operational code 
analysis presents an inconsistency associated with the interchangeability of indi-
vidual and organizational levels of analysis. Addressing these limitations, this 
thesis seeks to offer an alternative approach by appreciating the instrumentality 
of beliefs about organizational structure, its potential for determining the style of 
decision-making and for anticipation of the decision-makers’ logic of political ac-
tion. This study concludes with a section, which expands the parameters of op-
erational code research incorporating a structural context and discussion of its 
implications for research on terrorism. 
 
Key Words: Operational code analysis, non-state terrorist organizations, percep-
tions, organizational structure, methodology. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
OPERASYONAL KURAL ANALİZİNİN TERÖR ÖRGÜTÜ ÇALIŞMALARINA 
YARARI 
Zugaj, Julita Anna 
M.A., ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER DEPARTMANI 
Tez Danışmanı: Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı 
Hazıran 2010 
 
 Sistematik çalışmaların yapısını oluşturan operasyonal kural analizi, uzun 
zamandır beklenen bir yöntemi ortaya koyarak, günümüzde uluslararası sis-
temin işlevini tehdit eden terrorist organizasyonların güdüsel ve davranışsal 
yapılanmalarını anlamayı, ortaya çıkarmayı ve önceden tahmin etmeyi amaçla-
maktadır. Ancak bugüne kadar oluşan operasyonal kod yapılanmalarının me-
todolojik açıdan tam bir bütünlüğü olmadığı görünmektedir. İş bu yüzden op-
erasyonal kod yapılanmaları devlet yönetmelikleri ile değil organizasyon içi 
yönetmelikler ile faydalı hale getirilebilir. Ayrıca operasyonal kod literatürü 
analiz düzeyinde birey ve organizasyonu birbiri yerine kullanarak tutarsızlığa 
sebebiyet vermektedir. Bu tezin amacı, bahsedilen kısıtlamalara da değinerek, 
farklı bir yaklaşım sunmaktır. Bu yaklaşım; örgütsel yapıda inanç sistemlerinin 
önemine, operasyonal kuralların karar alma tarzları üzerindeki etkisine ve de si-
yasi eylem sırasında karar alıcıların muhakeme gücünü idrak edebilmeye day-
anmaktadır. Bu çalışma operasyonal kural araştırmalarındaki değişkenleri 
arttırıp konuya yapısal içeriği dahil ederek, terör çalışmalarında operasyonal 
kurallarının yerini tartışmaktadır.   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Operasyonal kural analizi, devlet dışı terör organizasyonları, 
algı, örgütsel yapı, metodoloji  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In the advent of the second half of twentieth century, forces of bipolarity not 
only impinged upon the perceptions of leadership elites, but also provided a 
framework for innovative academic studies venturing into assessments of inter-
national threats. In deep considerations of perceived threats to the international 
society, Nathan Leites (1951, 1953) undertook an extensive study of the political 
elite in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) attempting at a greater under-
standing of the underlining premises governing its actions. Emphasizing Soviet 
belief system in implicit relation to decision-making processes of Soviet ruling 
party, the Politburo, Leites’ (1951, 1953) operational code construct emerged as a 
study, not only insightful and pre-eminent in examination of decision-making 
but also unique in its methodological design. The complexity of Leites’ (1951, 
1953) analysis, however, despite academic price and acknowledgement of politi-
cal elites, constituting “a gigantic stature that is likely to faire école in politics and 
the other behavioral sciences for many years to come” (Kluckhohn, 1955: 117) in-
spired only limited efforts for similar research of political decision-making elites. 
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Over a decade later, the methodological essence of operational code analysis 
was extracted by Alexander George (1969), furnishing the approach with sound 
means for  generating  comparable  measures  of  belief  systems.  George’s (1969) 
construct embracing a set of questions for examination of philosophical and in-
strumental contents1 of political belief system constituted a solidified foundation 
for future studies of operational codes, which embarked to appear widely within 
the field of foreign policy decision-making.  
 
In a manner analogous to Leites’ (1951, 1953) perceptions of USSR as a threat 
to peace and stability of international system, contemporary challengers of the 
status quo, the non-state terrorist organizations merit a closer examination in re-
spect of the underlining principles governing their political behavior. Opera-
tional code analysis constituting a framework for systematic study appears to in-
augurate the long-waited approach aiming at understanding, unfolding and 
potentially anticipating motivational and behavioral constitutions of the non-
state terrorist threat2. The applicability of Leites’ (1951, 1953) and George’s (1969) 
pioneering constructs in understanding decision-making processes of state-
leading elites, however, leaves considerable questions concerning the utility of 
operational  code  analysis  for  the  study  of non-state  terrorist  actors.  
 
                                                   
1 The operational code comprises “philosophical” and “instrumental” contents consisting of ten 
typological questions, answers to which identify the political actor’s attitude towards politics 
(philosophical questions) and response repertoire (instrumental questions) (George, 1969). The 
questions are available in Chapter 4: The Operational Code Analysis p. 45-46. 
2 The term “terrorism” in the subsequent chapters of this thesis (Chapter II: Non-State Actors, 
Political Violence, Terrorism and Chapter III: Mapping Research on Terrorism) will be used in 
reference to non-state terrorist organizations, rather than to state or state-sponsored terrorism. 
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Operational code constructs known so far do not appear to be compact in re-
spect of methodology, which could be utilized within the studies of operational 
codes of organizations different than governmental. This point becomes of sig-
nificance in the light of the observation that non-state actors in general, and ter-
rorist organizations in particular display high degrees of de-bureaucratization. 
Into the bargain, the scholarly evolution of operational code analysis ceased to 
follow comprehensive inclusiveness of Leites’ (1951, 1953) model associated with 
the organizational level of analysis he adopted. Subsequent operational code 
analysis converted insubstantially only in consideration of beliefs sets and re-
sponse repertoire of individual decision-makers that claimed to constitute an in-
fluence upon decision-making processes of that actor. 3  
 
The fundamental aim of this study is to conduct a preliminary research into 
the kinds of information that would enrich operational code analysis and bestow 
for its applicability equally to state and non-state terrorist actors. Contending the 
potential contribution of operational code analysis for subsequent research on 
non-state terrorist organizations, this thesis attempts to compensate for these 
limitations by explicating various components of the operational code and com-
plementing it with beliefs about organizational structure in a way that enhances 
and improves the operational code construct for non-state terrorist organizations. 
                                                   
3 The operational code analysis have experienced the most extensive growth from mid-1970 until 
late-1990 with a series of comparable case studies of American decision-makers modelled upon 
Leites-George paradigm that eventually formed categorization of operational codes. A review of 
operational code literature is presented in Chapter IV: The Operational Code Analysis. 
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This thesis seeks to offer such an approach by appreciating the instrumental-
ity of beliefs about organizational structure, its potential for determining the 
style of decision-making that fundamentally answer the question George (1969: 
198) himself asked, namely: “How do political leaders in varying political culture 
and institutional structures approach the task of making calculations, of deciding 
what objectives to select and how to deal with uncertainly and risk?” This is to 
demonstrate that study of conceptions of organizational structure held by politi-
cal actor is a relevant and direct venue to the delineation of the logic of actor’s 
political action. 
 
In this study the thesis states that the utility of operational code in studying 
terrorist organizations depends upon the validity of the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: The conceptions of political strategy are particularly significant 
portion of political actor’s entire set of belief about political life.  
 
Proposition 2: The conceptions of political strategy are equally amenable to 
influence by the perceptions on organizational structure and processes as by 
the beliefs about strategy and tactics of political action and attitudes towards 
politics. 
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Proposition 34: Due to different perceptions concerning the effectiveness of 
organizational structures and processes that come into influent contact with 
existent behavioral patterns in organizations, the decision-making of non-
state terrorist organizations should not be amenable to the same kinds of 
analysis that inform about foreign policy decision-making in states and state 
institutions. 
 
Proposition 4: General beliefs and response repertoire can be extracted with 
the existent models for operational code analysis. 
 
Proposition 5: In order to provide for the grounding differences between de-
cision-making of states and non-state terrorist organizations and acquire 
comprehensive knowledge of the rules of conduct of studied entity it is nec-
essary to incorporate into operational code analysis the conceptions of orga-
nizational structures embraced within political actor’s rules of conduct. 
 
As both states and non-state terrorist organizations are complex political enti-
ties that engage in decision-making processes their motivations and behavior are 
demonstrably impacted by the set of general beliefs regarding their political 
world, set of specific beliefs regarding the response repertoire and conceptions of 
                                                   
4 This proposition is grounded in the general observation that states are essentially structured as 
bureaucracies (Snyder et al. 1962: 109) while non-state actors, among which non-state terrorists 
actors  can  be  distinguished  particularly,  present  a  tendency  to  deviate  from  bureaucratic  
structuring into other forms of organizational constitutions (Arquilla and Zanini, 1999). This 
premise is elaborated in full in Chapter V: Typology of Organizational Structures, and empiri-
cally validated with the case study of Al Qaeda in Chapter VI: Al Qaeda’s Organizational Struc-
ture. 
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behavioral patterns intersecting beliefs and responses within a cognitive realm of 
decision-makers. While both Leites (1951, 1953) and George (1969) codified the 
cognitive influences upon decision-making, it is of outmost importance to signify 
the essence of operational code analysis as cognitive at its core. Non-cognitive 
organizational influences, despite their recognized capacity to have an effect on 
the character, development or behavior of the decision-making in organizational 
setting, are not addressed in this study. A representative review of the non-
cognitive influences of organizational structure will be presented in contribution 
to the literature review;5 however, it will not be incorporated into the frame of 
reference for the construction of operational code belief system.  
 
A body of inter-related and traversing rules from which reader extracts prem-
ises governing the entirety of actor’s conceptions of political strategy will be con-
ducted within a framework of cognitive limits on decision-making. However, to 
denote on the interconnection and mutual reinforcement of cognitive and non-
cognitive realms, an analysis will be provided to denote the linkage between op-
erational code belief system, conceptions of organizational structure and evi-
dence for patters of behavior in organizations. The notion of organizational strat-
egy, as presented in this thesis, will provide for that connection. This is due to 
the nature of operational code beliefs, which embrace the conceptions of political 
strategy (Leites, 1953: 15) and the premise widely agreed upon within the field of 
organizational  studies  that  strategic  decision  processes  reflect  patterns  of 
                                                   
5 A review of non-cognitive influences of organizational structure on decision-making is pre-
sented in Chapter VII: Subsuming Organizational Structure into Operational Code Analysis. 
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behavior that develop in organizations (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984: 400). 
Contrary to the majority of operational code researches that have attempted to 
provide for the linkage between beliefs and behavior, the presented operational 
code construct accounts for the incorporation of the cognitive affirmations of the 
conceptions of organizational structure as they relate in turn to behavioral pat-
terns within the framework of operational code belief system. 
 
While the ability to utilize operational code analysis for examination of non-
state terrorist actors becomes a significant contribution in itself to the research on 
terrorism, this project also addresses a notion that the field of terrorism studies 
has made only limited headway in developing any kind of robust theory or in-
terpretation relevant to the terrorism. Reviewing a number of theoretical at-
tempts within the field of terrorism accurately reflects the claim that they cannot 
fall into the category of a grounded theory, primarily, as Ranstorp (2006: 6) 
noted, due to the fact that the terrorism studies often constituted “publicly re-
peated assumptions or theories that had become conventional wisdom within the 
field [of terrorism] without ever being based on any serious or tested quantita-
tive or qualitative field research or survey results.” This statement represents the 
actuality of a lack of serious theorizing in studies on terrorism presenting nu-
merous gaps of methodological and contextual nature. Operational code analy-
sis, providing proposed additions to its methodology, would constitute for an 
insightful  approach  of  study  non-state  terrorist  organizations  within  the 
framework  of  systematic,  reliable  and  testable  study,  imparting  in  turn  he 
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comprehensive framework for analysis of the non-state entities constituting a 
threat to the peaceful conduct of world affairs today.  
 
In terms of the above consideration of beliefs about organizational structure 
as factors of influence on decision-making of organizations, what emerges is a 
redefined and restructured concept of operational code that constitutes a new 
research construct for empirical validation of influences on decision-making and 
focuses on the interrelated structural and procedural conceptions influencing or-
ganizational rules of conduct. Combining the two fields of emphasis, would not 
merely examine terrorist organization in framework of structures and functions, 
but in systematic way would provide for the inclusion of a larger framework of 
organizational set of beliefs that embracive of beliefs about organizational struc-
ture provide the organization with a cohesive capability of distributing threat on 
international scale. A distinguished portion of this thesis, aims at the comple-
mentation of the theoretical and methodological construct of operational code 
analysis provided by George (1969). With the independently delineated ques-
tions concerning organization’s structural and procedural contents, the proposed 
structural changes into the operational code constitute for a significant theoreti-
cal contribution to the studies of the operational codes. In this respect, a proposi-
tion is made that an initial paradigm embracing a structural query about the na-
ture of political actor’s beliefs about organizational structure in detail allows for 
preliminary remarks intended to be representative in this regard. 
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The aim of this study is neither, as it might appear, to present a mere review 
of Leites’ (1951, 1953) and George’s (1969, 1979) studies, nor to contribute to the 
existing knowledge of Al Qaeda, as a subject of this study per se, but rather the 
aim is to use their operational code paradigms as a vehicle for assessing their 
contribution to our understanding of international political actors that they 
spawned: the application of operational code analysis for the assessment of the 
threat non-state terrorist organizations pose on international status quo. Fidelity 
to this project requires that we take a bearing for revision of operational code 
analysis and make mid-course corrections for its greater utility value in studying 
of contemporary threats. 
 
1.1. Overview 
This project begins with a brief introduction into the emergence of non-state 
actors within the international system, and means through which non-state enti-
ties attempt to influence the courses of political developments of global affairs. 
Within Chapter II, particular attention is given to terrorist organizations, as non-
state actors, which’s functions and patterns of violence present a significant 
threat to international peace and stability. Chapter III progresses to the assess-
ment of the research on terrorism attempting to address and understand the na-
ture of terrorist threat through identification of major scholarly contributions to 
the field. Identification of a lack of consensus over most terrorism issues and 
clear classification of the research on terrorism consequently leads to the proposi-
tion that operational code analysis as a study can contribute significantly to the 
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resolution of the conceptualization problem in terrorism studies by allowing a 
comprehensive incorporation of specific research questions into a unified sys-
tematic approach. Chapter IV provides a background on operational code analy-
sis, accounting for the in-dept understanding of the approach as it transformed 
from its initial appearance in Leites’ works (1951, 1953) into contemporary stud-
ies. Consequently the chapter ends with the identification of inconsistencies 
through the evolution of operational code analysis and proposes solutions, with 
particular emphasis on the operational code-strategy-structure relationship. This 
is to denote the significance of beliefs about organizational structure for the con-
ceptions of political strategy of political actor extracted by operational code 
analysis. In a following manner, Chapter V continues with a presentation of vari-
ances in organizational structures and presents, upon evidence, different organi-
zational structure of state institutions and non-state terrorist organizations. 
Chapter VI comprises a case study of Al Qaeda, which aims at the empirical 
validation of the argument stated that non-state terrorist organizations are gov-
erned by diverse structural underpinnings than state institutions. Chapter VII 
progresses into delineation of theories on decision-making with the cognitive 
frame of reference aiming at the incorporation of structural beliefs into factors 
bounding rationality of decision-makers. Chapter VII consequently discusses the 
theoretical approach providing for the incorporation of the aforementioned dif-
ferenced within a sound methodological structure of operational code analysis. 
The  proposed  methodological  addition  to  operational  code  analysis,  format-
ted as additional questions modeled on the operational code methodology by 
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George (1969) is consequently evaluated in respect of their influence on informa-
tion-processing for decision-making purposes. Conclusively, Chapter IX com-
prises the portion of the operational code of Al Qaeda constructed to identify the 
structural content of its conceptions of political strategy. In recognition of the fact 
that this study presents a preliminary project it does not lead to the construction 
of a complete operational code for selected terrorist organization.6 Rather it pro-
vides for a representative portion of the operational code addressing the struc-
tural content becomes a significant contribution to the terrorism studies as it 
could significantly assist future research on terrorism through utilization of op-
erational code analysis as an effective and insightful approach. In the conclusive 
chapter, the premises of the study are delineated in light of the precedent analy-
sis, concluding that operational code approach, providing the methodological 
additions, is appropriate for study of non-state terrorist organizations.  
 
1.2. Methodology 
The research of this dissertation applies heuristic case study in order to gen-
erate fruitful and supplementary insights into the study of operational code of 
political entities. Heuristic case study as a methodology of research does not as-
sume the aim of theory building and generalization, but rather provides for the 
“serendipitous additions to existing theories in order to cover puzzling aspects of 
                                                   
6 The operational code of Al Qaeda has been constructed by Picucci (2008). The study was quanti-
tative in nature and modelled upon George’s (1969) philosophical and instrumental questions. It 
is important to note that this thesis attempts to re-examine Leites’(1951, 1953) original construct, 
which has been significantly different than Geroges Picucci’s (2008) work is acknowledged yet 
not subjected to revision as Al Qaeda is not addressed per se, rather the operational code meth-
odology. 
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a case” (Eckstein, 1975: 143). The heuristic method simply attempts to separate 
the inquiry from the wider context and apply it to the recommended study to 
“stimulate the imagination toward discerning important general problems and 
possible theoretical solutions” (Eckstein, 1975: 143). Importantly, Eckstein’s 
(1975: 143) describes the attributes of the heuristic methodology indicating that: 
Such studies, unlike configurative-idiographic7 ones, tie directly into the-
ory building and therefore are less concerned with overall concrete con-
figurations that with potentially generalizable relations between aspects of 
them; they also tie into theory building less passively and fortuitously 
than does disciplined-configurative study, because they potentially gener-
alizable relations do not just turn up but are deliberately sought out. 
 
In this respect, the present study represents a research of complementary nature 
to the existing body of knowledge on operational code that aims at the initiation 
of essential line of thinking indispensable for the creation of the comprehensive 
theory improved by nature through the proposed additional construct tying op-
erational code analysis to organizational theory.  
 
The generation of the research insights stems from the application of crea-
tiveness to the examination of a case study, or multiple case studies in non-
comparative manner, since the heuristic research allows for the seriatim applica-
tion of the case study by “the so-called building-block technique in order to con-
struct increasingly plausible and less fortuitous regularity statements” (Eckstein, 
1975: 143). As the technique, attempts to study cases in an individual manner, it 
                                                   
7 Configurative-idiographic case studies are single-case studies often associated with area studies.  
They are highly descriptive aiming at understanding and interpreting a single case as it stands 
solely, rather than developing broader theoretical generalizations. The configurative-idiographic 
studies are inductive in a manner that “they involve a minimum of a priori theoretical preconcep-
tions, and the interpretation emerges from the case itself” (Levy, 2002: 135). 
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should not be mistaken for the premises of comparative studies. While compara-
tive study seek to analyze similarities and dissimilarities among studied subjects, 
through a systematic inquiry, the heuristic case study attempts to unfold gradu-
ally a better solutions for theoretical constructs through study of individual 
cases. As Eckstein (1975: 144) noted: 
A construct, based on a single case, is unlikely to constitute more than a 
slim clue to a valid general model. One therefore confronts it with another 
case that may suggest ways of amending and improving the construct to 
achieve better case interpretation; and this process is continued until the 
construct seems sufficiently refined to require no further major amend-
ment or at least to warrant testing by large-scale comparative study. 
 
Due to the fact that theories do not come directly from data, but rather from 
“theorist’s imagination, logical ability and ability to discern general problems 
and patterns in particular observations” (Eckstein, 1975: 145), the heuristic analy-
sis not being bounded into the extensive set of variables is able to increase the 
degree of insights, potentially finding correlations and variables of crucial impor-
tance to the attempted field of inquiry. The primary argument for the choice of a 
case study for examination might appear to constitute a premise against the gen-
eral law formation within the scientific discipline. Nevertheless, importantly as 
“certain kinds of cases may be regarded as more instructive for theory building 
than others” (Eckstein, 1975: 146), the claim in general will be made to the se-
lected case and the contribution to the general theory accordingly acknowledged 
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with the identification of the subject to subsequent rigorous inquiry for 
“grounded theory building.”8  
 
On that account, methodological application of heuristic case study, in this 
research allows for the identification of a case study, Al Qaeda representing a se-
lected non-state terrorist organization. Al Qaeda, perceived in history as threat 
and representing distinctive organizational structure is selected based on the na-
ture of the theory that is being constructed, namely the supplementary elements 
of operational code analysis, rather than on particular case that is otherwise of 
the interest to the researcher. In this manner, the focus of this thesis is directed 
specifically at the theory rather than specifically on the case studied. The nature 
of the heuristic study of the proposed case aims at the investigation that would 
develop testable hypothesis without guaranteeing a theoretical outcome. The 
purpose for evaluation of the selected case study as representative of a distinc-
tive organizational structure aims at the development of generalizable theory 
from particular instance of the chosen case. Limiting the examined variables to 
beliefs about organizational structure this study is able to shed light on the op-
erational code construct, allowing the emphasis to be directed to the configura-
tive elements of the cases in order to test the mechanisms of operational code 
analysis. Therefore, the case study of this thesis does not constitute a point of de-
parture but rather supplements an attempt at the generation of hypotheses, 
which can form the basis of new theory.  
                                                   
8 “Grounded Theory” refers to theory that is initially derived from observation rather than 
spawned wholly out of logic and imagination (Eckstein, 1975:147). 
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The choice of the theory and theme for this thesis are intertwined; when 
choosing the theme, I implicitly chose to build upon Leites’ conception of opera-
tional code analysis that would become a step towards verification of the pro-
posed construct. Based on the analogous nature of the inquiry to that of Leites 
(1951, 1953), the methodology of thesis in Chapter IX will constitute a qualitative 
method employing content analysis. Through qualitative approach to Al Qaeda, 
this thesis aims to aid not merely to the understanding of studied adversary, but 
primarily to illustrate that the operational code approach should not be restricted 
to quantitative inquiries, which became to be predominant following the rise of 
positivism in the discipline of international relations.  
 
In this context, the essential goal of heuristic and qualitative research, thus, is 
not to quantify data or to produce statistical results for generalizable application 
to all studied entities; rather it aims to explore the essential characteristics of 
studied phenomena and them to the attention of the future scholars. The under-
lining aim of this thesis, thereby, aims at the establishment of a unique, creative 
synthesis resulting from the grounded analyses that would constitute a sound 
basis for efficient application of the heuristically realized construct in the subse-
quent research.  
 16 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
NON-STATE ACTORS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE, TERRORISM 
 
 
 
The cross-section of contemporary international arena is characterized by het-
erogeneity of influences, governances and structures. Recognizing that twenty-
first century political arena is no longer confined solely to state actors becomes of 
prime significance to the future of relations among international entities 
(Ataman, 2003: 42). The forces of globalization had set up a global communica-
tions network, increased flows of goods and peoples around the world, and 
made weapons and other materials more available to variety of international ac-
tors. This has enabled a dynamic improvement of communications and techno-
logical development and thus new ways of organizing people (Grygiel, 2009: 38). 
The effect of these changes facilitated rise of political movements that are increas-
ingly capable of playing a strategic role in international relations and provided 
them with greater capabilities to project themselves across the world. Primarily, 
in wage of globalization, structural interconnectedness of people across the 
world  and  the  underlining  premises  of  information  revolution  produced  
increased  opportunities  for  non-state  actors  to  acquire  significant  roles,     
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accountability and representativeness for influences and political action (Flana-
gan, 2001: 15). And it is the nature of the distribution of non-state actors’ influ-
ences into the driving forces of international affairs that becomes of essential 
consideration for the security challenges arising from the emergence of diversi-
fied international actors. The starting point of this thesis is, therefore, that any 
interpretation of methods and approaches in international relations should take 
into account the significance of non-state actors operating transnationally.  
 
2.1. Classification of Influences of Non-State Actors 
“States and non-state actors form broad opposing categories… yet defining 
non-state actors chiefly by their independence from states and state authority 
would be misleading“ (Josselin and Wallace, 2001: 2), constituting for evolving 
relationship among state and non-state actors as one of the fastest moving di-
mensions of contemporary international politics (Higgot et al. 2000: 11). Among 
all, the anatomy of this relationship embraces disperse forces of influence in con-
sideration of world’s political agenda, essentially with variety non-state actors 
significantly contributing to the strengthening of political, economical, social and 
security mechanisms, and those that regrettably constitute the challenges to those 
mechanisms stemming from the implicit direction of their activities against indi-
vidually, nationally and internationally recognized values. As Josselin and 
Wallace (2001: 2) noted at one end of the non-state spectrum there are “compa-
nies and organization the activities of which meet with full approval and support 
from one or more national governments; at the other groups and movements 
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seen by the governments of most territories in which they seek to operate as 
threats to established order.” While the former group signifies transnational cor-
porations (TNC’s) and multinational corporations (MNC’s) existing beyond and 
within nation-states that penetrate the public and private realms, the picture of 
non-state influences extends to inter-governmental organizations (IGO’s) enter-
ing into a formal and legally binding agreements with think-tanks for policy ad-
vice and with non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) for conveyance of assis-
tance, advice and delivery of services. Conversely, the latter group encompasses 
revolutionary and violent non-state actors (VNSA) such as terrorist organiza-
tions, militias, insurgents and organized crime organizations, that have learned 
to exploit the international space and emerge into challengers capable of bringing 
about fundamental change of the nature of warfare and conflict in contemporary 
world (McAllister, 2004: 297). 
 
In this thesis, therefore, the working definition of non-state actors would sig-
nify actors, which “at least in principle autonomous from the structure and ma-
chinery of the state, and of the governmental and intergovernmental bodies be-
low and above the formally-sovereign state: transnational, rather than trans-
governmental” (Josselin and Wallace, 2001: 3). The focus of the thesis, however, 
is on those non-state actors that utilize the means of resistance to nation-state of-
ten manifested through violence-stimulated influences. Bull (1977: 268-70 as cited 
in Devetak, 2005: 237)  reminds  us  that  the  exercise  of  violence  by  non-state 
actors  remains  an  enduring  aspect  of  international  relations,  which  began  
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to increasingly account on the changing character of the perception of VNSA’s 
and their influence on global affairs. Inherent in nature of politics the line be-
tween peaceful and persuasive means of influence and hostile antagonism, 
which resorts to disruptive and violent means, is often crossed; for that reason it 
is important to highlight the political context of terrorism and the ultimate impli-
cations for the use of violence in that context. Whether bound by cultural, relig-
ious or historical perceptions, or based on pursuance of political, idealistic or 
economic rewards the choice of violence by non-state actors represents a shift in 
attributions and influences to the sphere of conflict and security considerations.  
 
Facilitated by the premises of information revolution, the radical break-
throughs among non-state actors become essentially facilitated. While informa-
tion revolution essentially brings profound changes in the communication and 
transport sectors, the international actors become increasingly directed towards 
utilization of new technologies for advancement of organizational innovation 
and survival. McAllister (2004: 300) stated that in face of global encroachment of 
information technologies, the tactical and organizational innovation becomes 
“necessary in order to take advantage of the force multipliers offered by the in-
formation revolution.” In a manner analogous to the transformation of business 
environment to ensure organization’s ability to adapt to increase in information 
flows, the new entrants into the sphere of conflict essentially adopt a complex 
adaptive systems (CAS) directed at the management of information interconnec-
tivity through diverse organizational structures in a manner revolutionizing the 
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affairs governing conflicts (McAllister, 2004: 301). The essential correlation be-
tween technology and information becomes increasingly pronounced in the 
methods of engagement in conflict, placing emphasis on the information as a ma-
terial power rather than on resources (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997: 150-152) fun-
damentally changing and magnifying the effectiveness of organizational designs 
to manage and conduct the warfare. Facing an adversary, with distinctive utiliza-
tion of information, technological innovations and structural organization for 
management of affairs, the imperatives of conventional military conflicts embrac-
ing underlining rationale behind targeting and execution of an offensive action 
becomes essentially challenging to the counter attempts of conventional military 
means, enhancing the asymmetry among adversaries of contemporary conflict. 
 
 2.2. Asymmetric Nature of Threat from Non-State Actors 
Traditionally understood considerations of national and international secu-
rity were conceived in terms of inter-state relations (Grygiel, 2009: 42). In con-
temporary world, following the decline of the throbbing polarity between West-
ern democracies and Soviet block countries, non-state violent actors gained their 
status as an adversary through the violence-driven animosity, that represent a 
powerful and overreaching challenges to peace and stability of international 
arena (Williams, 2003: vii). Facing enemies conversely diverse and substantially 
dissimilar to traditional-war-waging actors bring about a non-traditional security 
challenges, increasingly characterized by the elements of asymmetry as a weapon 
of choice (Blank, 2004: 357). No longer fearing solemnly challenges imposed by 
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actors defined by past precedents, states began to face asymmetric adversaries, 
with considerable military potentials and threatening capabilities, which Sep-
tember 11, 2001 illustrated at its highest capacity of non-state violence. Opposing 
the conventional understanding of war that emerged out of general practices and 
handling of inter-state affairs through application of military force as a mean for 
advancing or defending one’s objective provides for the fact that conventional 
military force were and remain largely “designed, trained and equipped to fight 
near mirror of themselves: forces with broadly similar infrastructures” (Bellamy, 
2002: 152), that are not so quite asymmetrical in nature. The newly risen non-
state challengers in conflicts denote the type of warfare, implying a relational 
quality of opposed structures or units of analysis not being designed against each 
other (Blank, 2004: 348); therefore they, constitute a great challenge for contem-
porary world in respect of the assemblage and conduct of counter efforts. With 
non-state asymmetric threats presenting different means, ends and vulnerabili-
ties of the parties involved (Bellamy, 2002: 154) the conventional wisdom of 
countering violence becomes insufficient in its application to contemporary vio-
lent non-state challengers. As Williams (2003: xii) noted that “in the new security 
environment, container defense might be more important than ballistic missile 
defense” attempting to portray that contemporary counter effort against orga-
nized violence requires acting, organizing and thinking differently in order to 
grasp the understand the opponent, grasp his weaknesses and gain an effective-
ness  of  action.  Asymmetric  adversary  represents  a  threat  emanating  from 
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different strategic realm, disparate from the one in-build in the approaches of the 
contemporary countering forces. 
 
 2.2.1. Asymmetric Threat and Terrorism 
Terrorism as an archetypal non-state asymmetrical adversary (Thornton, 
2007: 25) remains substantially the greatest challenge to the stability of interna-
tional system, not merely through increased scope and lethality of violent activi-
ties since 1960’s, or increased notoriety of Al Qaeda but primarily through the 
mechanisms by which the terrorist manifest the element of violence (Stepanova, 
2008: 1-2). Terrorist non-state organizations complement the element of violence 
with the elements of asymmetry that allows them do deploy threats and violence 
against enemies using “means that outside of the forms of political struggle rou-
tinely operating within some current regime” (Tilly, 2004: 5). Inherently devoted 
to “disruption of norms, the violation of generally accepted standards of de-
cency, including the rules of war as they apply to the innocent and the helpless” 
(Kupperman and Trent, 1979: 15), terrorism aims at purposeful ignition of shock 
and terror as a mean for achievement of intended objective, thus, becomes no less 
significant than the dangers of conventional war or any other political violence. 
The challenge of the terrorist violence is enhanced with the fact that terrorists so-
phistication requires terrorists to use a selective violence, in order not to damage 
their political cause, as well as, conduct the acts of violence in an environment 
where becoming known to the counter-terrorists would jeopardize their political 
and operational objectives (Shapiro, 2007: 2).  
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Typically terrorists win their outrages through generally minor, as contrasted 
with extraordinary attacks of September 11, 2001 on World Trace Centre (WTC).9 
Actuality of WTC attacks graphically and tragically validated the point that most 
inferable threats are not necessarily the most dangerous or urgent ones, and that 
world contemporary faces threats reaching beyond limits of conception and exe-
cution. In the wage of globalization, however, the terrorist use of violence be-
comes increasingly more powerful in means and ends, as globalization enhances 
not only the use of new technologies, extensive-reach for financial support and 
ability to reach across international borders, but also aids to the perceptions of 
political objectives reaching globally and notions of expressive violence, as a 
symbolic and communicative to the wider audience (Cronin, 2002: 46-51). The 
modern non-state violence, and that of international terrorism in particular is es-
pecially dangerous because of the inherent enhancement of information tech-
nologies it potentially derives from globalization. As a violent non-state actor ter-
rorism exists in an environment that influences it and is influence by it (Thomas 
et al., 2005: 9), thereby, the essence of influences on terrorism from the environ-
ment become an essential aspect for the understanding of the direction in which 
terrorism will be heading in the future of global affairs. In recognition of the fact 
that the acclimatization of terrorist organizations to the constantly changing in-
ternational environment and increase in counter-terrorism efforts on interna-
tional scale cannot be isolated from the objective which terrorists aim to advance, 
                                                   
9 The number of deaths in WTC attacks is believed to be 2,976, while in general single terrorists 
attacks until 2007 did not account for more than 400 fatalities (Global Terrorism Database avail-
able online: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/) 
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the international society’s confrontation with terrorist violence is likely to con-
tinue on a routine basis. 
 
 2.3. Research on Terrorism Within Non-State Actor Literature 
Discussion of non-state threat development presents terrorism as arguably 
the most important security challenge of 21st century. As at the outset of Cold 
War the world was characterized by polarized perceptions marked by propensity 
and pessimism, the evolution of terrorist threat and greater in destruction inter-
national appearances of terrorist violence brought the 21st century’s attention of 
scholars and politicians outside of realm of state violence. In this respect growing 
animosities of non-state actors and increase in the potential of terrorist threat ne-
cessitate for the diversion of focus within academia and political spheres into the 
effective means of understanding, analysis and countering it. 
 
Terrorism is a complex phenomenon characterized by uncountable dimen-
sions, therefore, acquirement of deeper understanding of the terrorist threat and 
its evolvement in utilization of violence for achievement of political purposes be-
comes crucial for projection of closer developments of terrorist threat. Cronin 
(2002: 58) noted that,  
Terrorism is an unprecedented, powerful non-state threat to the interna-
tional system that no single state, regardless of how powerful it may be in 
traditional terms, can defeat alone, especially in the absence of long-term 
serious scholarship engaged in by its most creative minds. 
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Motivated by the words of Cronin (2002), this research attempts to add up to 
the non-state literature on terrorism primarily from the perspective of countering 
the threat emanating from new security environment. However, in order to effec-
tively deal with terrorist threat, which is generated by, related to and used as a 
tactic in asymmetric conflict, it is not only indispensable but also satisfactory to 
address the fundamental causes of the emergence of conflict and the underlining 
resort to violence by belligerent parties. Recognizing the importance of influ-
ences a violent non-state actor acquires from its environment, underlining struc-
tural causes and their concrete manifestations become a primary contribution to 
the study of violent non-state actors.  
 
The following chapter, dedicated to the construction of the fairly accurate 
representation of a field of terrorist studies, is intended to illustrate primary ap-
proaches and general tendencies among scholars engaged in research on terror-
ism and provide reader with a snapshot of the field. The subsequent chapter ad-
dresses cohesiveness of existing academic body on terrorism, the gaps and limi-
tations and possible solutions in an attempt that would provide for accurate de-
scription, understanding and potential predictions of the terrorist actions. This is 
to adequately prepare for the solidification of the persistent level of the terrorist 
phenomenon against which the theory of operational code can be distinguished, 
in particular.  
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It is important to provide evidence for the equal relevance of operational code 
to the issues of categorization and definition in doubt, as well as, to the significa-
tion of the role of beliefs within the processes governing terrorist organizations. 
On both accounts, operational code analysis bares significant implications and 
innovative appurtenance to the formation of effective counter-terrorism strate-
gies presenting therefore theoretical, methodological and practical potential for 
the future of terrorist studies. The following overview does not aim to illustrate a 
definite anatomy of research on terrorism but rather attempts to generate obser-
vations concerning gaps and limitations of current body of knowledge on terror-
ism and precipitate new research agenda that would harness the importance of 
incorporation of decision-making processes of the terrorist organizations, and its 
potential for informing counter-terrorism efforts.  
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CHAPTER III 
MAPPING RESEARCH ON TERRORISM 
 
 
 
The present-day body of knowledge embodied within the field of terrorist 
studies has been a result of progressive and gradual accretion of data based on 
past analyses and observations. Thirty years of scholarly contribution uncovering 
the terrorist phenomena inadvertently provided for the construction of an amal-
gam of knowledge of terrorism allowing for diversity, steaming from inter-
disciplinary contributions. Two prominent academic journals Terrorism and Po-
litical Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism in the greatest extent contrib-
uted to two decades of systematic attention to the subject of terrorism within the 
discipline of International Relations. Although a diversified academic attention 
has been consistently present in past decades, “the size of academic community 
interested and committed to building a sustained body of knowledge remained 
resiliently very small” (Ranstorp, 2006: 3), pointing out the resemblances to the 
volume of literature and research in the fields taking on terrorist studies, namely 
political science, international relations, sociology, psychology and military stra-
tegic planning. Mapping terrorist research, Alex Schmidt and Berto Jongman 
 28 
(1988: 179) have identified 32 prominent academics primarily leading terrorism 
research and numerous one-time contributors to the field. In similar manner, 
Reid (1997: 97-99) observed that in three decades in history of terrorist studies 
between 1970’s-1990’s the academic research on terrorism were characterized by 
either moribund or flourishing tendencies depending on the waves of contempo-
rary terrorist activism and its respective media coverage, as well as, financial 
support for the research. 
  
The significant rebound of attention into terrorist studies, from peripheral 
considerations into forefront of policy and academic interest came swiftly with 
the events of September 11, 2001. Since the terrorist attacks on World Trade Cen-
tre in New York, the enormous body of literature encompassing highly diverse 
approaches provided for the emergence of terrorist studies as an established area 
of specification and expertise worldwide (Silke, 2007: 78-79). Terrorism studies 
were ultimately comprehensively analyzed in the traditions of diverse academic 
departments.  
 
The contemporary body of literature on terrorism presents a high diversity of 
techniques and approaches to different aspect of the terrorist phenomena in rec-
ognition of the existing problems associated with studying the terrorist phenom-
ena. However, the large dimensional academic contribution remains constrained 
within the applicability of state-centric theoretical foundations to study of terror-
ism. Plessis (2001: 134) argued that the existent international relations theories, 
 29 
more often than not, adopt state-centric approach, therefore, encounter difficulty 
in adjusting to the circumstances where diverse international actors increasingly 
face adversaries other than states. In order to identify a set of distinct observa-
tions for entirety of terrorism and make assertions about the underlying reality 
that brings about and affects it, it is necessary to undertake an extensive theory 
building in terrorism studies. Embracing the entirety of terrorism phenomena 
within an approach with a system of ideas intended to explain terrorism, espe-
cially one based on general principles independent of the explanation of terror-
ism, would constitute a concrete step forward for credible accountancy for terror-
ism within a range of description, explanation and potential forecast of wide 
range of actors.  
 
Contemporarily, the biggest challenge for terrorism as an academic phe-
nomenon steams from the intricacy of the dominant theories of international re-
lations, which failed to take full account and explanation of persistence of terror-
ism within international arena. Some scholars, such as Gray (2002), Richmond 
(2003) and Brenner (2006) attempted to adjust the aforementioned theories and 
allow for the incorporation of terrorist element into the solid theoretical composi-
tion. Their effort, however, proved to be possible only to the limited extent. Gray 
(2002) essentially refusing the notion of an unknowable violent entity illustrated 
that modern terrorism is a product of modernization stemming from the forces of 
globalization and capitalism, by indicating that terrorism represents merely a 
relic of the past rather than distinctively new phenomenon emerging within the 
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sphere of political influences and exercise of violence. Conversely to Gray (2002), 
Brenner (2006) identified that contemporary terrorism constitutes a sui generis, 
pathological form of politics exercised by the states and offered the application of 
monster-adjustment10 theory to extend the scope of realism beyond centralized 
territorial states. Brenner (2006) based his argument on the prepositions that new 
pathological forms are, like states, constrained by the structural anarchic condi-
tions, uncertain environment and aim primarily to survive. Conversely, Rich-
mond (2008) attempted to promote cross-fertilization between conflict analysis 
and terrorism studies as against the traditional perceptions of state-centric 
framework in order to encourage multi-divisional approach to the study interna-
tional relations. In summary, all of the abovementioned represented merely al-
terations to the existing theories in international relations, rather than proposing 
a new paradigm for studying terrorism within a distinct theoretical framework. 
The approach presented in this thesis aims in turn at the direction of terrorism 
research to progress towards the development of a novel theoretical framework, 
within the boundaries of operational code analysis, hypothesizing the possible 
requirements for studying diversity of actors on equal manner. 
 
Stemming from the needs for theory-building through adaptation of meth-
odological aspects, a small nucleus of scholars, the earliest of which Merkl (1986) 
and  the  latest  Silke  (2004)  concentrated  on  addressing  the  methodology  of 
                                                   
10 The central premise of monster-adjustment theory aims to re-describe an outlandish counterex-
ample in such a way that it ceases to be outlandish and thereby ceases to be a counterexample 
(Sarkar and Pfeifer, 2006: 438). 
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research. Both, theoretical adjustments and methodological directions of research 
on terrorism remain limited and constitute an inadequacy in the grounding 
foundations of terrorist studies, the foundations that within most academic dis-
ciplines are prerequisite for further research. Of equal importance for research on 
terrorism, as noted by Crenshaw (2000: 405) is the lack of internationally agreed 
definition of terrorism. As long as the consensus in defining terrorist organiza-
tion is not reached, the cohesive and cumulative theory of terrorism will not gain 
a prominent sound and universal explanatory power, leading to the solemn 
evaluation of event-driven research of individual events (Crenshaw, 2000: 405). 
The significance of reliance on the event-driven research constitutes for the defi-
cient predictive capacity of the terrorist theories, and therefore, hinder upon the 
“critical function in educating the broader public, politicians and the counter-
terrorism communities about terrorism in its broader strategic context” (Ran-
strop, 2006: 10). Within both, policy-driven and theory-driven approaches the 
academic value arises both from specific context of the terrorist incidents, but 
also from generalizations that would allow for development and maintenance of 
research continuousness allowing scientists to present new ideas and hypothe-
ses, both intra and inter-disciplinary in nature. 
 
The body of knowledge belonging to present academic efforts becomes in-
creasingly directed towards augmentation of terrorist research through incorpo-
ration of studies from outside of specialty. The research questions are formulated 
developing the premises of historical development and its effect on terrorist 
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practices, as well as, roles of political geography and application of theories of 
social construction to present innovative approach to the subject matter. It is im-
portant to move beyond merits of different approaches to reach truly innovative 
knowledge in future terrorism research. As Ranstorp (2006: 13) argued, “under-
standing the kaleidoscope of various forms of terrorism is a complex academic 
exercise and various aspects of the field are in many ways still embryonic in its 
development.” And in this context, incorporating the research approach of op-
erational code into the research inventory of terrorist studies, would redirect the 
field in its interdisciplinary essence into vitally state-of-the-art field of terrorist 
studies. However, whatever path the operational code approach directs, its suc-
cess relies strictly on the feats and fractures of past research which becomes an 
indispensable for the construction of comprehensive body of knowledge on ter-
rorism. The sections below, aim at the representation of the field of terrorism 
studies through delineation of the segregate areas of focus within the field of ter-
rorist studies, in order to present the absence of a unified theory that would em-
brace all below-mentioned categories into a coherent network for understanding 
of terrorist phenomena, through channels of research aimed at description, ex-
planation and forecast.  
 
3.1. The Anatomy of Research on Terrorism 
Terrorism studies cannot be thought about and drawn toward being a sepa-
rate academic discipline. The field of research on terrorism is segregated into dif-
ferent categories associated with different points of reference. While attempts to 
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define the motivational underlining of terrorism design the research to answer 
the question of why terrorism happens; the category encompassing behavioral 
terrorist studies attempt to understand how terrorists operate, while the counter-
terrorism studies constitute attempt to answer the question on how to prevent or 
eliminate terrorism effectively. In this section I will attempt to examine the 
aforementioned categories briefly in order to present the extent of the reach, ex-
amine a possible coherency of a theory embracing all these aspects and propose 
further implications for research within field of terrorism. 
 
The focus upon motivational, behavioral and counter-terrorism categoriza-
tion stems from the identification of the primary research questions concerning 
understanding and preventing the threat arising form terrorist actors. Recogniz-
ing that the field of terrorism incorporates variety of research embracing for ex-
ample historical perspectives (Wiktorowicz, 2006), the influences of ideological 
figures upon engagement in violent action (Zimmerman, 2004) or theories of 
strategic thinking (Hegghammer, 2006) as sub-categorical classifications remains 
essentially excluded from the descriptive attempt of this section in order to con-
strain the picture for a general delineation rather than factual representation of 
the field.  
 
3.1.1. Motivational Research 
The category of terrorist motivations, attempting to explain on why terrorism 
happens is divided to numerous sub-categories, embracing the condition that 
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give rise to terrorism or root causes, the organizational choice of terrorism and 
individual motivations. Since the motivational studies in terrorism encompass 
broad-range of sub-topics it is a generally accepted premise that the causes of ter-
rorism are complex and interrelated rather than single and decisive (Newman, 
2006: 751). The prominent scholar in the field of motivational studies concentrat-
ing on the root cause aspects of terrorism would be Bjorgo (2005), whose edited 
book, evolving out of a meeting of a number of international experts on terror-
ism, who gathered in Oslo in June 2003, delineated several root causes of terror-
ism among which there were non-democratic environment, charismatic leader-
ship and extremist ideological orientation. In a similar manner, Hippel’s (2007) 
root cause indicators for terrorism embraced poverty, religious extremism, social 
injustice and inequality and political governance of weak states among many 
others as significant in the evaluation of terrorist motivations from the perspec-
tive of structural conditions.  
 
Many other contributors to the root cause studies identified that personal de-
velopment (McCormick, 2003: 492), poverty, lack of education (Krueger and 
Maleckova, 2003; Newman, 2006), and clashes over cultural modernization 
(Mousseau, 2002) are among many interrelated factors frequently listed in con-
sideration of causal, more often than not, indirect relationship to the emergence 
of terrorism. In a similar manner to scholars studying root causes, there are 
number of academicians who attempted to evaluate the existing theories on the 
basis of their validity. Prominently, among all, the studies of Hudson (2002) and 
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Bergen and Pandey (2006: 118) argued, in partial contrary to the above theories, 
that majority of terrorist leaders had middle or upper class backgrounds and ac-
quired university degrees, thus weakening the link between terrorism and low-
class, low-education background of individuals. An important attention within 
root cause studies should be given to the rise of religious extremism and its ignit-
ing impact on terrorism (Laqueur, 2003: 25-28).  
 
In respect of the impact of religion on terrorism, the prominent study was 
conducted by Juergensmeyer (2000: xi) who identified that any religion can be 
presented in a manner that would impact terrorism given the condition that a 
believer assured of his actions and the existence of activist notions within a relig-
ious community to which one belongs. Scholars such as Lo (2005) opposed the 
notion of direct linkage between religious faith and terrorism indicating in turn 
that religion brought into the realm of politics becomes fundamentally changed 
in its underlining premises leading, thus, indirectly to the emergence of political 
violence. And it is this political aspect of terrorism that many authors identify as 
critical for the emergence of terrorism can be best understood within the context 
of organizational goals. 
 
Atkins (1992: 2) once noted that “as long any group can find reason to declare 
war on existing state of affairs, terrorism will always remain an available weap-
ons.” And this very premise becomes the underlining foundations for the evalua-
tion of how organizational goals lead to terrorism. This aspect of motivational 
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research represents terrorism as a tool and available option for successful goal 
attainment for a particular group or organization (Garrison, 2004: 260), based on 
the premise that terrorist “share a common understanding of the utility of ter-
ror.” Terrorist groups’ motivation in respect of calculable choices of available 
tools and strategies of political violence are often associated with group’s self-
identification and self-rationalization as a weak entity against the powerfulness 
of the state and with lack of resources the terrorism becomes the an attractive 
strategic option (McCormick, 2003: 475), resulting in turning their perceived 
weakness into a “political strength by pursuing an offsetting strategy of high-
profile violence.” In general manner, scholars pointing at terrorism as an avail-
able mean for achievement of political goals assume the rationality of terrorist 
collectives. 
 
In consideration of the individual motives for terrorist action, the proposed 
approaches more often than not extensively rely on the interdisciplinary research 
incorporating psychological and sociological aspects into political arena for ter-
rorist studies. The most prominent and widely-recognized name in the field of 
individual motivations is Jerrod Post (1990), who identified in detail the psycho-
logical aspect of terrorists, including elements of terrorist profiling and compara-
tive-psychology studies. Post (1990: 27-31) argued that factors such as self-image, 
personality type, psychological motivations can become significant for individu-
als to join, yet cannot be generalized as to encompass a wide-spectrum of organi-
zations with which terrorists affiliate. Other factors in individual motivations 
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were enlisted as threat to group’s identity or existence, inter-group dynamics, 
influence of group-leadership and other characteristics of group behavior (Post et 
al., 2002: 73), ‘individual identity’ (Post, 1990: 33-34) or ‘social identity’ inclusive 
of in-group based identity (Stets and Burke, 2000: 227). With unlike motivational 
dimensions of individuals, however, it is generally accepted that terrorists do not 
present different mental state to non-terrorist counterparts and thus are regarded 
in principle as ‘normal individuals.’  
 
3.1.2. Behavioral Research 
Within the study of terrorist practices academic scholars in general engage in 
studying the decision-making processes and evaluating the existing data from 
precedent attack to decode patterns in terrorist activities. Within the field of deci-
sion-making as previously mentioned some scholars regard the terrorism as a 
strategic choice undertaking research to elaborate on behavioral dimensions of 
this notion. An important observation within this category indicated that terror-
ist’s objectives and actions correspond in an indirect manner (McCormick, 2003: 
483). Elaborating on this argument, the elements of media, publicity and over-
emphasis of terrorist attacks help the terrorist cause indirectly by diverting the 
attention to the public and discrediting state actors for the achievement of de-
sired concessions. The implication of this research establishes terrorism as a 
mean rather than end-in-itself.  
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An important sub-category of behavioral research on terrorism associated 
both with the previous section on motivations and the view of terrorism as a 
‘mean’ for achievement of political action is devoted to the study of suicide ter-
rorism. Although in part the research involves considerations of motivational 
factors including the evaluations of profiles of suicide attackers (Pape, 2003), and 
psychological aspect of prestige associated with ‘martyrdom’ as identified by the 
members of terrorist organizations (Post et al., 2003: 179-180). A considerable 
amount of research has been conducted on becoming a suicide terrorist and or-
ganizational processes associated with that end (Sprinzak, 2002). From the in-
strumental research designs, incorporating organizational conditions, the re-
search on suicide terrorism often embodied the indication of increased advan-
tages of suicide terrorism to those of conventional attacks (Pape, 2003: 349), pro-
viding terrorist with increased leverage over their adversaries.   
 
In proximity to motivational studies, a number of scholars attempted to iden-
tify the relationship between individual terrorist and affiliated groups conclud-
ing that terrorist in general present loyalty to their organizations and substitute 
organizational goals for their own (Crenshaw, 1988: 19-20). Within the research 
devoted solely to behavioral considerations, the specific dimensions of research 
on terrorist behavior include organizational structure of terrorist organizations 
(Arquilla et al., 1999); terrorist financing activities (Pieth, 2002); utilization of de-
nial and deception (Jesse, 2006), terrorist education (Bergen and Pandey, 2006) or 
utilization  of  Internet  (Cronin, 2002),  as  well  as,  support  of  failed  states 
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(Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002). The researches indicated that terrorism’s organiza-
tional network structure significantly impinges upon its behavior and counter-
terrorism efforts (Arquilla et al., 1999: 81); terrorist resort to illicit organized 
crimes, such as oil and drug trades in order to obtain the majority of funding 
(Pieth, 2002: 6); terrorist operate on complex strategic and tactical levels in order 
to achieve their objectives (Jesse, 2006: 368); contemporary terrorists are often 
educated in the West (Bergen and Pandey, 2006: 123); the Internet provides facili-
tated access to information for training, recruitment and organization of attacks, 
as well as, caring out ‘cyber-terrorist attacks’ (Cronin, 2002: 46). Additionally, on 
the account of terrorist behavior, Takeyh and Gvosdev (2002) studied the success 
of terrorist utilization of the failed state environment for acquisition of self-
sufficient infrastructure. 
 
Amid research indicating future prospects for behavioral research also found 
its admirers within the discipline. Among many, the utilization of weapons of 
mass destruction has been increasingly apparent topic, with among many Para-
chini (2003), Jenkins’s (2006) and Gressing’s (2009) contribution to the notions 
and underlining principles for possible resorting to nuclear weapons by terrorist 
organizations. Additionally, Dolnik (2003) explored a link between suicide ter-
rorism and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. 
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3.1.3. Counter-Terrorism Research 
In respect of the research on counter-terrorism, the essential focus of studies 
has been directed at the prevention and elimination of the terrorist threat. Much 
of the research in relation to the elimination of the terrorist threat has been di-
rected towards the notion of disengagement of individual terrorists from the 
pursuance of organizational objective. In particular Horgan (2005) attempted to 
identify the psychological providing for the increasing incentives of individual 
members to separate from  the  course  of  terrorism.  Across  the  line  of  preven-
tion  and  elimination, Horgan (2005: 150) further argued that “physical disen-
gagement” such as capturing or killing of member of terrorist organizations 
would constitute another counter-terrorism tactic of pre-emption and eventual 
elimination of the terrorist threat.  
 
The counter-terrorism debate has become increasingly incorporated the ar-
guments identifying the negative effects of countering terrorism with the mili-
tary force of states. On that account, a vast body of literature denoting the 
asymmetric character of terrorism and consequent difficulties that state encoun-
ter with facing threats emanating from non-state actors (e.g. Bowen, 2004; 
Delpech, 2002, Gray, 2002) accounted for increasing perceptions that use of mili-
tary force could represent only but partial counter-terrorist strategy, next to po-
litical strategy aimed at successful prevention and elimination of terrorist threat 
(e.g. Cronin, 2002: 55; Mousseau, 2002: 5). The general arguments signify that ter-
rorists operate on different operational level than states presenting states with 
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impossibility of countering terrorist units in the same manner as countering mili-
tary forces of another state. An example argument presented by Hoyt (2004: 162) 
illustrated that “it is a mistake to assume that high-technology tools of conven-
tional conflict can be utilized freely and easily in opposition to the forces of trans-
national terrorism today.” Among the non-military options, the prominence of 
international infrastructure of cooperation and processes that could effectively 
cut  the  terrorist  from  considerable  finances  or  disable  them  from  utilizing 
valuable resources, such as organized crime, including narcotics trafficking to 
fund terrorist attacks (Biersteker et al., 2008). On the other aspect of counter-
terrorism, Takeyh and Gvodev (2002: 105-107) identified that while terrorist or-
ganization utilize failed states for refuge, proposing an aspect of nation building 
that would rehabilitate failed states and provide effective military and security 
assistance, which in turn would disable civilian population from entering a ter-
rorist network of global reach. The extent, however, to which the abovemen-
tioned constrains on terrorist action can eliminate or prevent terrorism is highly 
disputable and necessitates the simultaneous efforts directed at the motivational 
and behavioral dimensions of terrorism in full recognition of the complexity of 
the terrorist threat.  
 
3.2. Implications for Future Research on Terrorism  
The existing traditions within the research on terrorism present that the field 
of terrorism studies made only a limited headway in developing any kind of ro-
bust theory or interpretations relevant to the challenges posed by terrorism, by 
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providing independent accounts to the questions of terrorism related motiva-
tional, behavioral and counter-action aspects. There is, however, no apparent 
theoretical and methodological framework within the social sciences in general 
and political science and international relations in particular that would consti-
tute for a comprehensive illustration of terrorism incorporating the subcategories 
into a wider theoretical framework.  
 
The break-through into the field of terrorism studies in an effort to construct a 
general theory, however, can be identified with the action of turning to and 
adopting a distinctive approach of operational code construct as a method origi-
nating in “policy sciences.” Snyder et al. (1962: 33) noted that “if one wishes to 
probe the ‘why’ questions underlying the events, conditions and interaction pat-
terns which rest upon state action, then decision-making analysis is necessary.” 
Since the underlining premises of any research aims at better understanding of  
the  phenomena,  the institutions and academics in proximity to the world of real 
decision making, should be provided with a considerable place within the disci-
pline, for not only the underlining frameworks for examination of decision-
making processes, but also for a fruitful and reliable advise for decision-makers.  
The systematized applications of operational code analysis for construction of a 
general theory represent a step forward in the progressing towards the achieve-
ment of the grounded theoretical reality for research on terrorism embracing the 
elements of motivational and behavioral aspects of terrorist organizations in 
general, and equally constituting a value for counter-terrorism research.  
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Operational code analysis, substantially does not rely on event-driven re-
search, but rather promotes a general narration of terrorist action that would not 
only represent an educative tool for researchers and broader public and politi-
cians but also constitute a significant predictive capacity. Through delineation of 
the rules of conduct which govern the internal forces of terrorist organizations, 
and external relationships that terrorist organizations assume to provide for the 
greatest efficiency for the desired political outcome, the operational code analysis 
markedly constitutes a foundation for a sound and cumulative theory progress-
ing towards the greater research consciousness through acquirement of new 
ideas and additional hypotheses within and across the fields of academic in-
quiry. 
 
Operational code analysis significantly requires further improvement for 
achievement of true academic value, as its evolution has significantly followed 
the path of state-centrism, although its original design was viable for inclusion of 
threat-imposing non-state actors.  The following section, thus, provides an intro-
duction to operational code analysis, presents its in-depth evolution and sys-
tematization and consequently reaches back to its origins in proposition of fur-
ther progress and systematization of the operational code construct towards its 
utilization for studies on terrorism. 
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CHAPTER IV 
OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
Identified by the premises of cognitive studies a manner in which decision-
makers perceive the external world is of fundamental significance in determining 
the content of their relations with the outside world. A former United State’s 
State Department planner, Louis Halle (1960: 316) wrote that decision-makers 
address themselves not to the external world, but rather to “the image of the ex-
ternal world.” Contemporary approaches in international relations often do not 
account sufficiently for the importance of images that reflect tendencies and 
preferences for scientific methodologies. Nevertheless, despite of often non-
inclusiveness of the images in analytical frameworks, in general, scholars of in-
ternational relations accept the preposition that political behavior is shaped by 
the manner in which decision-makers perceive and interpret social and physical 
environments. The underlining logic behind operational code analysis refers di-
rectly to the portion of subjective beliefs that are likely to constitute for signifi-
cant influences on political and social behavior. In recognition of cognitive proc-
esses  and  psychological  variables,  foreign  policy  scholars  attempt  to  extract 
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individual’s beliefs and ideas in relation to the nature of politics and appropriate 
political actions. Operational code analysis constitutes a distinctive approach to 
study of political beliefs and rules of conduct constraining the rationality of deci-
sion-makers. Belonging into the category of cognitive studies, next to cognitive 
mapping,11 image theory12 and conceptual complexity analyses,13 operational 
code analysis distinguishingly appears among the theories of foreign policy as 
making a venture to understand a significant portion of decision-maker’s politi-
cal beliefs that affect the overall policy process and final decision outcomes. 
However, without a systematic methodology it is often difficult to present these 
beliefs and response repertoire with clarity in order to determine how these be-
liefs affect political behavior. As Peter Hall (1989: 4) noted, “those who seek to 
expose the bare conflicts of interests hidden behind political rhetoric or historical 
nostalgia admit that ideas play an important role in affairs of state. But that role 
is not easily described.” Extracting belief systems of individual leaders and lead-
ership groups with a well-defined and systematic method, operational code 
analysis enables analysts to identify organizing principles behind decision-
maker’s subjective beliefs and thus provides means to anticipate the decision-
maker’s response to the incoming stimuli from the environment. 
                                                   
11 Cognitive mapping, as defined by Axelrod (1976: 55) is “a specific way of representing a per-
son’s assertions about some limited domain, such as policy problem. It is designed to capture the 
structure of the person’s causal assertions and to generate the consequences that follow from this 
structure.” Cognitive mapping attempts to illustrate the network of concepts as they are in turn 
connected with each other through causal linkages. 
12 Image theory was first introduced in works of Cottam (1977). Image theory assumes that indi-
vidual behave in perpetually patterned ways. The patterned cognitive constructions in turn filter 
information for policy decision-making purposes and thus decision-maker’s images enter into 
causal relationship with his/her behaviour.  
13 Conceptual complexity analysis focuses upon structure and evaluation of a degree of complex-
ity and interconnectedness of individual’s cognition as expressed in his/her belief system. A con-
textual complexity appeared initially in the work of Driver (1977).   
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4.1. Evolution of Operational Code Analysis 
Incorporating diverse cognitive variables into empirical research on decision-
making have been characterized by sharp differences over the questions of the-
ory, scope and methodology.14 One landmark work, which differed in important 
respects from other cognitive approaches, was the two-volume study of Nathan 
Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (1951) and A Study of Bolshevism (1953), 
through which he de-coded a beliefs system of Soviet ruling elite. In its first ap-
pearance the term operational code referred to “rules which [a political actor] be-
lieve to be necessary for effective political conduct” (Leites, 1951: xi) and “con-
ception of political ‘strategy’” (Leites, 1953: 15).15 In the preface to Operational 
Code of Politburo (1951) Leites wrote that the book had two main aims: to identify 
those aspects of Bolshevik beliefs that relate to the strategy and tactics of political 
action and to single out Bolshevik attitudes toward politics as directed towards 
the external world as well as intra-Party governing relationships. Within the 
general composition of the subsequent study on operational code of Politburo, A 
Study of Bolshevism (1953), Leites attempted to relate both aims to the personali-
ties and historical experiences that shaped Bolshevik approach to politics.16  
 
                                                   
14 A comprehensive overview of existent theories of cognition in international relations literature 
was presented in Young and Schafer (1998).  
15 First and foremost is the surprising uncovering of an immense misguidance within the tradi-
tion of operational code analysis concerning Merton’s theoretical framework. Despite the exten-
sive reference to Merton’s (1940, 1952) works within many of studies on operational code (Walker 
and Murphy, 1981: 24; Walker 1983: 200; Walker, 1990:403; Young and Schafer, 1998: 69; 
Crichlow, 1998: 688; Cairo, 2004: 240), I have found that Merton have not used the concept of op-
erational code in any of the cited works.  
16 In contrast to the Operational Code of Politburo (1951), Leites in A Study of Bolshevism (1953) en-
riched his inquiry into operational code beliefs through exploration of psychoanalytic and psy-
chocultural sources of Soviet actions.  
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The two-volume work of Leites (1951, 1953) composed of list of maxims, thus, 
emerged as the initial paradigm composed of the general rules of Bolshevik con-
duct focusing upon “world-view” and “response repertoire” shared among role 
incumbents of a political organization (Walker, 1990: 403). Importantly Leites’ 
(1951, 1953) both works embraced interdisciplinary complexity of analysis, with 
the amalgam of political, organizational and psychological realms that approach 
study of decision-making elites. The particular employment of psychoanalysis 
accounts for complexity of its design of Leites’ (1953) researches, where Leites’ 
(1953) focused on deliberate delineation of preconscious and conscious content of 
Bolshevik doctrine in his construction of an account for the origins of Bolshevik 
character (George, 1969: 194; Walker, 1990: 404) as it was manifested in personali-
ties of Lenin and Stalin (Walker, 1990: 404). The prominence and sophistication of 
Leites’ (1951, 1953) approach, however, was widely limited by the lack of struc-
turing and synthesis of Bolsheviks’ believes about politics and rules of conduct 
associated with the concept of operational code. As George (1969: 196) observed, 
Leites (1951, 1953) “did not clarify sufficiently the order, hierarchy, and interrela-
tionships among the various elements of the code,” which in turn hindered upon 
reader’s identification of its structure and research mode. 
 
Sixteen years later Leites’ (1951, 1953) works were re-visited and distilled by 
Alexander George (1969) into series of questions to guide subsequent inventories 
of the operational code for assessment of actors posing international threats. 
George’s (1969: 193)  revision  was  grounded  in  his  observation  that  “while 
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complexity of the [Leites’] work adds to its richness and intellectual appeal, it has 
also made it unusually difficult for readers to grasp its structure or to describe its 
research mode.” To fully understand the concept of operational code George 
(1969: 197) identified the term as “a political leader’s beliefs about the nature of 
politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical 
development can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and tactics.”17 At-
tempting for greater parsimony of Leites’ (1951, 1953) construct, George (1969) 
brought the operational code analysis into separate being that existed along the 
lines of “ten different ‘beliefs’ formulated as questions, the answers to which, he 
argued, essentially captured the operational code of Bolsheviks”(Young and 
Schafer, 1998: 70). The ten-beliefs construct of George (1969) composed of five 
‘philosophical’ questions and five ‘instrumental’ pertained beliefs about political 
actors, nature of political universe and beliefs concerning planning and strategies 
for effective action respectively. According to George (1969: 201-216), a decision 
maker’s operational code analysis consists of his answers to the following ques-
tions: 
 
Philosophical beliefs: 
P-1.  What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe 
essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of 
one’s political opponents? 
                                                   
17 George (1969) pointed out the fact that beliefs embraced within the operational code of a politi-
cal actor embrace only a significant portion of actor’s set of beliefs about political life. Particular 
attention should be, thus, given to the beliefs referring to the classical problem of political action. 
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P-2.  What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental 
political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessi-
mistic on this score? And in what respect the one and/or the other? 
 
P-3.   Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? 
 
P-4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical devel-
opment? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired 
direction? 
 
P-5.  What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical develop-
ment? 
 
Instrumental beliefs: 
I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political ac-
tion? 
 
I-2. How are the goals of actions pursued most effectively? 
 
I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? 
 
I-4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interest? 
 
I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s inter-
ests?18 
 
                                                   
18 George (1979: 97) in his further defence differentiated the belief system of operational code 
from political attitudes held by the actor.  Operational code beliefs have gained the status of “cen-
tral beliefs” rather than object and context-specific.  As noted by George (1979: 100), the individ-
ual beliefs of the operational code are “bound together by some form of constraint or functional 
interdependence” thus aggregate to form a unabridged “belief system.” 
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Based on the structure of ‘ten-belief system’, George (1969) simply drew a 
parallel between Leites’ (1951, 1953) studies and ‘answers’ to the abovemen-
tioned questions. In evaluation of other political leaders and leadership groups, 
the philosophical questions aim at the anticipation of actor’s diagnosis of a situa-
tion, while the instrumental questions aim at the anticipation of actor’s percep-
tions on appropriate responses. To extend the underlining premises behind the 
concept George (1969: 191) further noted that “these beliefs… provide norms, 
standards and guidelines that influence the actor’s choice of strategy and tactics, 
his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action.” Importantly, how-
ever, the rules embraced by the operational code cannot be regarded as prescrip-
tive, as the definitions may imply, but rather should be seen as a guide to politi-
cal decision-making. The belief system embodied within the operational code 
does not unilaterally determine the actions of political-actors, nevertheless, re-
mains an important, but not the only, variable that shape decision-making proc-
esses. 
 
George (1969) himself represented the operational code as a revision of Leites’  
(1951, 1953) construct: experimental, exploratory, and preliminary in his purpose 
to chart a course for others to follow. Thus, in excerpting the operational code 
portion from the works of Leites (1951, 1953), George (1969) acknowledged that 
he was excluding some of its politically less relevant features. The major contri-
bution of George’s (1969) study was to elucidate operational code analysis 
through  making  it  primarily  cognitive  in  conceptualization  and  exclude  the 
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psychoanalytic aspect of its features by focusing on the maxims of political strat-
egy solely as the beliefs implicitly or explicitly held by the political actor. Opera-
tional code construct has thus become representative of “an attempt to isolate the 
most politically relevant aspects of individual’s cognitive map and conceptualize 
them so that they become a set of general beliefs about political life”(Walker, 
1990: 130). This was intended to make political actor’s beliefs and perceptions 
more susceptible to investigation and analysis through methods available to po-
litical scientists. 
 
In a study published ten years later, George (1979) further elaborated upon 
his operational code construct, and differentiated the beliefs in the operational 
code from political attitudes. In George’s (1979) understanding the political atti-
tudes are contextual in nature and inclusive of object-specific considerations, 
while operational code extracts general beliefs embraced within a belief system 
structure in which “individual beliefs are bound together by some form of con-
straint or functional interdependence” (George, 1979: 100). In consequence, both 
Leites’ and George’s analytical studies have addressed “important theoretical 
and real-world questions which were anomalies within the rational actor para-
digm’s traditional theoretical context” (Walker, 1990: 407). Both, Leites’ (1951, 
1953) qualitative content analysis and George’s (1969, 1979) re-defined belief-
inventory constitutes undoubtedly a solidified foundation for the gradual devel-
opment of operational code analysis as a research focus for the assessment of 
cognition in international relations. 
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The operational code analysis have experienced the most extensive augmen-
tation in mid-1970, with Leites-George paradigm guiding a series of comparable 
case studies of American decision-makers that eventually generated a typology 
of operational codes (Holsti, 1970; McLellan, 1971; Hosti, 1976, 1977; Johnson, 
1977; Walker, 1977; Stuart and Starr, 1981; Starr, 1984; Walker and Falkowski, 
1984; Walker, 1995; Walker, Young and Schafer, 1998). In respect of theoretical 
developments, Loch Johnson’s (1977) study of Senator Franck Church introduced 
new aspects for the considerations within operational code analysis. The most 
important of the insight of Johnson (1977) was the suggestion that the beliefs in 
operational code were arranged along a continuum making the answers to phi-
losophical and instrumental questions applicable to interval-level scales, thus fa-
cilitate comparison among political actors (Young and Schafer, 1998: 70). In this 
respect, the initiation of quantitative approach to study of operational code was 
grounded within the theoretical considerations of Johnson (1977). The second 
important theoretical contribution of Johnson (1977: 89) accounted for the change 
and degree of change in operational codes stemming from changes in environ-
mental aspects creating psychological impact and pressure circumstances. The 
accountancy of change in the operational code inspired significant comparison 
studies of changing operational codes, one of which was conducted by Stephen 
Walker (1998), in which he identified changes in Jimmy Carter’s belief systems 
throughout his time in the office.   
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In terms of methodological arsenal, the history of operational code analysis 
presents significant evolutionary patterns. Leites’ (1951, 1953) methodological 
techniques followed subjective and interpretive reviews of the writing of Bolshe-
vik’s two most important leaders, Lenin and Stalin. Most subsequent studies of 
operational codes were conducted in a similar way, using qualitative content 
analysis guided by George’s (1969) five philosophical and five instrumental 
questions. In addition to the above, some scholars (McLellan, 1971; Johnson, 
1977) in addition to the information acquired from official publications, authors 
acquired data from private communications and from interviews with the stud-
ied leaders and their colleagues. As Young and Schafer (1998: 71) noted, “in sev-
eral cases, researchers (e.g. Johnson, 1977; Walker 1977; Stuart and Starr, 1981) 
were interested in materials produced prior to the leader taking office and have 
examined honors theses, interviewed parents and classmates, and explored per-
sonal papers form this period.” In all studies of operational codes, however, 
George’s (1969) ten-belief framework served as the organizing manual and guide 
for the identification of the evidence. The high-costs, time-longevity, question-
able reliability and virtually impossible comparison of existing researches stem-
ming from the methodological foundations soon transformed the operational 
code analysis into a different methodological sphere. 
 
In respect of methodological developments, operational code analysis signifi-
cantly developed with Ole Holsti’s (1977) quantitative construct for study of op-
erational codes. The primary reason for the implementation of quantitative 
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methodology was to provide future operational code analyses with reliability of 
research which up to this point was limited by the generally difficult to replicate 
and compare methodological foundations. Basing his construct on George’s 
(1969) philosophical and instrumental questions, Holsti (1977) constructed a cod-
ing manual in order to apply a three-step strategy to formulate six political belief 
systems for operational code analysis. The six-type typology of Holsti (1977) 
categorizing the beliefs into six categories derived from the juncture of two mas-
ter beliefs concerning fundamental nature of political universe and fundamental 
sources of conflict (Hosti, 1977: 156-157) was designed as a scheme for specifica-
tion of George’s (1969) construct.  
 
The basic point of reference in analysis in Holsti’s (1977) typology was “indi-
vidual behavior constrained by the decision maker’s belief system” (Walker, 
1990: 409). Holsti (1977) adopted the key philosophical and instrumental ques-
tions from George (1969) and complemented his construct with significant in-
sights. Primarily, Holsti (1977) identified a pattern of cognitive consistency, from 
which are derived two general propositions, namely that beliefs reinforce one 
another and that under specified conditions beliefs influence final decision-
making by constraining a range of alternative choices. It is an important devel-
opment to identify linkage between philosophical and instrumental beliefs and 
perceive them in a coherent manner rather than as separate sets of beliefs. In or-
der to prove his initial observations, Holsti (1977) analyzed quantitatively com-
pared number of existing qualitatively constructed operational codes in order to 
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test his typology. Due to a lack of extensive quantitative data, Holsti’s (1977) 
analysis attempted for indirect-validation of the new operational code typology, 
resulting in coherent operational code design, however, embodying some ambi-
guities and overlapping beliefs (Stuart, 1979; Walker, 1983). The deficiencies of 
Holsti’s (1977) construct, however, were soon corrected by Stephen Walker 
(1983) whose works significantly solidified foundational aspects of research for 
subsequent operational code researches of quantitative nature.  
 
The availability of qualitative and quantitative methodologies for studying of 
operational code facilitate in the greatest extent comparison studies that attempt 
to explore links between political action and beliefs. As quantitative approaches 
identify reliable patterns of behavior, the qualitative methods, however, can also 
reflect not less important idiosyncrasies of the beliefs, lost within the scientific 
and number-based structures. 
 
Understanding in essence the anatomy and evolution of the operational code 
analysis, the following section consequently progresses towards delineation of 
limitations of the construct, its original underpinnings and proposed solutions, 
that already apparent in the initial operational code construct represent a signifi-
cant establishments for further inquiry into utilization of the approach for studies 
on non-state terrorist actors. 
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4.2. Utilization of Operational Code Analysis for Terrorist Organizations 
The contemporary operational code analysis emerged markedly different in 
its theoretical and methodological design than originally intended by Leites 
(1951, 1953). Initially, Leites’ (1951, 1953) references to “the Bolsheviks,” “the 
Party” and “the Politburo” indicated that he attempted to analyze and decode a 
social group, a collective body of individuals sharing common perceptions and 
beliefs. Leites (1951, 1953) attempted to uncover operational rules of Bolshevik 
conduct through finding evidences of the perceptions on governing relations of 
the Party towards outside world, as well as, within the Party itself. George’s 
(1969) attempt to reuse the operational code analysis as a residual methodology 
from its traditional status at the outset displays a significant inconsistency, which 
should be brought to the notice of the researchers. George’s (1969) definition of 
the operational code, despite its prominence, presents a significant flaw of corre-
spondence to Leites’ (1951, 1953) works and his definition. George (1969: 197) 
stated that  
Political leader’s beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, 
his views regarding the extent to which historical development can be 
shaped, and his notion of correct strategy and tactics – whether these be-
liefs are referred to as “operational code,” “Weltanschauung,” “cognitive 
map,” or an elite’s “political culture” – are among the factors influencing 
that actor’s decisions. 
 
The recognition of the quality of George’s (1969) work should be given to the 
unprecedented conceptualization of operational code, yet it should be noted sig-
nificantly that the definition of the concept refers to individual decision-makers, 
rather than a collective body. Thus George (1969) restructured Leites’ (1951, 1953) 
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operational code from signifying rules and patterns within a group and shared 
perceptions on the outside world of individuals within that group to considera-
tion of individual operational codes without the connection to the group dynam-
ics.  In this respect, George’s (1969) conceptual framework has largely failed to 
take up Leites’ (1951, 1953) original design by relegating the level of analysis to 
individual rather than sub-group or organizational. In spite of the fact that in The 
“Operational Code:” A Neglected Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making 
(1969) George had not explicitly intended to relegate operational code into indi-
vidual level of analysis, in his consequent work on operational code The Casual 
Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: “The Operational 
Code” Belief System (1979) he unequivocally pronounced his intended level of 
analysis through association of operational code belief system with cognitive 
schemata of individuals.19 As the question of the units of analysis is critical for 
most areas of cognitive science, the fundamental critique addressed in this study 
embraces a question of whether aggregated forms of cognition can account for a 
mere reflection and articulation of collective-level of analysis as presented by 
George (1969, 1979).  
 
The fundamental observation upon which further analysis will be conducted 
is the fact that because lone individual rarely controls all decision-making activi-
ties  even  in  an  organization  with  high  level  of  centralization  of  authority  it 
                                                   
19 George (1979: 97) observed that “of the various characteristic of cognitive structure that have 
been employed as basic unit of analysis, I regard schemata as particularly appropriate and impor-
tant in studying the role of cognitive variables in the decision-making behaviour of political lead-
ers.” 
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is assumed that decision-making rests (at a minimum level) with small coalition 
of individual decision-makers (Mintzberg, 1979). In this context, what’s neces-
sary in terms of thinking about decision-makers and their orientation to action, is 
to consider them as participants in a system of action” (Snyder et al. 1962: 86). This 
means that rules among and actions of decision-makers constitute some form of 
efficient and orderly approach to activities. This system refers to a set of ordering 
device that prescribes principles, procedures and relationships that contribute to 
the continuation of activities. Snyder et al. (1962: 87) identified this type of sys-
tem as an organization. Ocasio (1997: in Ocasio: 2001: 42) offers a more elaborated 
definition of an organization stating that it comprises a “social system of collec-
tive action that structures and regulates the actions and cognitions of organiza-
tional participants through its rules, resources and social relations.”20 The as-
sumption here is that both collective action and cognition in any organization are 
subjected to regulatory mechanism, and thus a mere understanding of organiza-
tion as a monolithic actor would be insufficient in this regard. While the observa-
tion that membership in organization is represented by distinct organizational 
identity, organizations continuously face a challenge of consolidating divergent 
identities into a coherent one. Approximating the organization as a unitary actor 
                                                   
20 In evaluation of decision-making within organizational context it is important to set up the 
boundaries of organizational realm.  One of the most important methodological assumptions is 
that only those within organizational setting are to be viewed as potential decision-makers.  This 
is important to note in respect of the organizational environment where the private public or 
masses – regardless of how powerful – cannot be regarded as participants in organizational deci-
sion-making unless – even on temporary basis – assume a position within an organization. Sny-
der et al. (1962: 99) identified an important observation on this account: “It appears to us more 
difficult to isolate the decision-making process (or system or unit) and to relate officials and non-
officials when there is no way of assigning recognized roles to all actors.” 
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proves often to be difficult if not impossible, as its social composition exists by 
virtue of the individuals whose relationships span organizational boundaries. 
Lindblom (1982: 125) observed that: 
Even if we imagined an individual with the knowledge-storing capacity 
and the information processing capacity of a large organization, the deci-
sions which the individual would make would be different to the ones an 
organization would make even with the same inputs and the same initial 
definition of the problem 
 
On this account, to the extent that aggregation of individuals emerges as a piv-
otal feature of any organization, the analyst should abandon the notion of an or-
ganization as a unitary actor with a well-defined and unambiguous preference 
ordering. As this understanding treats both individual and the organization as 
legitimate levels of analysis, the issue of aggregation form the individual to the 
organizational level becomes a concern when the organization is perceived as a 
unitary political actor.  
 
George (1969) certain that he have exposed an engine that drives cognition of in-
dividual leaders forward, never seems to ask whether, next to philosophical and 
instrumental, there is another category of beliefs to be incorporated into opera-
tional code paradigm. Confident that he has identified a direction in which op-
erational code analysis is proceeding – assessment of individual leaders - George 
(1969) does not tell us explicitly how he have identified and how he arrived at 
what the ultimate destination actually is. It appears that, George’s (1969) interest 
in operational code analysis in evaluation of individual leadership has grown 
largely out of George’s (1969) adaptation of Brim et al. (1962) paradigm within 
 60 
which the authors depict personality variables related to decision-making proc-
esses. George’s (1969) work parallels – and in terms of theoretical potential holds 
up considerably better than – Brim et al. (1962) differentiation among epistemo-
logical and instrumental beliefs – at least in respect of particularly significant por-
tion of political actor’s entire set of beliefs about political life. Brim et al (1962: 49) 
brings epistemological and instrumental under variable of decision-maker’s per-
sonality.21 This is to denote that while borrowing a paradigm from Brim et al 
(1962), George (1969) inherited the level of analysis as well.  
 
As stated previously, Leites’ (1951, 1953) concept of operational code has his-
torically been collective in its level of analysis. Notwithstanding the fact that it 
appears as Leites (1951, 1953) portrayed Politburo as unitary, purposive actor, his 
underlining conclusion was that Politburo’s behavior was not in line with the 
course of ideal rationality that would be chosen by a unitary rational actor.  
Leites (1951: xi) relegated the concept of unity to represent a shared belief system 
guiding  Bolshevik  reasoning,  by  inviting  the  reader  to  think  about  the 
“governing relations within the Party as well as with the outside world.”22 While 
the  external  influences  represented  merely  an  impact  of  the  image  of  the 
outside  world  on  decision-making,  the  internal  relations  provided  a  mean  
                                                   
21 Brim et al. (1962: 54) identifies epistemological and instrumental beliefs as explanatory variable 
for personality characteristics, in addition to abilities and motives. The similarity of Brim et al 
(1962) and George’s (1969) models of beliefs is substantial. For Brim et al (1962: 54) epistemologi-
cal beliefs are those concerned with the characteristics of nature, while instrumental with the rela-
tionship of means and ends.  
22 Although Leites (1951: xi) specifies that the first study “deals mainly with the relation between 
the Party and the outside world rather than with the Party’s internal relations” the following 
paragraph denotes that a subsequent study will address the inside-rules governing the relations 
of the Party.  
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of acknowledgment of the shared nature of beliefs bearing an effect on the proc-
ess of policy formulation.  
 
The aim of this thesis is however, not to demean George’s attempt. After all, 
he had the courage to venture clear methodology-based approach to operational 
code. In fact, George (1969) recognized that Leites (1951, 1953) operational code 
analysis referred to the “perceptions or maxims of political tactics and strategy 
that characterized the classical Bolshevik approach to politics” (George, 1969: 
193), emphasizing the group level of analysis, he continues to emphasize an in-
dividual approach to study with an implication that “this I shall attempt to do 
here [establish framework for finding answers about actor’s political beliefs and 
relation of knowledge to action] in order to facilitate similar studies of other lead-
ers and other leadership groups” (George, 1969: 199). Taking upon Leites’ (1951, 
1953) seemingly references to Politburo as a unitary rational actor, George’s 
(1969) conceptualized the applicability of operational code analysis equally to 
individuals and decision-making collectives.  
 
Interchanging units of analysis becomes a convincing reason to believe that 
George’s (1969) reformulation is not useful as, let alone analytically superior to 
Leites’ (1951, 1953) model, in relation to its utilization for non-state actors. The 
existent reliance on George’s (1969) conceptualization does not provide a solid 
resolution to the problems in question and more recent theory-based frameworks 
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in the operational code literature have also not addressed this problem directly.23  
It is unfortunate that George’s (1969) successors have focused overwhelmingly 
on this model all but ignoring the underlying logic behind Leites’ (1951, 1953) 
approach to study of conceptions of political strategy held by the political orga-
nization (their operational code). 
 
Despite sharp differences over the questions of theory, scope, and methodol-
ogy for disparate levels of analysis, both models and subsequent operational 
code studies have been primarily state-centric. This aspect is closely related to 
the problem of the level of analysis, since George’s (1969) model significantly 
omits how operational code analysts deal with the problem of implicit assump-
tion that states are bureaucratic (Snyder et al., 1962; Allison, 1971; Frazmand, 
2009).24 The obedience of state institutions to strict bureaucratic structures relies 
on the lack of structural capabilities necessary for rigid management of units and 
the social, political and economic paradigms that account for emergence and 
maintenance  of  bureaucracy  as  the  most  efficient  organizational  system  for 
                                                   
23 The existent operational code studies have primarily focused upon the development of 
George’s belief-set paradigm and improvement of methodological soundness of operational code. 
The first theoretical change is found in Loch Jonson’s (1977) study of Senator Frank Church 
where the authors attempted to arrange the operational code questions along a continuum in or-
der to facilitate the application of interval-level or ordinal scales to the data. The second and third 
theoretical changes found in operational code research addressed the problem of change in op-
erational codes (Johnson, 1977) and topical and target-specific, rather than general nature of the 
beliefs system (Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998). 
24 The bureaucratic structure of state institutions is axiomatic (Farazmand,2009). This collection of 
essays in a descriptive and exploratory manner identifies durability and dependability of state 
institution on bureaucratic structures and focus on the multifunctional role of bureaucracies in 
socio-economic, political, cultural and ideological spheres of public relations. Additionally, Alli-
son’s (1971) Organizational Process Model of Decision-Making substantially addresses the notion 
and mechanisms of how existing governmental bureaucracy limits decision-making processes of 
the state. 
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governmental institutions throughout centuries. Across the spectrum of non-
state terrorist organizations, the structural defining of organization presents an 
increased adaptability and re-formatting of organizational structure aimed at 
changing the components of inner functioning that maintain or improve the link-
ages with other components. Non-state terrorist actors are essentially unbound 
by the necessity for rigid and stable organizational management, presenting a 
spectrum of organizational structures deviating in various degrees from bureau-
cratic structure. Although, the ideal types of both bureaucracy and networks are 
often the creations of theoretical speculations, non-state terrorist organizations 
present essentially increased capabilities to approach higher degree of de-
bureaucratization than states.25 
 
For greater utilization of operational code analysis for studying of non-state 
terrorist organizations Leites’ (1951, 1953) motivating intuition that beliefs about 
organizational dynamics are important should be vindicated. To the recognition 
of the researchers should come the fact that beliefs about organizational charac-
teristics are strongly grounded in the political actor’s attention to the strategic 
implications other than those beliefs which George’s (1969) model focuses. In or-
der to account for the existent inconsistencies within the operational code ap-
proach, in respect of its utilization to study of non-state terrorist organizations, 
an  incorporation  of  beliefs  about  organizational  structure  is  proposed  to  be 
                                                   
25 A comprehensive discussion on non-bureaucratic organizational structures within terrorist or-
ganization was provided by Arquilla et al. (1999) and Arquilla et al. (2001). The authors recognize 
that what distinguishes the new generation of conflict is the networked organizational structure 
of its practitioners- characterized by the element of leaderlessness and quickness of mobilization.  
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suggestive in this regard. Beliefs about organizational structure would not only 
constitute a sound account that differentiates the individual from collective level 
of analysis, but through delineation of the indispensable rules of organizational 
structuring account for the differences in the conceptions among state and non-
state terrorist actors, whose structural discrepancies are axiomatic. Organizations 
obtain their characters from within the structure through coordination of the ac-
tivities of its incumbents, and it is this character that is to be addressed within the 
premises of the operational code analysis. The intention, however, is not to dis-
cuss the organizational structure, as it exists, but to discover structurally defined 
rules which political actors believe to be necessary for effective political conduct. 
This is to divert the analysts attention to the perceptions through which decision-
makers attempt to bypass the existent constrains within which they operate.  
 
Through the cognitive recognition of internal mechanisms for decision-
making and means of their improvement for effective action, the decision-makers 
initiate the process of adjustment and fitness of organizational activities within 
the environment. What should be brought to the attention of the reader in this 
statement is the differentiation between the initial and desired state that comprises 
the relationship between decision-making and organizational structure. While 
the initial state encompasses the current context in which decision-maker is lo-
cated, namely, current structure and other contextual factors, the desired state 
defines the outcome preferences (MacCrimmon and Taylor, 1976). The notion 
addressed in this study is the process decision-makers employ, specifically the 
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cognitive orientation of the decision-makers through which they attempt to move 
from the initial to the desired stage.  On this account Bobbitt and Ford (1980: 17) 
argue that “because the perception or awareness of a discrepancy between an ini-
tial and desired state is necessary before a decision-maker will act, factors that 
influence such perceptions are important.” This is to identify the direction of the 
research, by pertaining the theme of this thesis to the cognitive orientation of the 
decision-makers, that denotes the “systems of organization of information, ob-
servation and though in the process of individual and group problem-solving” 
(Solo, 1967: 361). Bobbit and Ford (1980: 17) identified the relation of cognition to 
the conceptions of organizational structure as representative of decision-maker’s 
information-processing capabilities and modes of decision-making. This consti-
tutes a direct linkage to operational code analysis which is encompasses beliefs of 
a kind that “influence decision-making indirectly by influencing the information-
processing tasks that precede and accompany the decision-maker’s choice of ac-
tion” (George, 1979: 101). The annotation may be made in here concerning the 
analysis of decision-makers’ perceptions on the relationships and rules govern-
ing organizational behavior, accounting for the interaction of decision-makers’ 
perceptions with their competencies as they stem from the organizational struc-
ture.  
 
 4.2.1. Operational Code and Beliefs About Organizational Structure 
According to March and Simon (1958: 170) organizational structure consists 
“simply of those aspects of the pattern of behavior in the organization that are 
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relatively stable and change only slowly.” Organizational structure reflects orga-
nization’s formal composition of tasks and reporting relationships that allow an 
organization to coordinate, control and motivate its members for the purpose of 
common objective (George, 2005: 505).26 Each organization presents a unique 
structured outline that facilitates reaping of the advantages of the external envi-
ronment and minimizes the disadvantages of managing the lines of time, culture 
and geography to survive.27 The choice for beliefs about organizational structure 
as a selected variable to be incorporated into operational code construct stems 
primarily from the reciprocal relationship between organizational structure and 
strategic decision-making processes (Bower, 1970; Mintzberg, 1979; Duncan and 
Weiss, 1979).   
 
4.2.1.1. Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Code Analysis 
Central to the studies of decision-making, and thus development of opera-
tional codes is the notion of the decision. Mintzberg et al. (1976: 246) defines deci-
sion as “a specific commitment to action” in the context of decision process defined 
as “a set of action and dynamic factors that begins with the identification of a 
stimulus for action and ends with the specific commitment to action.” Snyder et 
al (1962: 90) provides more comprehensive definition of decision-making process by 
                                                   
26 In literature on organizational theory the general agreement prevails that organizational struc-
ture can be identified through three dimensions: centralization, formalization and complexity.  
The elements of organizational structure are addressed in detail in Chapter V: Typology of Orga-
nizational Structures. 
27 Facing various crises of growth and survival of the organization the leadership scans the envi-
ronment and examines solutions for coping with organization’s external problems and its inter-
nal predispositions for creating of a workable set of relationship rules. This, according to strategic 
fit theory, is to ensure organization’s fitness or congruence with the environmental and internal 
contingencies facing the organization (Andrews, 1971; Hofer and Schendel, 1978). 
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diverting analyst’s attention to the fact that it embraces “a selection from a so-
cially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects of one pro-
ject intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the 
decision-maker.” Within organizational realm, deciding upon important deci-
sions and linking them to strategies is known in organizational studies as strate-
gic decision-making and in foreign policy decision-making studies as policy-making.  
 
The use of term strategic aims to focus the researcher on the plan of organiza-
tional action designed to achieve an overall aim, often called the mission or a 
formal goal of the organization (Daft, 2004: 59). In contrast, describing specific 
actions as tactics, diverts the attention of the researcher on the action that is care-
fully planned to achieve a specific end. Differentiating among the content of 
strategies and tactics can be problematic in a sense that the two are closely re-
lated and exist on the continuum. Strategies generally embrace the planning as-
pects that orchestrate and/or inspire sets of action (tactics) in a response to a 
given problem (Paquette, 2002: 9). Mintzberg (1978: 935) importantly conceptual-
izes strategy as a pattern in a stream of decisions, which aims to identify the consis-
tency behind decision-maker’s preferences over time. This description allows for 
the general differentiation among strategic and tactical realms of decision-
making based on the notion of change. Strategies describe more or less constant 
sequence of activities aimed at the planning stage of action, while tactics are con-
tinuously subjected to changes that would adjust organizational activities in re-
spect of the fulfillment of the general goals. 
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Since, the concept of operational code, as intended by Leites (1951, 1953), 
aims to embrace the conceptions of political strategy, thus, signifying that it is the 
strategic element of organizational decision-making that is at the centre of theo-
retical considerations. Despite the fact that George’s understanding of Leites’s 
works leads him to conclude that operational code belief embrace precepts of po-
litical tactics and strategy (1969: 191, 193, 197, 199),28 the implicit assumption both 
for Leites (1951, 1953), as well as, George (1969) appears to present the notion of 
strategy in less strict sense than understood by the scholarly definitions. Leites 
(1951: xi) explicitly addressed the notion of the political strategy in a manner that 
prescribes an efficient approach to political action. This implicit conceptualiza-
tion suggests that the rules of tactical nature within operational code are merely 
complementary to strategies. To provide an example, in the introductory chapter 
to his work Leites (1953: xiii) observes that 
The Politburo has, until now, maintained an attitude of extreme reserve 
and deceptiveness toward the outside world. The poker fact, the exuber-
ant cordiality of the nth vodka-toast, and the storm of indignation from 
the U.N. rostrum are all designed to conceal the real Soviet aim from the 
enemy.  
 
In this particular example, taking a reserve and deceptive stance towards oppo-
nents becomes a tactic in the general plan to conceal the activities of the Polit-
buro. However, looking at the actual rules of conduct in Leites’ (1951: 7) opera-
tional code construct for the Politburo, the strategic frame becomes much ex-
plicit: 
                                                   
28 In the only instance that George (1969: 216) explicitly refers to tactics, observing that “the tactic 
of rudeness was believed to be not overly risky, because in Bolshevik thought, a ‘serious’ power-
ful opponent is expected not to allow himself to become emotionally around by such tactics.” 
 69 
The Party, which must have “a political approach to everything,” must 
also assume that every aspect of itself and of its environment can be “util-
ized” for the enhancement of its power unless there is conclusive evidence 
to the contrary. 
 
 
In this rule, the belief concerning means and ends that Leites (1951) identified, is 
presented as a general rule applicable to variety of situation, much like the pat-
tern in the stream of decisions (Mintzberg, 1979: 935). Due to the fact, that rules 
within the operational code construct of Leites (1951, 1953) bears resemblance to 
other rules within the model, the primary focus can be identified, therefore, as 
addressing strategic implications of the beliefs upon decision-making processes 
of the examined political actor. 
 
4.1.1.1a Strategic Decision-Making in Non-State Terrorist Organizations 
The strategic frame has been widely adapted to the study of non-state terror-
ist decision-making. McCormick (2003: 418) stated that “[non-state] terrorism… 
is an instrumental activity designed to achieve or help achieve a specified set of 
long-run and short-run objectives.” This indicates a strategic orientation of non-
state terrorist organizations not merely in the consideration that decision to em-
ploy terrorism is based on the anticipated consequences of actions; rather the 
strategic decision-making in non-state terrorist organization gains significance in 
the consideration of the fact that it is “’preference-based,’ in the same sense that 
alternative courses of action are evaluated in terms of their respective impact on 
terrorist objectives” (McCormick, 2003: 418). Disassembled to its essentials, in the 
strategic view, the decision-making in non-state terrorist organizations embraces 
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considerations of availability of alternative courses of action, their expected con-
sequences, the influence of these consequence upon the formal organizational 
objectives and decision rules, that will be employed to decide among the alterna-
tives. The employment of strategic frame for decision-making in non-state terror-
ist organizations would contribute to the comprehensive analysis of organiza-
tion’s likely course of action through defining its objectives and operating con-
strains, and then identifying which course of action is most likely to be chosen by 
the non-state terrorist organization in order to efficiently conduct a political ac-
tion with reference to expected political returns.  
 
4.2.1.2. Structure Follows Strategy and Strategy Follows Structure 
 Having identified that operational code analysis is directed primarily to ad-
dress the  conceptions  of  strategic  decision-making  process  within  organiza-
tion,  it  is important to address in detail the relationship of organizational struc-
ture to strategic decision-making as it could be in turn be evaluated through op-
erational code methodology. Central to this evaluation becomes the enduring as-
sumption, widely shared within the strategy formulation literature that the ap-
propriateness of organization’s strategy “can be defined in terms of its fit, match 
or congruence with the environmental or organizational contingencies facing 
[it]” (Zajac et al. 2000: 429). Facing various crises of growth and survival of the 
organization, the decision-makers scan the environment and examine solutions 
for coping with organization’s external problems and its internal predispositions 
for creating a workable set of relationship rules. This assumption is commonly 
 71 
known as the strategic fitness (Andrews, 1971; Hofer and Schendel, 1978) and it 
assumes that organization formulates its strategies to support and accomplish its 
overall objectives and for that purpose it aligns its organizational structure with 
the environmental and internal junctures accordingly.  
  
 Studies of the relationship between strategy and structure have identified two 
primary observations depending on which body of empirical evidence the schol-
ars advance their arguments.  The two arguments, without loosing their validat-
ing assumptions argue either that strategy follows structure (Chandler, 1962) or 
that structure follows strategy (Bower, 1970). Both prepositions are important in 
respect of what they imply about decision-making processes in organizations. 
The first preposition can be summarized in the statement by Hall and Saias 
(1980: 153), which assumes that 
With the inside/out approach they [strategists] admit that strategic 
choices are directly determined by the condition of the structure, and with 
the outside/in approach that they are influenced by the structural ele-
ments of the diagnosis. 
 
On that account, Bower (1970) identified strategy making as a multilayered proc-
ess, where managers manipulate the structural context within which the pro-
posal generation takes shape.   
 
The second preposition constitutes a classical model of the dynamic relation-
ship between strategy and structure and is grounded in the observation of 
Chandler (1962) that internal structure of the organization must fit with the 
adopted strategy. Chandler (1962), however, did not perceive structure-strategy 
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alignment in simplistic manner, but identified that it is a dynamic and evolution-
ary relationship. Chandler (1962) observed that changes in organizational struc-
ture did not follow automatically from changes in the strategies, but rather are 
initiated through organizational crises. Importantly, the implication of this model 
assumes that “the recognition of opportunities [of structural content] takes place 
in the mind of managers and is often independent of changes in the external en-
vironment” (Burgelman, 1963: 62), that is the structural change reflects endeav-
ors to reinforce the results of strategic behavior arrived independently of it. 
 
For the purpose of operational code analysis it is important to recognize the 
dynamism of reciprocal relationship between strategy and structure, regardless 
of the direction of that relationship. The questions can be asked concerning the 
fact that if structure is to shape strategy, then what shapes the structure and vice 
versa. The operational code analysis does not address the notion of strategy for-
mation or formulation per se, rather it attempts to address the conceptions of po-
litical strategy. For that reason viewing whether the strategy originates in the 
structure (strategy follows structure), or is maintained through it (structure fol-
lows strategy) becomes significant for operational code analysis in the fact that 
the structure poses significant implications for conceptions of strategy.  
  
While the organizational theory cannot solely take upon the task of account-
ing how perceptions come into play in the consideration of decision-making 
processes,  the  operational  code  analysis  enhanced  by  it  does,  and  it  is  by 
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assessing the performance of the comprehensive paradigm that the researchers 
can ultimately judge the value of operational code for non-state terrorist actors. 
Adding a structural dimension to the operational code analysis yields significant 
analytical gains that permit general causal inferences, improve predictions and 
provide cogent explanations of terrorist motivations and behavior. The following 
chapter attempts to bring the reader closer to the concept of organizational struc-
ture and identify the typology of organizational structures in a manner consis-
tent with the argument that non-state terrorist organizations are essentially di-
verse in structural constitutions than state institutions.  
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CHAPTER V 
TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
 
 
 
Modern society is accompanied by the creation of more and more complex 
organizations, with different structures and governing processes. The organiza-
tional functioning encompasses variety of modes of application and degree of 
institutionalization of the rules governing organization behavior constituting for 
a high differentiation among organizational structures and processes. The orga-
nizational structure allows organizations to allocate responsibilities for different 
function and processes to different entities in a coordinated manner in order to 
efficiently attain organization’s goals. Thus organizational structure represents 
somewhat a system, whether formal or informal, that coordinates the accom-
plishment of organizational goals.  
 
Prominently, Max Weber’s as the founder of classic organizational theory 
catalogued organizational structures in reference to economic and business-
oriented entities. With the gradual expansion of the field, the subsequent organi-
zational  theories  began  to  emerge  and  the  attention  began  to  shift  to  fields 
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beyond economics and started to attract the attention of scholars from fields of 
social  sciences,  such  as  sociology  and  politics.  The  growing  classification  of 
organizational forms allowed variety of disciplines to understand mechanisms 
and underline principal dimensions of organizational structures and processes. 
 
The reliance upon organizational structure in an attempt to extract the con-
ceptions of political strategy of non-state terrorist organization necessitates iden-
tification of structural dimensions as these bear in turn on strategic decision-
making. In his early study, Child (1972) identified centralization, specialization, 
standardization, formalization and vertical span of control as dimensions of or-
ganizational structure. In his latter study, Child (1974) narrowed structural di-
mensionality by suggesting that the agreement exists among scholars identifying 
complexity, decentralization and formalization as core elements of organiza-
tional structure. A number of scholars for example Van de Ven (1976) and Ford 
and Slocum (1977) supported the restricted conceptualization of organizational 
structure, which began to embrace elements of complexity, formalization, cen-
tralization and administrative intensity. The subsequent study of Dalton et al. 
(1980) further designated the conception of organizational structure into narrow 
conceptual framework through categorization of structural dimensions embracing 
organizational/subunit size, span of control, flat/tall hierarchy, administrative 
intensity and structuring dimensions as represented by specialization, formaliza-
tion and centralization.  
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In general, following the precedent of the abovementioned studies and sup-
plemented with a number of consequent theoretical and empirical studies on or-
ganizational structure (Gerwin, 1981; Walton, 1981; Fry, 1982; Fry and Slocum, 
1984; Friedrickson, 1986) it can be identified that the conceptualization of cen-
tralization, formalization and complexity as dimensions of organizational struc-
ture has received more attention than others in their profound impact upon deci-
sion-making.  
 
An additional dimension of organizational structure is note of addressing, 
namely the aspect of communication and information within organization. This 
approach differs specifically from the traditional conceptualizations of organiza-
tional structure as it adds the information dimension as a criterion for judgment 
of organization’s internal composition. In fact the choice of the control of infor-
mation as the first question of the query provides for its significance as a master 
structural belief.29 Availability of specific modes of communication and informa-
tion channels presents a capability to determine, in large part, the way in which 
decision-making functions and/or is distributed throughout the organization for 
effective achievement of desired objectives (Simon, 1976). This question attempts 
to address the notion of increased value of information as a result of the informa-
tion revolution. Arquilla and Ronfeld (1999) observe that information “matters 
more than ever for reasons that did not exist even 20 years ago.” For the purpose 
of this thesis the elements of the organizational structure are: 
                                                   
29 Master or dominant belief exercises a subtle influence on other beliefs in the operational code of 
political actor (George’s, 1969, 1979). 
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I. Centralization. Centralization refers to the degree to which the right 
to make decisions and evaluate organizational activity is dispersed 
(Fry and Slocum, 1984: 255). Centralization embraces hierarchy of 
authority30 and the degree of participation in the decision-making 
process (Fry and Slocum, 1984: 255).  
 
II. Formalization. Formalization describes a degree of job codification 
and specification of work procedures as well as observation of these 
rules by organizational members (Hage and Aiken, 1969). Through 
formalization, organizations specify how, when and by whom organi-
zational tasks are performed (Hall, 1977). Formalization comprises ex-
istence of written rules and procedures as well as mechanisms to 
eforce the compliance with these rules and procedures (Fry and Slo-
cum, 1984). 
 
III. Complexity. Complexity refers to the condition of being composed of 
many interrelated parts (Friedrickson, 1983). Van der Ven (1976) re-
corded that complexity depends upon variances in dimensions such as 
standard deviations on unit specialization, standardization, discretion 
and  professionalism  across  departments.31  Hall (1977)  simplified 
                                                   
30 Although historically Weber (1947) included hierarchy of authority as a separate dimension 
and various researchers perceive it as such, the reciprocal relationship between centralization and 
hierarchy of authority is combined in this study, as differentiation would not bear significant im-
plications for this research. 
31 Van der Ven (1976) noted that simple organization will exhibit homogenous scores on these 
structural characteristics, thus a highly differentiated organization need not be complex. 
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Van de Ven’s model by directing analyst’s attention to horizon-
tal/vertical differentiation32 and spatial dispersion as potential sources 
of complexity. 
 
IV. Communication and Information. As Redfield (1958: 7) stated, “mod-
ern organizations are in large part built upon and held together by 
communications.” This is to denote, first and foremost, the organiza-
tional dependence upon the “existence on shared, similarly perceived 
experiences, making for the possibility of the existence of understand-
ing among the members” (Snyder et al., 1962: 126). This premise indi-
cates that through communications the existing organizational system 
may be maintained, altered, supplemented or destroyed. Thus the 
structure would encompass “the specific character of the actor’s com-
municative activities, that is, the information communicated, the 
meaning attached to it, the channels chosen or, just as tellingly, not 
chosen” (Snyder et al. 1962: 126).  
 
The dimension-specific approach is often used in organizational studies to 
denote specific types of organizations.  The practical and theoretical aim of this 
thesis is, in this manner, to define the pattern of correlation between these vari-
ables. Labelling organizations as bureaucratic, or non-bureaucratic; would pro-
vide for intended effect of differentiation among organizational structures of 
                                                   
32 Horrizontal/vertical differentiation and specialization are often used interchangeably in the 
literature (Grinyer and Yasai-Ardekani,1980). 
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state and non-state actors..33  This study in its specification attempts acknowledge 
the typographical conceptualization and further uncover the specific effect indi-
vidual perceptions of organizational structure that affect the process of organiza-
tion’s strategic decision-making. 
 
The following section attempts to bring closer a review of organizational 
structures as recognized and accepted across the multiple fields of study and 
thus provide a grounding argument reflecting the broad agreement concerning 
the bureaucratic structural nature of state institutions and deviations from bu-
reaucratic form of governance in organizational structures of violent non-state 
actors.  
 
5.1. Bureaucratic Organization 
The foundation for modern organizational design and modern management 
practices rely strictly upon the recognition of the need for organized behavior, 
orderly arranged relationships and efficiency and predictability of coordinated 
action that would enable high productivity and increase prosperity (Daft, 2004: 
25). These administrative necessities in particular contributed to the development 
of bureaucracies as the most prominent organizational structures. Theoretically, 
the design of bureaucracy relies upon the conceptualized organizational model 
                                                   
33 This is to denote the differences between structures of the state institutions and more structur-
ally ambiguous non-state actors.  Allowing for the clear cut labels of non-state actors as bureau-
cratic  or non-bureaucratic would defeat the purpose to uncover the fundamental reasons being 
their decision-making. For most of the organizations the separate elements of the operational 
code structural content would display tendencies to be more bureaucratic or non-bureaucratic as 
all of the elements are mutually reinforcing each other. This approach is to address the deviation 
from the ideal type of the organization in search for better understanding of a political actor. 
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of Max Weber (1947)34 who’s formulative theory provided for the delineation of 
the primary, ideal-type dimensions of bureaucracy. In reality, bureaucracies exist 
across multiple of dimensions, presenting comparatively greater of lesser degree 
of faithfulness to the Weberian ideal-type.  
 
Weber measured the extent of bureaucratization through organization’s dis-
play of characteristics such as division of labor, hierarchy of authority, hiring and 
promotion based on technical competency, fixed salaries, promotion granted ac-
cording to seniority and/or achievement, impersonal treatment of workers and 
extensive written rules governing performance of duties and behavior at work. 
The prominence of Weber’s theoretical elaboration on bureaucratic model re-
sulted in the fact that students and scholars of organization have used the bu-
reaucratic model as “the basis for conceptualizing the system of interrelation-
ships in organizations” (Hall, 1963:32).  
 
The emergence of bureaucratic structures relied essentially upon the stability 
of external environment that enabled organizations to maintain their search for 
efficiency and order. While for the most of twentieth century the environment 
was perceived as “orderly and predictable and the role of managers was to main-
tain stability,” the Industrial Age enabled essentially the prioritization of organi-
zational  growth  and  efficiency (Daft, 2004: 27).  In  consequence,  organizations 
                                                   
34 The prominence of Weber’s analysis on bureaucracy, as a theoretical founder and advocate of 
bureaucratic structure, can be seen in the works of founders of bureaucratic theory (Friedrich, 
1949; Merton 1949, Heady, 1959; Dimock, 1959), who relied on Weber’s bureaucratic dimensions 
for their selective contributions to the theory of bureaucracy. 
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became large and complex becoming essentially vertical, hierarchical and bu-
reaucratic.  
 
  Bureaucratic organizations emerging from the environmental necessities and 
predispositions of surfacing technologies of Industrial Age aimed essentially at 
the premises of interchangeability, that “shifted control of the factory away fro 
the craftsmen on the production floor and into management” (McAllister, 2004: 
300). The emergent organizational structure, the bureaucratic pyramid, provided 
for the re-structured and institutionalized industrial affairs aimed at the coordi-
nation of organizational activities for greater efficiently of production, allocation 
of resources and distribution of products across the society. The contextual as-
pect of organization’s size became the primary determinant for the emergence of 
organizational ability to control large-scale activities and personnel through rules 
and standardization that provided for greater organizational efficiency. Stable 
and ordered functioning of immense-sized organizations became achieved 
through stratification of relationships within an organization, subjecting the low 
strata to the orders and supervision of the individuals situated at the higher and 
narrower positions within the bureaucratic pyramid. Bureaucratic model of or-
ganization included distinguishable cultural embodiments observable in the  
autocratic  leadership  styles  with clear-cut divisions among the managers, who 
engaged in decision-making processes, and workers, who did the manual labor 
was apparent. The contextual preconditions of bureaucratic structures became 
associated essentially with control, order and stability of the contextual elements 
 82 
of industrial age organizations. Figure 1, presented below, represents the hierar-
chical structure of the organization and its stratification that provided for impor-
tant underlining challenges that bureaucracy encountered in the changes into an 
information-based environment. 
 
Figure 1. Pyramidal organizational structure of bureaucracy 
 
The essential structural predisposition of bureaucracies is represented in the 
representative channels for information flow and communication mechanisms. 
With the technological advancements of industrial era that predisposed the ad-
vancement in machinery facilitating the production, bureaucracies remained es-
sentially focused upon the organizational efficiency, and essentially adapted sys-
tem for information channeling  enabling  the  essential  focus  upon  organiza-
tional  adaptability  with machines and  factories rather than information as 
value-basis for organizations (Daft, 2004: 8). Within the pyramidal structure es-
sentially  the  information  flows  are  integrated  vertically,  both  in  respect  of 
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top-bottom as well as bottom-up informational transition. Classically illustrated 
bureaucratic systems of informational flows present particularly the flow of deci-
sions from the top echelons onto the bottom strata, with socially specializing in-
dividuals revolving around the notion of hierarchy and monocratism, character-
ized by the system of “superior and role-relationships in which the superior is 
the only source of legitimate influence upon the subordinate” (Thomson, 1961: 
19). Yet, the significance of the bureaucratic structure in the age of information 
revolution lays essentially in the transition, filtering and management of infor-
mation originating in the lower levels with the destination at the highest level of 
decision-making.  McAllister (2004: 300-301) essentially underlined the assump-
tions behind bureaucratic structuring of organizations while stating that informa-
tion traveling vertically to the decision-making units and subsequently descend-
ing to the appropriate department is essentially subjected to the filtering mecha-
nisms somewhere along the chain of command, therefore, proves essentially inef-
ficient in managing intensive information flows.   
 
5.1.1.Bureaucracy and The State 
 Although informational revolution contributed significantly into an evolution 
of non-bureaucratic organizational structures within the business environment, 
the bureaucratic forms of organization remains the oldest and prominent institu-
tion of government and administration in history (Farazmand, 2009: 1). As 
Farazmand (2009: xv) observed, “despite all innovations and alternative organi-
zational system, nothing has replaced bureaucracy as the ‘core’ of government 
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and large scale corporate governance systems.’” The reason for governmental 
organization to adopt and maintain bureaucratic organizational structures lies on 
the priorities stemming from the “dominant value patterns in the society [which] 
favor high centralization in governments” (Hage, 1965: 306). In this manner it is 
essential to reach back into the theory and emergence of a concept of the modern 
state. 
 
 The importance of bureaucratic structure for the apparatus of modern state is 
presented significantly within the idea of sovereign state. As in the pre-modern 
Europe35 the political authority was shared among variety of actors, including 
secular and religious institutions and individuals such as kings, nobility, papacy, 
bishops, agrarian landlords etc. the modern state “aimed at replacing these over-
lapping and often contentious jurisdictions through the institutions of a central-
ized state” (Axtmann, 2004: 260). Gaining a legitimate status, through application 
of the theory of sovereignty, the modern state’s government claimed supremacy 
over other authorities and resources of a territory it controlled. The very estab-
lishment of a legal, rightful exercise of a narrow command over a broad popula-
tion indicates the pyramidal structure of governance inherent in the concept of a 
state. Axtmann (2004: 260) additionally argued that “modern territorial state 
came into existence as a differentiated ensemble of governmental institutions, 
offices, and personnel that claims the executive power of authoritative political 
                                                   
35 Historically the idea of sovereign states described in this thesis as modern states came to domi-
nate political through after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, ending a Thirty Year’s War in 
Europe. 
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rule-making for a population within a continuous territory that has a clear, inter-
nationally recognized boundary.” The modern state apparatus have gained an 
authority to govern and achieve economic, political and social objectives of the 
society. And since societies consider certain social ends as more important than 
other, which give rise to different means for maximization of desired ends, the 
bureaucratic government appears to provide the efficient tool for management of 
complex politics (Barkey and Parikh, 1991: 526). As Eisenstadt (2004: 631) noted, 
bureaucratic efficiency is best maintained in the organizational functions aiming 
at the “organization of adequate services and co-ordination of large-scale activi-
ties, in the implementation of different goals, in the provision of resources of dif-
ferent groups and in the regulation of various inter-group relations and con-
flicts.” In this respect, the governmental provision of such services, maintenance 
of political elite’s strategic power over complex societal forces, control of re-
sources and provision of political and administrative services through reliance 
on bureaucratic structure provide the example for governmental bureaucratic 
reality. The persistence of bureaucracy in governmental structure is essentially 
subjected to the “maintenance, continuity and enhancement of both capitalist 
and socialist systems: an instrumental arm of public governance and administra-
tion in both its civilian and its military-security forms” (Farazmand, 2009: xv). 
  
While management of state affairs acquires efficiency from bureaucratic 
structures, the non-state actors do not present necessary pre-conditions of bu-
reaucratic management for maintenance of organizational being. Stressing the 
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representation of information as essentially of existential value to many of non-
state actors, equally to those oriented economically or politically (McAllister, 
2004: 301) proves the significance of emergent non-bureaucratic structures not 
only in terms of the increased comparative advantage through efficient informa-
tion flow, but also the appearances of non-bureaucratic structures in conflict. The 
following section constitutes an analysis of non-bureaucratic organizational 
structures and their subsequent contribution to threat constituency within the 
paradigm of conflict.  
 
5.2. Non-Bureaucratic Organizations 
 The notion of an organizational structure qualitatively different from tradi-
tional bureaucratic designs in not recent. In 1961, Burns and Stalker identified 
organic structures of organizations as “a network structure of control, authority 
and communication with lateral rather than vertical direction of communication” 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961 as cited in Arquilla et al. 1999: 48). Since then, the non-
bureaucratic organizations have increased their appearance, both in terms of 
methodological challenges and theoretical trajectories. Generally accepted pri-
macy of bureaucratic model became increasingly questioned with the increasing 
organizational changes in 1980’s responding to the new requirements for adapta-
tion and innovation of organizations stemming from the advent of information 
revolution (Travica, 1999:2). The world external to the operations of organization 
became more complex with increasing globalization of corporate capitalism and 
cultures,  as well  as,  more  complex  and  rapid  governance  structures  that   
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essentially encountered difficulties in multi-task and increased information flow 
management representing a reality for organizational change and innovation in 
order to meet the increasing challenges.  
 
In an era of information, the increased value of information impinged signifi-
cantly upon the perceptions of efficiencies of bureaucratic structures in dealing 
with increased amount and flows of information (Arguilla and Ronfeldt, 1999: 
ix).  Bureaucratic organizational structures became overloaded, with “succeeding 
levels further and further removed from the source of information” (McAllister, 
2004: 301). Therefore, in circumstances, where the filtering of increased amounts 
of information increasingly isolated the distribution of information across py-
ramidal strata of bureaucracies, the eventual quality of decision-making became 
affected, necessitating a shift in fundamental structural paradigm in order to sus-
tain the most efficient organizational functioning. With the advent of information 
revolution, the emergent dynamic environments did not allow organizations to 
remain within the controllable paradigm of bureaucratic organizations and ne-
cessitated in turn “flexible information systems to ensure the organization’s abil-
ity to adapt to ever-changing information flows” (McAllister, 2004: 300). The tra-
ditionally organized bureaucratic organizations, and newly emergent organiza-
tional entities began to transform into flat structures supportive of interconnec-
tivity and increased information flow, eventually forming new organizational 
forms essentially deviating from the underlining premises of bureaucracy. 
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 Non-bureaucratic organizations are extensively “characterized by informal 
social and work relationships, including minimal division of labor, de-
hierarchization and … general rules that permit flexible social control and self-
regulation” (Travica, 1999: 2). It has been generally accepted that non-
bureaucratic organizations fall within one of the following categories: the organic 
organization (Burns and Stalker, 1961), adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1979) or network 
organization (Morgan, 1993). And as much as bureaucratic structures deviate 
from the ideal-type structures, the non-bureaucracies can equally be placed on 
the continuum of dimensions. Despite different degrees of applicability to the 
abovementioned categories are applicable to different organization, the common 
premise differentiating them from bureaucracy establish non-democracies fun-
damentally within a post-bureaucratic organizational structures. 
 
5.2.1 Organic Organization 
The organic organization has a longest history within the typology of new 
forms of organization, constituting the first theoretical typological model within 
spectrum of organizations analogous to network structures. Initially defined in 
Management of Innovation (Burns and Stalker, 1961) the structural design of the 
organic structure reflects the “decision-making capacity to cope with changing 
conditions and indeterminateness” (Butler, 1991: 77), congealing the high degrees 
of adaptation and response to the external change and environmental uncertain-
ties as the primary characteristic of the organic organization. Organic structures 
are  “appropriate  in  unstable,  turbulent,  unpredictable  environments  and  for 
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non-routine tasks and technologies. For organizations coping with such uncer-
tainty, fining appropriate, effective and timely response to environmental chal-
lenges is of critical importance” (Hofler, 2006). The organic organization through 
adjustment and refinement of individual tasks, places emphasis primarily on the 
problem-solving processes within an organization constituting for reality in 
which encouraged employees interactively contribute to the decision-making 
processes through mechanisms for empowerment and initiative (Vernon, 2002: 
149). In this manner, “the basic notion of regulating relations among people by 
separating them into specific predefined functions is abandoned… where people 
enter into relations that are determined by problems rather than by the struc-
ture” (Verzuh, 2003: 38). This representative “commitment to tasks” rather than 
“loyalty to organization” (Hage, 1965: 305) represent the new reality of organiza-
tional design to the functional realities established by bureaucratic management. 
 
Burns and Stalker (1961, 121-122) delineated the primary characteristics of or-
ganic organization as composed of  
• network structure of control with authority and communication 
shifted to ad hoc locations; 
• mechanisms for allocation of task-required knowledge 
• mechanisms for adjustment of continual re-definition of individual 
tasks 
• communication in format of information and advice rather than in-
structions and decisions 
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• mechanisms for encouragement of responsibility for decision-making 
throughout the organization rather than transformation of responsibil-
ity upwards, downwards or sideways 
• commitment to “technological ethos,”36 rather than reliance solely on 
obedience for achievement of desired ends 
 
The abovementioned delineation of characteristics of organic organization do 
not aim to represent additional variables into the organizational theory but 
rather identify the  differentiation  mechanisms  for  the  ideal  types  of  the  or-
ganizations  in  a contrasting manner. Most bureaucratic and organic organiza-
tions will be between the two extremes. Despite sharp differences between or-
ganic and bureaucratic organizations, the organic structures are not structurally 
revolutionized from hierarchy, formalized rules, regulations, processes and pro-
cedures of bureaucracies (Hofler, 2006), making them not adaptable to absolute 
decentralization.   
 
5.2.2. Adhocracy 
Another non-bureaucratic organizational model is adhocracy, a theoretical 
design popularized by Toffler (1970) and advanced by Mintzerg (1979). Adhoc-
racies, like organic organizations are easily adaptable to unstable environmental 
condition  (Morgan, 2006: 50);  yet  unlike  organic  structures  are  designed  
                                                   
36 “Technological ethos” a term coined by Jeanne Randolph (1991). Randolph describes “techno-
logical ethos” as an ideology that promotes values aimed at achieving a concrete end rather than 
the process for achievement. In “technological ethos” realm a “problem to be solved” is shared or 
dispersed amongst a collective for objectifying effect. 
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primarily “on the fly according to needs/purposes as they occur” (Travica, 
1999:6), for temporary existential purposes. Adhocracies essentially are orga-
nized in project form, which “involve requirements regarding flexibility and 
learning on the basis of existing specialized knowledge and methodological 
know-how about project works” (Alversson, 1995: 99). For that reason, as ob-
served by Morgan (2006: 50), “the adhocracy usually involves a project teams 
that come together to perform a task and disappear when the task is over, with 
members regrouping in other teams devoted to other projects,” illustrating the 
primary design of adhocracies to enhance the degree and capability of problem-
solving and innovation development processes and innovation development 
processes. Mintzberg’s (1979) described dimensions of adhocracy as, among all: 
• low formalization of behavior;  
• low standardization of procedures;  
• horizontal job specification; 
• roles not clearly defined;  
• selective decentralization;  
• organization of work resting on specialized teams, and; 
• emphasis on democratic culture and non-bureaucratic values.  
 
Minzberg’s and McHugh (1985: 161) further elaboration on adhocracies led to 
the identification of further characteristics of adhocratic forms of organizational 
design, such as increased operationalism in dynamic and complex environments; 
production of complex, unique products by temporary multifunctional teams of 
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highly trained experts; organizational coordination based on mutual adjustment 
and stimulated by informal structural parameters deviating from direct control 
and standardization mechanisms, hierarchy and formalized aspects that stimu-
late the organizational activities. In this manner, adhocracies rely strictly on in-
dependent and self-regulatory participative management, essentially with moti-
vation “derived from system needs, task-related factors and peer pressure rather 
than from supervision” (Marriner-Tomey, 2004: 287). On this account, Jaeger and 
Kanungo (1990: 141) identify adhocracy as a “flexible organizational form where 
coordination is based on mutual adjustment as opposed to the bureaucracy 
where coordination is accomplished through rules and regulations.” Adhocracies 
are, therefore, adaptive models of project-organizations, based on flexibility of 
design and knowledge-intensive configuration recognizing realities and meeting 
them in an individual manner.  
 
 5.2.3 Networked Organization 
 Within recent years, a new form of non-bureaucratic organizational structure 
emerged, namely networked organization. Although organic organizations and 
adhocracies are based on the principles of networked alignment of organiza-
tional units, nevertheless, they are more specific and characterized by grounding 
principles, while network organizations encompass wider spectrum of organiza-
tions, to which the central principles of organic organization or adhocracy do not 
apply, but which are arranged on the logic of networks, nodes and interconnect-
edness (e.g. Reich, 1991; Quinn, 1992). Networked organizations appear in three 
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distinct levels of reference, namely as inter-organizational, intra-organizational 
and hybrid of intra-and inter-organizational forms.    
 
5.2.3.1. Inter-Organizational Networks 
In traditional design the functions of organization such as production or mar-
keting belonged to one organization, while inter-organizational network presup-
poses that the same functions are preformed by various organizations. The con-
cept originated with the in-depth analysis of Aldrich and Whetten (1981) who 
represented economic relationship in three-dimensions, organization sets, action 
sets and networks, in an attempt to facilitate research on complex entities. Ald-
rich and Whetten (1981) argued that action-sets and networks, unlike organiza-
tion-sets, which constitute a body of organizations with direct links, represent a 
group of interacting organization connected by a certain type of relationship. 
Aldrich and Whetten (1981: 386) note that as much as organization-sets form 
“neither a corporate body nor a coordinating association and thus by definition 
cannot act in ways that organizations or action-sets can” (Aldrich and Whetten, 
1981: 386) the action-sets, which are formed temporarily and their permanent 
equivalent, the networks, an alliance of organizations are modeled on the rela-
tionships governing intra-organizational functioning.  
 
The extension of the view that inter-organizational networks are more than a 
sum of individual links that comprise it was further advanced by Miles and 
Snow (1986) with the concept of ‘dynamic network,’ as referent to the proprieties 
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of the organizational structure with each network component (individual firm) 
being complementary rather than competing with each other in the market 
sphere. As Miles and Snow (1986: 65) noted, this “complementarity permits the 
creation of elaborate network designed to handle complex situations… which 
cannot be accomplished by a single organization.” According to this model, each 
individual firm’s perceived benefits of participation in the network stem from its 
distinctive competence and is “not only enhanced by participation in the net-
work, [but] it is held in check by its fellow network members” (Miles and Snow, 
1986: 65). The dynamics of inter-organizational network, therefore, encourage 
each participant, individually or collectively, to perform proficiently and main-
tain its responsibilities for the network as an organizational entity. The organiza-
tions as units within the model of “dynamic network” are connected with “bro-
kers” at the centre that operate the functioning of the business network. 
 
Similarly, Powell’s (2003) contribution to the inter-organizational network 
theory attempted to identify the distinctive nature of networks as a separate form 
from those of hierarchical-bureaucratic governance structures and market trans-
actions. Powell (2003: 316) identified that hierarchies represent the emphasis on 
the relationships and previous interactions upon which new transactions are 
modeled with preservation of respective hierarchical position of a corporation 
within the economy. Similarly, in markets transactions are reflected in the com-
petitiveness among actors approaching market relationship in an untrustworthy 
manner. However, network structure of inter-organizational relations, placing an 
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emphasis on interdependence among actors, perceptions of one’s position in re-
lation to other’s and establishment of “mutual orientation-knowledge which the 
parties assume each has about the other and upon which they draw in communi-
cation and problem solving” (Powell, 2003: 318). The network structure, there-
fore, represents a structure of collaborative and concordant relationship among 
organization, with emphasis on trust, reliability of information, knowledge and 
skills acquisition realizing that each party of the network is independent on the 
resources by another unit, and the ability to gain from the accumulation of the 
resources. Particularly, the element of trust becomes the distinguishable cohesive 
tissue of inter-organizational networks (Powell, 1987: 82). Approaching the sub-
ject of networks from the perspective of its distinctiveness from markets and hi-
erarchies, Antonelli (1989) analyzed restructuring of Italian industries in terms of 
development of marketing networks competing against each other. In Antonelli’s 
(1989) analysis the importance of Information technology made its appearance as 
both enabling and sustaining element for the longevity of a network. In addition, 
within Child’s (1987) typology of organizational structures, the inter-
organizational networks are particularly subjected to the reliance on information 
technology in formalization of information procedures and exchange. In conclu-
sion, the inter-organizational networks are particularly reliant on the information 
network and formation of attitudes of trust representing cohesive forces binding 
different corporations into an extensive inter-organizational network. 
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 5.2.3.2 Inter-Organizational Networks 
 
 The intra-organizational model represents rather recent development in re-
spect of organizational theory and practice. The characteristics of internally net-
worked organization are generally more reflective and anticipatory of changes in 
environment than entities with inter-organization network formations. Within 
the inter-organizational networks, two hierarchically structured organizations 
enter into network relationship with each other, affecting partially their proc-
esses and functions, however, with intra-organizational structures, the internal 
changes provide for the reality of change in which “cultures that involve and 
support these structures and power design based on principles other than the hi-
erarchy-legitimized seniority” (Travica, 1999: 11). This internal transformation 
represents the changes that through redesign of organizational functioning and 
design go beyond organizational boundaries (Venkatraman, 1991). 
  
 The intra-organizational network structures gained their theoretical under-
pinnings with the works of Rockart and Short (1991) who identified the informa-
tion technology as the primary cohesive force in the construction of informal 
human networks. Rockart and Short (1991: 255) stated that “IT is seen as a design 
factor in organizational change and innovation, and not just as an enabler of 
more effective, organizational functioning once a given design has been put into 
place,” constituting a force of inter-relationships rather than formal organiza-
tional  design  representing  a  formation  of  distinct  organizational  culture. 
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Rockart and Short (1991: 256) listed the underpinning of the cultural dimensions 
of the networks as: 
• Shared goals as a necessary condition for organization of activities; 
• Share knowledge expertise an underlining force for effectiveness; 
• Shared work as a mean for incorporation of groups outside of local 
structure; 
• Shared decision-making as a mean for introduction of expertise from 
across the organizational spectrum; 
• Shared timing and issue prioritization as a mean for enhancing the ac-
tion steps, particularly in response to critical issues;  
• Shared responsibility, accountability and trust as elements further 
strengthening the intra-organizational cohesion; and 
• Shared recognition and reward as implicit in the effective functioning 
of networks. 
 
 In the equal manner to the examination of Powell (1989, 2003) where trust be-
came a critical condition for sustainability of inter-organizational networks, 
Rockart and Short (1991: 257) argued, that “the use of network cannot be truly 
effective until a certain level of trust is established in the organizations.” The 
authors significantly note that the issue of trust within network establishments is 
particularly difficult due to the fact that as trust regularly emerges from face-to-
face interactions, the network organizations necessitate trust-formation processes 
through mediated communication facilitated by means provided by information 
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technologies. In this manner, the information technology gains a particular status 
for network organization as tool for integration of information, communication 
and organizational processes across functional and geographic lines constituting 
for the emergence of flat, flexible and responsive organizational network struc-
tures.  
 
 Among other conceptualizations of the networked intra-organizational struc-
tures within literature, Bush and Frohman (1992) explored the communication 
forces within network organizations. As networked organization’s composition 
of the team differentiates from the traditional hierarchical-bureaucratic organiza-
tions, as designed to meet global needs of the organization, the individuals and 
managers within new structures are assigned to the roles of “integrators of in-
formation not only from other members of the team but from others both inside 
and outside the organization” (Bush and Frohman, 1992: 26). The authors, iden-
tify the need for additional mechanisms that would enhance the speed of the in-
formation transferred within the complex network environment, are developed 
in order for quick collection and distribution of information through the trans-
formation of responsibilities from function to innovation teams and means of in-
formation technology enabling the necessary enhancement for information dis-
tribution and management. 
 
 Similarly, Quinn (1992: 120) provided for a concept of networked organiza-
tions, coining the term “spider’s web organizations” due to their “lightness yet 
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completeness of its interconnection structure.” Quinn (1992: 120) identified the 
characteristic of network organizations as essentially lacking or with only mini-
mal formal authority of “order-giving” of hierarchies, with individual units op-
erate essentially independently   and   presenting   intensive   information   and   
knowledge   sharing   or  responsibility mechanisms. Quinn’s empirical study 
was sampled on Arthur Andersen & Company’s network design. Yet again, the 
study pinpointed the role of information technology as an indispensable enabler 
of a network organization, principle of decentralization and real-time informa-
tion modes.  
 
 5.2.3.3 Hybrid Networked Organizations 
 
 Morgan (1989, 1993) introduced a concept of loosely-coupled network, within 
the typology of organizational models investigate within his study. Within the 
examination of loosely-coupled networks Morgan (1989, 1997) merged the inter 
and intra network forms as subsequent organizational design resulting from or-
ganizational evolution. At first a small core of individuals “sets a strategic direc-
tion and provides the operational support necessary to sustain the network, but 
it contracts other individuals and organizations to perform key operational ac-
tivities” (Morgan, 1989: 67), resulting in the initial operationalization of an ideas 
and central goals of the group. With the central group providing strategic direc-
tions, regulating resource flows, the network resembles the ‘dynamic network’ of 
Miles and Snow (1986). However, as the organizational evolution continues, 
Morgan (1997: 74) suggested that the central group directing the activities of the 
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network’s functioning,; he illustrated the networked organizational structure re-
sembling a “spider plant” or “umbilical cords,” with central part being an entre-
preneurial team and of shoots representing subcontractors. Within the network 
organization the individual elements of the ‘spider network’ are integrated 
through information technology that enables for linked information systems, dis-
tribution of resources and responsibilities across the network, and significantly 
bounding separate individuals with shared vision and values through provision 
of information and intelligence throughout the system. Morgan (1997) signifi-
cantly addressed the issues of decentralized and self-organization nature of the 
described network organization arguing that network organizations are cannot 
be “regarded as having clear-cut goals and objectives that would endure over 
time” (Morgan, 1997: 8) and that could be managed through bureaucratic gov-
ernance since the information technology significantly transforms the organiza-
tional reality into a form that “transcends traditional barriers of space and time, 
continually creating and re-creating themselves through changing networks of 
interconnection based on “real-time” communication” (Morgan, 1997: 8). In this 
manner, Morgan introduced an evolutionary form of organization subjected to 
steadily changes, with essentially decentralized and flat structure and subjected 
to the forces of information technology as enabling and sustaining the self-
organization mechanisms of this structure. 
 
In a similar, manner, the evolutionary character of network organizations are 
defined was noted by Alstyne (1997: 86) 
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Structurally, a network organization combines co-specialized, possibly in-
tangible, assets under shared control… procedurally, a network organiza-
tion constrains participating agents’ actions via their roles and positions 
within the organization while allowing agents’ influence to emerge or 
fade with the development or dissolution of ties to others. As decision-
making members, agents intervene and extend their influence through as-
sociation they alter the resource landscape for themselves, their networks 
and their competitors and in the process can change the structure of the 
network itself. 
 
 In addition to the above, Baker’s (1992) study contributed to the theoretical 
underlining of the network structure as evolutionary that present an intrinsic 
ability to “repeatedly  redesign  itself  to  accommodate  new  tasks,  unique  
problems,  and changing environments [that] enables such organization, to es-
cape the plight of forms such as bureaucracy, which ossify and become incapable 
of change” (Baker, 1992: 398). The inter-intra hybrid formation of network struc-
ture as conceptualized by Baker (1992) was represented in a unique observation 
that network structures provide for the integration of the corporation across ver-
tical, horizontal and spatial boundaries. The three dimensional paradigm of net-
work organizations include distribution of hierarchical positions, functional divi-
sion of labor and dispersion of organizational units across space, and high degree 
of integration across those boundaries constitute a chief structural characteristic 
of a network organization.  
 
 Baker (1992: 400) examined “thick network” organization as integrated across 
formal boundaries of multiple types of socially important relations such as 
“strong and weak task-related communication, informal socializing, advice-
giving  and  advice-getting,  promotion  decision  and  so  on.”  In  contrast,  a 
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“thin network” organization represents firms with extensive electronic commu-
nication networks, yet presenting a doubt over the “extent to which the organiza-
tion is integrated over multiple types of socially important relations” (Baker, 
1992: 400). Baker (1992) subsumed network organization to the element of inte-
gration, where the formal categories or groups such as formal position, geo-
graphic location, and market focus are not significant barriers to interaction. The 
hybrid understanding of network by Baker (1992) was reflected in the argument 
that “interpersonal ties of all types – task-related communication, advice, social-
izing and so on – are as easy established between as within formal groups or 
categories” (Baker, 1992: 401). Baker’s (1992) study next to building strong theo-
retical conceptualization of networked organizations, provided for the holistic 
empirical examination of several real estate development firms as inclusive of 
various networks of relationship among members and within firms. 
 
 In summary, the primary characteristic of networked organization comprise 
essentially elements of  
• Shared goals reinforced through the mechanisms of social networks and 
informal relations and trust 
• Support of information technologies comprising a basis for connection 
and information flows that essentially bind and maintain the organization 
• Low hierarchy and centralization, with managerial responsibilities shared 
and overlapping across the organization 
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• The organizational integration over vertical, horizontal and spatial 
boundaries 
 
 5.2.4 Typology of Network Structures 
 
The network organizations come in three types: a chain network organization, 
where end-to-end communication must travel through the intermediate nodes; a 
star network, where a set of actors is tied to a central node of actor, and must go 
through that node to communicate and coordinate; and an all-channel network, 
where every group is connected to every other (Arquilla et al. 1999: 49). The 
chain networks, regarded often as traditional network organizations were sup-
planted by the notion of value networks, or “constellations” (Norman and Rami-
rez, 1993). In turn globalization  provided  an  ideal  environment for the emer-
gence of dense global interconnections  promoting  more  and  more  complex  
networks  (Monge and Fulk, 1999).  The types of networks are illustrated in Fig-
ure 2 presented below: 
 
 
Figure 2. Types of Networked Organizations 
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Among different types of network organizations, the all-channel networks are 
of greatest significance as their complex structure, are not only difficult to orga-
nize and maintain but also difficult to analyze and intercept (Springer et al., 2009: 
101). With ideally no central leadership, the all-channel network does not rely on 
hierarchical driving-forces for improvement, but allows for autonomous initia-
tives and influences informational developments. The original design of the net-
work assumes its reliance on quick and broad dissemination of information, 
which is accomplished through dense, technologically fuelled communications 
(Springer et al. 2009: 101). Cooper (2005: 165) noted that chain and hub variations 
of network, as well as, within hybrid forms “attempt to create the optimal com-
promises between speed or efficiency in communications, on the one hand, and 
security,” and an all-channel network’s mechanisms for information flow and 
consensus creation represent its greatest advantage of speedy collaboration and 
decentralized decision-making despite physical dispersion of the nodes. The all-
channel network, therefore, represents a self-organized entity, which relies on 
local initiatives and autonomy of decision-making in decentralized operations, 
leaving the original leadership free of blame for an operation (Springer et al. 
2009: 101). Arquilla et al. (1999: 51) significantly observed that the capacity of all-
channel network “designs for effective performance over time may depend on 
the presence of shared principles, interests, and goals – at best, an overreaching 
doctrine  or  ideology  –  that  spans  all  nodes  and  to  which  the  members 
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wholeheartedly subscribe.” It is important to note, that the abovementioned 
principles, enable the members to be all of one mind. 37 
 
The presented networks models may exist in different variations placed on 
the continuum of largeness, with close or loose connection, inclusive or excusive 
in membership and clearly bounded or permeable to the external environment. 
The networks may be “segmentary or specialized – that is, they may look alike 
and engage in similar activities, or they may undertake a division of labor based 
on specialization” (Arguilla et al. 1999: 50). More often than not, network organi-
zations are structured in hybrid forms, combining hierarchical and different 
network designs at specific levels of interaction. McAllister (2004: 303) argued 
that “network will always prefer an amorphous structure in order to take advan-
tage of both the defensive qualities of the all-channel network and the offensive 
capabilities of a centralized command node.” The inherent properties of hetero-
geneous amalgam of diverse network structures allows the organization to adapt 
to uncertain environments easily and therefore provide for their applicability for 
a wide-range of conditions and purposes. The example of hybrid network orga-
nization is illustrated in Figure 3, on the following page. 
                                                   
37 The notion of all of one mind will be addressed in this thesis, through the notion of collective iden-
tity, in Chapter VII: Subsuming Beliefs About Organizational Structure into Operational Code 
Analaysis, p. 166-167. 
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Figure 3. Hybrid Network Organizational Structure 
 
5.3. Non-Bureaucracies, State and Non-State Actors 
In many cases, the organizations or individuals that form network are en-
gaged in a diverse but overlapping activities and processes with the primary re-
liance on the cohesiveness of information transformed across the network. 
Cresswell et al. (2005: 5) identified the individuals and organizations taking part 
in networks as interacting and referent to the same stakeholders, with whom the 
separate units interact in different times improving the interoperability of the or-
ganizational structure for efficient maintenance of programs and services. In 
networks constitutes a web of distinct but overlapping policy community in 
which one unit of organization cannot achieve its goals without the involvement 
of others” (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 278). Essentially in non-bureaucratic or-
ganizational setting, the individual interests of diverse actors are negotiated 
throughout a structure rather than controlled through the mechanisms of top-to-
bottom subordination. 
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Looking at the organizational arrangements of states, constituent of multiple 
vertical levels arranged across traditional boundaries of agencies. Modeling the 
state institutions as economic enterprises becomes often difficult and complex, if 
not impossible, due to the organizational imperceptible mergence into economic, 
political and social realities. Pardo and Burke (2008: 2) pointed out that “often 
government capabilities necessary to affect change across the boundaries of or-
ganizations are missing.” Both research and practice have presented that gov-
ernments are “inconsistent and ad hoc in their abilities to operate in a network 
form” (Pardo and Burke, 2008: 3), demonstrating little if any capability of the 
government to achieve a level of interoperability that brings together multiple 
governmental units based on shared knowledge, interoperable technological in-
frastructure and decentralized decision-making. The innovation of state institu-
tions is primarily reflected in changing the nature of external relationships 
through the adaptability of the organizational structures to the needs of organi-
zational recipients leaving the inner functions primarily unchanged.  
 
Conversely, across the spectrum of non-state actors, the structural defining of 
organization present increased adaptability and re-formatting of organizational 
structure aimed at changes to components of inner functioning maintaining or 
improving the linkages with other components. First and foremost, the non-
bureaucratic organizational structures are, not only extensively evaluated in the-
ory but also represented in their application, the economic non-state constituents 
of world affairs, namely multinational corporations (MNC’s) and transnational 
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corporations (TNC’s), that is enterprises controlling activities in different coun-
tries. The multinational enterprises are essentially flexible presenting an “inher-
ent volatility of the international business environment” (Giroud, 2003: 14). The 
economic enterprises are inherently founded on the principle of interconnectivity 
in order to efficiently cope with increasingly complex decision-making processes 
across boundaries. Lall and Streeten (1977 as cited in Giroud, 2003: 14) identified 
multinational enterprises as organizations that aim at the maximization of one 
overall objective for all its constituent units, treating “the whole world as an op-
erational area, and able to coordinate its functions in any way necessary for 
achieving maximization and operationalism. Dishman (2005: 238) presented that 
“the dawn of Information Age, which brought a different set of factors for corpo-
rate success, quickly strained the rigid hierarchical organization.” With the en-
hanced technology corporations in order to succeed were required to operate in 
faster, more flexible, integrative and innovative manner. And while in hierarchy, 
limitations of the distance between managers and the rank and file and division 
of functions and specialization disabled the efficient use of technology for orga-
nizational purposes, the new forms of organizational structure emerged as a re-
sponse to the compartmented and slow-communication structures of bureaucra-
cies. Bureaucratic corporations soon realized that their organizational structures 
were significantly impeding their success and necessitated internal transforma-
tion as a mean of adaptation to an external environment.  
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Deviation from the bureaucratic and hierarchical structure of the organization 
for international economic enterprises does not represent a solemn tendency 
across MNC’s and TNC’s, however, while some corporations remain essentially 
bureaucratic, those that choose to and chose to undergo an organizational trans-
formation are provided with facilitated means for construction of integrated 
work configuration, differentiation of subsidiary roles and responsibilities and 
simultaneous management of multiple innovation processes that collectively 
constitute an integrated and viable organizational network system. Information 
Revolution has not just had severe implications in the economical sector but also 
for other non-state actors, for whom the hierarchical organizational sector began 
to constitute an obstacle rather than a solid framework for organization. 
 
Among the other non-state actors, the organizational structuring of non-
governmental organizations (NGO’s) varies in accordance with the origins and 
internationalization of the organization. The variety of existent organizational 
structures of NGO’s appear essentially as either “ethnocentric structures” that 
are based on a “tight control of subsidiary offices of centralized headquarters,” or 
“polycentric structures” which are constituent of “a high degree of decentralized 
local control and interconnectedness” (Lewis, 2001: 178). The differentiation 
among structures of NGO’s is subjected essentially to the need of an organization 
to “maximize [its] proximity of decision-making processes to its constituent 
groups wherever they are” (Lewis, 2001: 179). The careful balancing of structures 
with constituent membership and core values reflects the NGO’s emphasis on 
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communication and participation and as in the case of economic enterprises, al-
lows the organization to adapt according to maximization of its objectives. There-
fore, a non-governmental organization wishing to expand its influence globally 
requires organizational restructuring in accordance with its fundraising capabili-
ties, multicultural sensitivity and local outlook often choose to engage in net-
work building, more often between than within organizations, in order to adapt 
to a changing circumstances. Fowler et al. (1992: 18) identified that organiza-
tional development of non-governmental organizations is subjected primarily to 
the optimization of its performance in relation to organizational goals, resources 
and environments. In an equal manner to economic enterprises, the choice of 
network remains an open option for NGO’s and IGNO’s due to the fundamental 
characteristics of their objective and forces maintaining the efficiency of their ac-
tivities.  
 
Within the last category of non-state actors, the non-bureaucratic structure of 
VNSA, particularly terrorist organization, becomes embodied within an asym-
metric advantage that non-bureaucratic structures provide for non-state actors. 
The essential characteristics of network originating within the economical-
paradigm and theories are not only theoretically but in essence apparent within 
the realm of conflict. From theoretical perspective, McAllister (2004: 301-302) de-
noted that both, market competition and warfare, are subjected to the informa-
tion revolution and its premises necessitating changes in organizational affairs.  
The  nature  and  extent  of  the  transformation  of  warfare  in  the  wake  of    
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information revolution, has been a subject of strict analysis by theoreticians of 
revolution in military affairs (e.g. Van Creveld, 1991; Lind et al, 1989; Tucker, 
2000; Murden, 2007), who identify the fourth-generation of warfare as essentially 
subjected to technological changes that essentially enable non-state adversaries 
in the management of information acquisition and flows providing them with 
increased ability to acquire weapons and implement attacks and significantly 
cause mass casualties in a manner unassociated with the conventional  use  of  
violence by states. As Dishman (2005: 238-239) noted, “unlike business commu-
nity, low-profit s did not drive these organizations to seek change; law enforce-
ment and intelligence, which began to successfully root out subversive organiza-
tions, forced illegal armed groups to find new ways to evade authority and be-
come more resilient.” The subsequent organizational adaptation to management 
of technological innovation and information becomes, therefore, apparent in the 
transition of non-state organization into non-bureaucratic structures in order to 
gain the advantage in an asymmetrically defined conflict.   
 
Emerging from the information revolution as a pre-eminent organizational 
paradigm, among all non-bureaucratic organizations, networks became particu-
larly adaptive with an enhanced ability to acquire operational advantage in con-
flicts (Stepanova, 2008: 128). Flexibility, mobility and adaptation to changing cir-
cumstances of networks are particularly contributory to the decreased time for 
transmission of information and coordination among various nodes, decreased 
costs for establishing a communication infrastructure and increased scope and 
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complexity of information shared among organizational members (Zanini and 
Edwards, 2001: 35-36). In this manner, the organizational survival was ensured in 
spite of circumstances, when leader is captured or killed, based on the principle 
of the resilience in networks (Arquilla and Ronfeld, 1997). With these enhanced 
operational capabilities, the networked-waged war enables a delinquent to “con-
verge on a target from multiple directions, or perhaps on multiple levels, simul-
taneously (McAllister, 2004: 303), constituting a reality in which changes adver-
sary’s conceptions of strategies from those understood conventionally, and tar-
gets from those defined narrowly. The full advantage of networks becomes the 
essential underlining argument for the emergence of conflict with belligerents 
presenting fundamentally changed characteristic of engagement. In circum-
stances, where the general trend for adaptation of network structure is apparent 
primarily among non-state actors (Stepanova, 2008: 129) combined with the cen-
tral characteristics of networks and its advantages in conflict environments, the 
contemporary dimension of asymmetric warfare becomes prominent and essen-
tially important for the future of world affairs.  
 
In summary, the obedience of state institutions to strict bureaucratic struc-
tures relies on the lack of structural capabilities, necessity for rigid management 
of units and social, political and economic paradigms that not only accounted for 
emergence and maintenance of bureaucracy as the most efficient organization for 
government and structural affairs throughout centuries. Conversely, non-state 
actors as essentially unbound by the necessity for rigid and stable management, 
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present a spectrum of organizational structures deviating in various degrees 
from bureaucratic structure. Although, the ideal types of both bureaucracy and 
networks are often the creations of theoretical speculations, the non-state organi-
zations present essentially increased capabilities to approach higher degree of 
network formation than states. As the choice of network structure remains op-
tional for non-state actors, it is this option and degrees of deviation from bureau-
cratic structure analogous to state institutions that provides for the fundamental 
differences between state and non-state organization. The primarily belligerent, 
non-state entities presenting the identifying degrees of network-based violence 
are terrorist organizations addressed in detail in the following section. 
 
5.3.1 Non-Bureaucracies and Terrorist Organizations. 
Terrorist organizations have diverse origins, ideologies and organizational 
structures; however, in general terrorist organizations do not employ a bureau-
cratic style of organization (Mullins, 1988: 214). Variances in the structures of ter-
rorist organizations can be categorized among traditional and new-generation 
groups (Zanini and Edwards, 2001: 32). The traditional group encompasses ter-
rorist organizations emerging in 1960’s and 1970’s, e.g. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’s 
(ETA) or Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Europe or Palestinian Liberation Orga-
nization (PLO) and other terrorist organizations formally or informally linked to 
PLO in Middle East. Zanini and Edwards (2001: 32) observed that “these groups 
have utilized autonomous cells as part of their organizational structure, but the 
operation  of  such  cells  is  guided  by  a  hierarchy  through  clear  reporting  
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relationships and virtually little horizontal coordination.” Although Zanini and 
Edwards (2001: 32) believed that the traditional terrorist organizations are “rela-
tively bureaucratic,” the level of bureaucracy can be subjected to strict question-
ing while compared to bureaucracies of state institutions. It is important, how-
ever, to note that terrorist organizations originating in 1960’s and 1970’s are often 
situated within a context of broader movements, involving the creation of politi-
cal parties, e.g. ETA’s affiliation with Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE) and Heri Batsuna 
(HB) political parties (Douglass and Zulaika, 1990: 248-249); PLO political and 
terrorist undertakings within the context of Palestinian National Liberation 
Movement, or Fatah (Weinberg and Pedahzur, 2004: 95-97); Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) terrorism and its politicized nationality (Entessar, 1989: 84-87).   
 
As Weinberg and Pedahzur (2004: 95) correctly noted, “groups or organiza-
tions operating within the context of a broad movement such as Palestinian Na-
tional Liberation Movement may, over time, shift from strategies of terrorism to 
peaceful party politics and back to terrorism, depending upon prevailing condi-
tions and incentives to behave in one way or the other.” Important, however, 
remains the fact that differentiation between bureaucratic inclinations of political 
parties associated with any terrorist organization does not merely reflect the bu-
reaucratic nature of the terrorist entities. While bureaucracy clearly identifies that 
written rules and procedures of conduct should be formalized and defined, and 
consequently recorded, it would be difficult to imagine that terrorist organiza-
tion, even if existent as political parties, would formally identify specific rules for 
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conduct falling within the range of terrorist behavior or record the achieved re-
sults.  
 
The terrorist element of the wider movements relies primarily on under-
ground organization and secrecy. Terrorist fractions or groups essentially de-
pend upon secrecy in order to assure their survival from the counter-terrorist 
mechanisms of the state, relying primarily on decision-making processes aimed 
at concealing the whereabouts, movements and exact responsibilities of the 
members in connection to terrorist undertakings of the organization. Even in the 
case of relatively open organizations such as PLO in which the primary decision-
makers are known to the authorities, efforts are made to remain relatively secret 
and unknown to the state authorities leaving the terrorist positioning and ad-
vances primarily self-evident rather than precisely defined. In this respect, the 
organizational structure of terrorist organizations fundamentally opposes the bu-
reaucratic dimensions of formalization and reliance on standardized procedure 
thus constituting hybrid entities, of half-bureaucratic and half-non-bureaucratic 
nature. 
 
Conversely, the new-generation organizations, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, 
Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group or Al Qaeda are “loosely organized groups with 
religious or ideological motives, [where] operatives are part of a network that re-
lies less on bureaucratic fiat and more on shared values and horizontal coordina-
tion mechanism to accomplish its goals” (Zanini and Edwards, 2001: 33). To a 
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varying extent, the abovementioned organizations, share principles of the net-
worked organization characterized by a “group of organized in loosely intercon-
nected, semi-independent cells that have no single commanding hierarchy” (Ar-
quilla et al., 1999: 56). Hamas presents a distinctively unique hybrid organiza-
tion, which next to the network structural arrangement also incorporates a “great 
leader,” in a fashion similar to PLO’s Yasser Arafat (Arquilla et al., 1999: 57). In 
respect of the other terrorist organizations presenting novel organizational struc-
tures, the clear distinctiveness from bureaucratic dimensions can be identified, 
establishing a factual observation in reference to new structures and processes 
guiding the behavior of those organizations. Building, dynamic and expansive 
terrorist network the new-generation terrorist organizations, although detached 
in their individual pursuance of political objectives, are loosely coupled with 
each other, despite the geographical dispersion and diversity of social connec-
tions (Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2007: 81). Despite the inherent heterogeneity of en-
tities embraced within the contemporary terrorist networks, the difficulty arising 
from the deliberate maintenance of low profile of terrorist organizations within 
the network, it becomes not only difficult to identify the individual components 
but also trace the activities within the network. 
 
Mapping the contemporary terrorist networks, thereby, becomes challenging 
in respect of the monitoring of individually undertaken terrorist activities, but 
also realizing the extensive connection among individual organizations in rela-
tion  to  the  wider  spectrum  of  networking  relationships  among  affiliated  
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terrorists of the world. The duality of Hezbollah, manifesting its primary pres-
ence essentially in Lebanon, in addition to representing “highly organized, well-
financed and extremely disciplined link in the network of global terrorism” (By-
ers, 2003: 49), becomes an instance of the complexity of modern new-generation 
terrorist organizations. Hezbollah in political context of its movement is struc-
tured with clear hierarchy responsible for “overall administration as well as ex-
ecutive, legislative, judicial, political and military affairs”(Phillips, 2008: 41), yet 
disciplining secrecy as a terrorist organization it is a “far-flung multinational or-
ganization with a worldwide presence” (Phillips, 2008: 41) maintaining multiple 
network of terrorist cells in disperse parts of world, including Asia, Europe and 
South America (Giraldo and Trinkunas: 144-148). 
 
In the light of the strategic importance of organizational structure, the fact 
that states are bureaucratic, while non-state actors deviate from bureaucratic 
constitutions becomes of great significance. Operational code beliefs shape the 
subjective understanding about what exists and how to act, through developing 
of assumptions that are rarely questioned or scrutinized. Thus to remind reader 
of the primary argument of this thesis, it is important to note that “most of peo-
ple assume that organizational hierarchy is a necessary and useful arrangement. 
When a person encounters superior-subordinate situations; he or she views them 
as normal, acceptable and unproblematic” (Miller, 2008: 106). In this manner, the 
perceptions of organizational structure become entangled into decision-making 
and thus should be recognized within operational code analysis. 
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The following chapter is devoted to a case study of Al Qaeda, as a terrorist 
organization exemplifying the highest degree of non-bureaucratic structure. The 
following chapter through representation of the evolution of Al Qaeda’s organi-
zational structure presents a premise that structuring of organizational form ac-
count for valuable insights into Al Qaeda’s threat-display, as ideological and so-
cial dimensions of its activities can no longer account solemnly for coherent ex-
planatory power of the phenomena.  
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CHAPTER VI 
Al QAEDA’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
It has become a commonplace to allude to a general spread and evolution of 
networked structures, and more specifically, to their employment by and impact 
on non-state actors, and terrorist organizations in particular. Al Qaeda, as a 
unique organization among all terrorist organizations in this respect, within its 
historical evolution seems to have intuitively grasp the advantages of the poten-
tial of alternative organizational structures, which have allowed Al Qaeda to 
move into the realm of flexibility, integration and assumption of provocative 
role. Subjected to the forces of globalization, Al Qaeda successfully managed to 
elevate its organization into the global terrorist movement presenting one of the 
most salient threats to the contemporary international order. While perspectives 
of political, historian and social scientists overall are both essential in an under-
standing and addressing the threat posed by Al Qaeda, often the fundamental 
characteristics of the phenomenon are significantly undervalued and misjudged, 
while  approached  with  constrains  of  given  specialty.  Since  the  emergence  
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of religious terrorism38 in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, Al Qaeda presented its 
uniqueness in operational and strategic organizational underpinnings. Al Qaeda 
has moved terrorism beyond the position of resistance affairs organized in forms 
of protests and localized low intensity conflicts, by transforming political vio-
lence into a globally instrumented threat aiming broadly at challenging the exist-
ing international order and the extent of Western influence as the predefined by 
that order. In order to grasp the ongoing and dynamic processes within Al 
Qaeda organization requires an analysis of its organizational structure that rep-
resents the fundamental essence of its organizational personality distinct from its 
individual members. The accurate portrayal of organizational dimensions re-
quire the examination of the interaction of contextual predispositions and the re-
sultant structural underpinning of Al Qaeda, in the past and today, in order to 
represent the adjustment of the organization to the environment and consequent 
strive for effectiveness outcomes.  
 
In view of many Al Qaeda historically represented an efficient, well-financed 
and sophisticated organization that lead to the spectacular of September 11, 2001 
in its greatest capacity. Since then, the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, 
lead by the United States, unprecedentedly damaged not only Al Qaeda’s territo-
rial core for command and control and training camps, but also lead significantly 
                                                   
38 The reference to the emergence of religious terrorism is often described as a fourth wave of ter-
rorism (Rapoport, 2004), and is characterized by a predominance of terrorist groups that use re-
ligious justifications for terrorist action, whereas the precedent waves were characterized by the 
secular nature of objectives. While the first wave of terrorism was the anarchist wave (1880’s-
1914), followed by the anti-colonial wave (1920-60’s), the third wave was followed ethno-
nationalistic and ideologically defined patterns of political violence (Bowden and Davis, 2008:23) 
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to the target displacement of the organization’s leadership forcing Al Qaeda to 
undergone extensive restructuring of its organizational foundation. As such, 
both the academia and counter-terrorism law enforcements must indubitably 
understand the importance of the organizational state of the organization, 
through its continuous evolution and devolution. Presently, the variety of ana-
lysts pose a question whether Al Qaeda constitutes a re-formed smaller nucleus 
of previously magnified organization or whether it has evolved into a global so-
cial movement encompassing not only active trained terrorists but also self-
recruited wannabes who find purpose in terrors and comrades on the Web 
within the ideological framework provided by Al Qaeda (Sageman, 2008a: 37). In 
the context of the ongoing debate, the subsequent identification of organizational 
structure of Al Qaeda would not only bring a reader closer to important aspect of 
the organizational being but also provide an established answer to the question, 
whether Al Qaeda should remain classified as organization, or whether should it 
be evaluated in term of the social movement many appear to identify Al Qaeda 
with. With the established answer to this question, both academics and policy-
makers could analyze accurately and find means of efficient defeat of Al Qaeda 
worldwide. 
  
Etzioni’s (1964: 5) definition of organizations as “social units deliberately con-
structed and reconstructed to seek specific goals” would represent the frame-
work for defining and understanding the organizations. Conversely, the bench-
mark against which Al Qaeda will be defined will be Stojkovic et al. (2003) 
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framework for evaluation of organizational structure. The unpacking of organi-
zational structure necessitates importantly an incorporation of aspects of organi-
zational purpose and activity as complementary forces assisting organization in 
its structure formation (Stojkovic, et al. 2003). The three aspects provide for the 
framework for differentiation between rigidity constructed bureaucratic entity, 
as characterized by Weber (1947), and a recently emergent networked organiza-
tions. With the historical account on the proliferation of nebulous entities with 
diverse organizational structures, the elements of purpose, as emphasized by 
Etzioni (1964), and the activities of the analyzed organization bare an important 
point of reference for an accurate analysis of Al Qaeda. While the purpose spe-
cifically designs measures with which an organization effectively calculates the 
potential for achievement of its objectives, an important question concerning the 
activities of the organization embraces the preciseness of organizational exis-
tence, that is, whether the organization itself carries out the activities or whether 
it supports the weight of the activities of outside groups acting on the behalf of it. 
In this respect, the totality of organization’s structure in respect of its purpose 
and activities would constitute a comprehensive review of Al Qaeda’s structural 
being. 
 
To achieve a permanent acceptance of the understanding of Al Qaeda laid 
down in this thesis, first a brief history of its origins and transformation will be 
provided. In due course an analysis of its current organizational structure, ac-
counting for the elements of leadership, communications and recruitment will be 
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brought forth. Identifying the boundaries of organizational formation of Al 
Qaeda would establish a ground for further analysis of the organization, identifi-
cation  of  its  operational  code  through  delineation  of  structurally  defined  
potential vulnerabilities, patterns of activities and consequently add-up a value 
to the considerations examined by the academia and counterterrorist communi-
ties. 
 
6.1. Evolution and Devolution of Al Qaeda 
While the ideological origins of the organization reach back to the emergence 
of Salafi’s ideology (Laqueur, 2003: 30) that promoted an utopian vision of united 
Islamic world calling for the re-establishment of caliphate and ultimate re-
unification of Muslim umma (the community), the organizational underpinning 
of this radical Islamic ideology, known as Al Qaeda today, came into being in the 
wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1980’s, although the exact date of 
its emergence has been disputed among scholars. The decade of conflict in Af-
ghanistan between 1979-1989 gave Islamist extremists a rallying ground for revo-
lutionary activism uniting Arab volunteers from around the world fighting for a 
common cause. One of the most significant organizational forms of Islamist non-
state resistance in Afghanistan, directly preceding Al Qaeda’s emergence, was 
Maktab al-Khidmat (MAK), or Service Office in translation, co-founded by Ab-
dullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden in 1984. The organization essentially chan-
neled recruits from Afghanistan, provided indoctrination and training, facilitated 
acquisition of weapons and provided a degree of financial assistance to volunteer 
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fighters against Soviet Union (Migaux, 2007: 293). So to enable its participation in 
the anti-Soviet resistance war, MAK assumed hierarchical structure of command 
and  control,  with  each  unit  subordinated  in  a  pyramid-like  structure  to  the 
organization’s leadership (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 277). Since the circum-
stances of a war necessitated high levels of specialization and top-to-bottom sub-
ordination in order to acquire efficiently of the processes of collective resistance 
against Soviet Union, MAK was essentially reflected highly structured hierarchy 
of authority, centralized decision-making, distribution of assigned task to author-
ized individuals, as well as, high levels of professionalism ensuring comprehen-
sive training program for militants. 
 
 In the wake of Soviet announcement concerning withdrawal from Afghani-
stan in 1988, the contemplative discourse between Abdullah Azzam and Osama 
bin Laden over the future of post-Afghanistan jihad reaching an agreement not 
to dismantle MAK, but rather to replace it with a ‘base,’ known in Arabic as Al 
Qaeda, that would serve as a “headquarters for managing future jihad in other 
theatres” (Conboy, 2006: 56).  The agreement between Azzam and bin Laden was 
reached concerning the fact that recruitment and funding infrastructures created 
for Afghanistan should not be dissolved (Gurule, 2008: 30), an agreement that 
was successfully transformed into a reality where “the new organization [Al 
Qaeda] relied on the infrastructure of the MAK, but its ideological orientation 
was unsure and its operational capabilities almost non-existent” (Mendelsohn, 
2009: 46).  
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 The ideological uncertainty for organizational objectives following the end of 
was in Afghanistan began to shape the future of organization’s being. Resolved 
with Azzam’s death in a car-bomb attack in 1989, leaving bin Laden in “complete 
control of MAK’s funds and operational mechanisms, which were folded into the 
evolving Al Qaeda organization” (Gurule, 2008: 31), Al Qaeda was to emerge as 
a novel organization. This change of strategic realm ignited Al Qaeda as a dis-
tinct organization ready to begin its existence independent of the Jihadist activ-
ism that existed within the context of Soviet-Afghani war, and prompted further 
ideological evolution of the organization. Of the greatest importance, becoming 
the primary figure in Al Qaeda, bin Laden’s ideological stand directed the orga-
nizational goals towards fighting apostate regimes around the globe, as he aimed 
to “train Muslim fighters to continue jihad outside Afghanistan to advance the 
cause of radical Islam” (Gurule, 2008: 30). Since the ideological stand necessitates 
means of support, primarily through organizational structure, Al Qaeda’s de-
signed global reach, fundamentally challenged the bureaucratic pre-existence of 
MAK and necessitated a transformation into a flexible, loosely knit structure 
with horizontal communication orientation that would enhance organization’s 
capabilities of reaching international audience.  
 
 While the strategic orientation of a newly established organization changed, 
the end of the Soviet-Afghani conflict in 1989, provided for further significant or-
ganizational changes in respect of the organizational size. With the end of Af-
ghanistan chapter, thousands of volunteering mujahideen were now ready to look 
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ahead. While the volunteers comprising MAK decided to return to respective 
homelands and live mundane lives, other married locals and choose to live in 
Pakistan or Afghanistan (Mendelsohn, 2009: 45). There were also a number of in-
dividuals who recognized that their acquired knowledge of combat and experi-
ence on battlefield would significantly enhance the international Jihadist struggle 
put forward by bin Laden (Migaux, 2007: 297). And it was that small group of 
jihadists that pledged their loyalty to bin Laden that essentially constituted the 
core of Al Qaeda and continued to work with bin Laden thought the 1990’s 
(Burke, 2003: 7-9; Tanter, 1999: 265). According to 9/11 Commission Report 
(2004: 56), the early structure of Al Qaeda comprised of a “military committee, a 
financial committee, a political committee and committee in charge of media af-
fairs and propaganda.” The charge over the committees was assigned to the Ad-
visory Council or Shura Majlis, headed by bin Laden and comprised of bin 
Laden’s inner circle. 
 
 With the end of the Soviet-Afghanistan war, the consequent lack of infrastruc-
tural and financial underpinnings for large scale operational functioning, the 
early years of Al Qaeda remain somewhat ambiguous in respect of its activities 
and structure. In the wake of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, bin Laden returned 
to Saudi Arabia where he began to lay foundation for the future global Jihadist 
network. Robinson (2001:126) noted that during his period in Saudi Arabia, bin 
Laden “stayed in almost daily contact with ‘his men’ around the region, taking 
over their plans, seeing where he could be of help.” These contacts provided a 
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foundation for many of modern Islamic terror activities, particularly in Egypt 
and Algeria, with the emergence of local Islamic resistance conflicts39. Maintain-
ing his financial independency, bin Laden regularly shifted large amount of 
money to his allies channeling the resources “into the bank accounts of those 
wishing to buy arms and explosives to be used in a struggle at home” (Robinson, 
2001: 126).  
 
 According to Gurule (2008: 34) bin Laden also “funded military and basic ex-
plosives training for al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, and training on how to 
create cell structures for terrorist operations abroad.” In this context, the financial 
resources for early Al Qaeda’s existence did not constitute for a major challenge 
to organizational functioning in respect of its supportive nature in Islamic strug-
gles in theatres of war in diverse parts of the world. The core of human re-
sources, initially gave Al Qaeda a power vacuum with numerous mujahideen, 
trained in Afghanistan under Osama’s sponsorship, that constituted a force 
which could be sent to support Jihadist struggle internationally (Robinson, 2001: 
118). In context, the organizational constituency of Al Qaeda in the post-Soviet-
Afghanistan war was essentially transnational in nature linking “a global plat-
form with local struggles, [where] its members could help to advance the net-
work while retailing their affiliation to local and national based groups” (Men-
delsohn, 2009: 53). The transnational composition of Al Qaeda, linked primarily 
                                                   
39 After the war in Afghanistan against Soviet Union, the mujahideen fighters left to their respec-
tive homelands with a stronger commitment to jihad and more radical perspectives that lead to 
an initiation of local Jihadist opposition fronts. Mendelsohn (2009: 46) noted that “with the end of 
the war, Arab state saw resurgence of Islamic domestic violence as a more zealous and able Af-
ghan returnees started working to undermine local regimes.” 
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with a shared ideological stand of affiliated groups, provided for ambiguity of 
the organizational functioning and structure. Until 1998, Al Qaeda’s role with 
respect to terrorist operations was primarily concentrated with “providing funds, 
training and weapons for attacks carried out by members of allied terror affili-
ates” (Gurule, 2009: 38). As a result, Al Qaeda represented essentially an organi-
zation with substantial influence and degree of absorption of fundamentalist 
groups dispersed transnational, provided guidance to these groups and encour-
agement for active participation in fighting in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, 
Somalia, Yemen and Kosovo and further cemented its credentials in the funda-
mentalist camp. Bin Laden essentially perceived that various components of the 
Islamic movement in different parts of the world and creation of trust-bonds 
among fundamentalist groups would strengthen the ambiguity of the responsi-
ble actor for the attacks. The element of trust thus become fundamental in the fu-
ture structural forms of Al Qaeda, as it grounds the foundation for informal or-
ganizational structure, with high degree of coherence and intractability. 
 
 Al Qaeda’s early establishment was situated within a moderately unstable 
and complex international environment. The complexity of environment imping-
ing upon organizational structure of Al Qaeda became apparent in the context of 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. “Osama bin Laden’s conviction that he had de-
feated the Red Army in Afghanistan led him to propose to the Saudi authorities 
that  he  Arab  mujahideen  help  them  take  on  the  Iraqi  armored  divisions” 
(Migaux, 2007: 317), which had lead to the refusal from Saudi authorities and 
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eventual bin Laden’s exile in Sudan in 1991, welcomed by Hassan al Turabi. With 
the changes in political sector, particularly the invasion of Kuwait which brought 
a presence of Christian troops on Saudi soil, strengthened bin Laden conviction 
that Al Qaeda’s purpose should be directed against far enemy, i.e. United States, 
rather than maintaining its fight against the near enemies, i.e. national regimes as 
in the past (Gerges, 2005: 191), solidified with 1996 declaration of war on the U.S. 
and subsequently, in 1998 issuance of fatwa calling for all Muslims to wage jihad 
against Jews and Crusaders. The gradual shift of goals from near enemy to far en-
emy made operational control and oversight of organization more difficult to 
manage. 
   
 The Al Qaeda’s change of strategic aspect, with United States becoming the 
prioritized enemy, constituted for further differentiation strategic underlining, 
that necessitated organizational further drive to informality necessitating further 
structurally designed security measures such as cell formation, and strengthen-
ing of loyalty and trust between not only terrorist groups, but also entrusted fi-
nancial donors. In this context, bin Laden remained in close relationship with va-
riety of Islamic groups such as Egypt’s Al Jihad and al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya, 
Iran’s Hezbollah, Sudan’s NIF and jihad groups in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and 
Somalia as well as, “dozens of other like-minded fundamentalist groups were all 
clamoring to build bridges with Al Qaeda” (Robinson: 2001: 143). In an attempt 
to coordinate financing and support of various affiliated terrorist organizations 
committed to global jihad, bin Laden established an “Islamic Army Shura.” 
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Building upon his fund-raising experience from Afghanistan, bin Laden could 
further ensure financial resources to Al Qaeda through maintenance of contact 
with sympathizers of the fundamentalist cause back from the days in Afghani-
stan (Robinson, 2001: 139). 
 
 During bin Laden’s stay in Sudan, Al Qaeda was given an immense opportu-
nity to advance its structural design. Within the period of five years, between 
1991-1996, bin Laden’s residency in Sudan proved to constitute a successful Al 
Qaeda’s base for business operations and preparations for jihad (Bevy, 2006: 5).  
Bin Laden’s business network comprised of 134 Arab businessmen, whose com-
bined commercial empire maintained bank accounts in virtually every country 
and, collectively, routinely shifted billions of dollars around as a part of their le-
gitimate business” (Robinson, 2001: 139), in the greatest extent contributed to the 
continuation of Al Qaeda’s role as an umbrella organization, brining regional 
and international terrorist organization through provision of financing and 
weapons. Sudan provided a stable environment to bin Laden’s gradual progres-
sion towards a more advanced network with Al Qaeda essentially as the fore-
front executive organization rather than supportive. The essential cultivation of 
relationship with like-minded terrorist groups, provision of support in funds, 
weapons and training ensured Al Qaeda’s loyal stand against its cause and 
slowly mature in structure to independently carry its mission and initiate a 
greater Jihadist struggle against infidel countries, particularly the United States. 
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  Although the environment in Sudan was relatively stable allowing al Qaeda 
to enjoy its bureaucratic centralization and hierarchy, began to loose its solid 
grounds in 1994, when Saudi Arabia stripped bin Laden of its citizenship and 
frozen his financial assets (Tanter, 1999: 265). The financial sector, was for a large 
part instrumental in Al Qaeda’s efficient functioning, both in Afghanistan, Saudi 
Arabia as well as Sudan, while it ensured the constant provision of support to the 
like-minded terrorist groups waging jihad in various countries like Egypt, Bos-
nia, Chechnya, Yemen, Kashmir and Philippines (Gurule, 2008: 33). According to 
9/11 Commission Report (2004: 62), money problems proved costly to bin Laden 
in many ways, particularly hurting bin Laden’s companies in an unstable eco-
nomic environment of Sudan. In nearly two years, Sudan became a doubtful ha-
ven for bin Laden, who returned to Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda began to adopt 
a more coherent and mature organizational structure (Burke, 2004: 8). 
 
 It is important, therefore, to note that Al Qaeda, during bin Laden’s stay in 
Saudi Arabia and Sudan, was still structurally immature, with a centralized deci-
sion-making in hands of bin Laden, hierarchy of authority distributed among or-
ganizational committees, and professionalism of individual members accounting 
mainly for past-experience acquired in Afghanistan and post-war training camps 
in Afghanistan and high degrees of informality within Al Qaeda and between Al 
Qaeda and the like-minded terrorist organizations around the world.  In terms of 
the specialization aspect of Al Qaeda’s structure, the organization’s essential 
membership component could not be effectively described within the categories 
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of either low or high specialization. While the late-Sudan existence of Al Qaeda, 
proves to provide the examples of cell establishment as in Nairobi in 199340 that 
lead to 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi in Kenya and Dar es Sa-
laam in Tanzania, the Al Qaeda’s general pattern for division of labor seem to be 
distributed to specific cells, which were entrusted with the carrying out of attacks 
against U.S. targets. According to 9/11 Commission Report (2004: 68), the cell 
responsibilities during the preparation for Nairobi attacks included technical 
surveillance and on-site management and casing for targets. The cell’s opera-
tional commander was Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri, Al Qaeda’s military committee 
chief, while progress of preparations for attack was regularly reported to bin 
Laden’s indicating the centralized structure of Al Qaeda and its essentially hier-
archical structure. 
 
6.2. Road to September 11, 2001. 
The gradual evolution of Al Qaeda’s objectives during 1990’s, following bin 
Laden’s return to Saudi Arabia and exile in Sudan until 1996, the organization 
was essentially maturing into a coherent structure with established boundaries. 
The general agreement among scholars identifies Al Qaeda as a coherent struc-
ture after bin Laden’s return to Afghanistan in 1996 (Rabasa et al. 2006: 28), 
where the organization began to evolve essentially into a networked structure, in 
                                                   
40 Bin Laden’s involvement in the attacks in Somalia and World Trade Centre in 1993 is unclear, 
and the extent to which Al Qaeda could be affiliated with the Islamist cells operating in these at-
tacks. 
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both inter-organizational and intra-organizational dimensions of networked or-
ganizational form (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 279).  
 
In respect of the nebulous inter-organizational character of Al Qaeda’s activi-
ties, the organization’s strengthened transnational collaboration with affiliated 
groups provided for the enhanced global reach and soundness in its global 
agenda. The inter-organizational networked structure of Al Qaeda began its exis-
tence in 1998, with bin Laden’s formation of World Islamic Front for Jihad 
against the Jews and Crusaders (FIMLJC). The transnational advocacy network 
of Al Qaeda embraced, Al-Jihad and Gama-a al-Islamiya in Egypt, Jemaah Isla-
mayah in Indonesia, Group Islamique Armee and Salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat in Algeria, Abu Sayyaf and Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 
Philipines, as well as, numerous groups in Kashmir region of Pakistan (Mannes, 
2004: 3-99). All of the groups were operating with varying degrees of input and 
coordination from Al Qaeda’s leadership while maintained much of their opera-
tional and logistical independence (Asal et al., 2007: 23). Owen (2004: 220) identi-
fied that the alliance represented a significant step in organizational structuring 
of Al Qaeda, providing the organization with  “formidable organizational talents 
of the Egyptian members of Jihad, a highly secretive military group with a long 
history of assassinations and other terrorist activities.”  
 
Importantly, however, maintaining international ties with terrorist groups 
was regarded as a secondary objective of Al Qaeda, which centered Al Qaeda as 
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an organization with solemn capabilities to plan, supervise and execute terrorist 
operations. The eventual attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 
in 1998 and attack on the American destroyer USS Cole in 2000 represented the 
first organizational coherence and strength of Al Qaeda in organizing terrorist 
attacks. According to the 9/11 Commission Report (2004: 67) Al Qaeda no longer 
“concentrated on providing funds, training and weapons for actions carried out 
by members of allied groups” but itself planned, directed and executed terrorist 
attacks under the direct supervision of its commander-in chief, namely bin 
Laden.  
 
The attacks in Africa and Yemen have established al Qaeda as a sophisticated 
organization, which managed to adapt its internal structure to achieve its desired 
goals, despite often challenges imposed on the organization by an external envi-
ronment. In fact, it was the safe haven in Afghanistan that allowed bin Laden to 
execute even more ambitious and deadly terror operations, which indirectly 
linked the influence of external environment upon organizational success. Al 
Qaeda’s success, however, did not rely solely on the solid organizational base 
with a strong degree of organizational coherence (Rabasa, 2006: 28), that pro-
vided an infrastructure of facilities for the global network of Islamist movements 
but also strengthened Al Qaeda’s self-reliance on the internal networking that 
enabled the organization to carry out attacks without establishment of solidly 
connections  to  external  group’s  activities.  The  internal  networked  structure 
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of Al Qaeda began to evolve, providing the organization with means for secre-
tive, flexible and coherent organizational activity. 
 
Central to Al Qaeda’s pre-9/11 structure was the central leadership often 
called Al Qaeda Central, Al Qaeda Professional Cadre or Al Qaeda Core (Dish-
man, 2005: 243).  This organizational core consisted of a “dozen or so inner mem-
bers surrounded by an outer circle of roughly 100 highly motivated loyalists 
drawn from around the Muslim world and committed to the Jihadist agenda” 
(Burke, 2004: 13). At the core structure of Al Qaeda was comprised of three lay-
ers, with bin Laden at the top of hierarchical structure, followed by a consultative 
committee, often referred to as Shura Majlis or Advisory Council, made up of vet-
erans from the Soviet-Afghan war, including al-Zawahiri and responsible for re-
porting directly to bin Laden. At the lowest level, Al Qaeda core comprised four 
operational committees, responsible for military, finance and business, fatwa and 
Islamic study, and media and publicity (Guanaratna, 2003: 31), assuming inde-
pendent roles embracing activities on the specific substantive issues assigned to 
them. The military committee, for example, “plans and executes for Al Qaeda, 
conducts surveillance, gathers intelligence and trains members in military tac-
tics” (Dishman, 2005: 244). Like the Advisory Council, combat veterans of the 
Afghan resistance headed individual committees. Prior to 9/11 attacks, for ex-
ample, Khalid Sheik Muhammad (KSM) was a head of Al Qaeda’s military 
committee, conceiving and helping planning of the plot to crash the airliners into 
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symbolic targets in the United States. Figure 4 below represents a simplified 
graphical illustration of Al Qaeda Central during its early existence. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Hierarchical Representation of Early Organizational Structure of Al Qaeda Central. 
 
In general, for most important terrorist attacks, bin Laden’s direct engage-
ment with the executers of the major terrorist attack is, however, questionable 
and often over-stated whereas the safest assumption remains that at minimum 
bin Laden was heavily involved in the operational decision-making (Dishman, 
2005: 244). The authority of Al Qaeda prior to 9/11, therefore, resided primarily 
in hierarchy, the Al Qaeda Central Cadre, that essentially directed the organiza-
tional behavior though supervision and standardized rules of social control.  
Within the Al Qaeda central the social relations were essentially role-based, situ-
ational and instrumental essentially on the principles of isomorphic distribution 
of prestige, privilege and power. The core of Al Qaeda was essentially arranged 
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in closer proximity to bureaucratic-hierarchical structure than the network struc-
ture. The core of Al Qaeda, however, did not constitute for the entirety of its or-
ganizational underpinning and looking further into the organizational premises 
of the organization, particularly in respect of the management of attacks, the or-
ganization presents essentially a hybrid network structure, allowing the central-
ized coordination of disperse all-channel networks from Al Qaeda’s hierarchical 
core. 
 
Al Qaeda following the model of the two major Egyptian groups, the Islamic 
Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, necessitated its entirety of organizational 
structure to account for operational leader’s connection to central leadership re-
ceiving logistical, financial and other assistance while operating with consider-
able autonomy during the attack preparation stage (Springer et al, 2009: 103). In 
this respect pre-9/11 Al Qaeda represented a hub-network structure of organiza-
tion, with the leadership  of  Al Qaeda  aware  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  indi-
vidual  cells  and the advancement respectively assigned responsibilities, while 
the recruiters in individual cells conducting the attacks or providing logistical 
assistance were given only partial information regarding the specific segments of 
the operation. While individual cells were organized in depending on the loca-
tion, mission and other circumstances unique to each operation, that in turn re-
sulted in the fact that individual cell members knew at most the target and 
names of other members of their specific cell, and not being able to reach further 
into  the  command-and-control  structure  (Springer et al. 2009: 106).  On  this  
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account,  it is important to note that “organizational members may have had con-
siderable latitude as to how they would accomplish their missions, such as the 
September 11 attacks, but their function was dictated from outside” (Springer et 
al. 2009: 106).  
 
Al Qaeda, essentially becoming a learning and adaptive organization pro-
moted the increasing establishment of cells with members from different func-
tional areas that were able to self-direct their activities with a limited supervision 
from a centralized body. The organization deviated from bureaucratic structure 
since it could not longer rely on strive for efficiency through control, but rather 
adapted itself to the mechanisms for effective management of organizational af-
fairs. Figure 5, on the following page, illustrates the totality of Al Qaeda’s struc-
ture between 1998-2001. It is important to note that the Al Qaeda Central, repre-
sented by red dot signifying Shura Majlis headed by bin Laden, and light grey 
dots as representative of operational committees. The illustration presents Al 
Qaeda central essentially as a hub-network rather than hierarchy in order to il-
lustrate the centralization aspect of the organization rather than its hierarchical 
layout. The distinction between hierarchy and centralization becomes important 
in this respect, as hybrid network structures do not assume necessarily decen-
tralization. 
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Figure 5. Simplified Organizational Chart of Al Qaeda Organization (1998-2001) 
 
An essential aspect of the Al Qaeda’s evolution into a networked structure 
began apparent with the increasing significance attached to organizational ideo-
logical stand and the aspect of informality and cohesion. Hoffman (2006: 10) 
noted significantly, that “Al Qaeda has been able to configure itself into an orga-
nization more reflective of ideology than it once was,” and this very premise 
points at the significant maturity of Al Qaeda in its organizational culture that 
provided for a strong informal cohesion, that through collective identity41 pro-
vided for high degree of internal integration and external adaptation. 
 
                                                   
41 The essence of the concept of collective identity resides in a shared sense of “one-ness” or “we-
ness” anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences among those who comprise 
the collectivity and in relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of ‘others’” 
(Snow, 2001:2213). The notion of collective identity is addressed in Chapter 7: Subsuming Orga-
nizational Structure into Operational Code Analysis. 
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In this manner, among all the attacks, the September 11, 2001 provides the 
most sophisticated example of Al Qaeda’s hybrid organizational structure. Ac-
cording to 9/11 Commission Report, bin Laden held essentially leadership role, 
provided for financial support and supervised the recruitment of leading opera-
tives and “muscle hijackers”42 for the operation, although originally the concep-
tualization of the plot was conducted by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) who 
subsequently held the responsibility for operational support to the attackers. The 
terrorists taking part in the attacks where initially recruited from the Arab Mus-
lim communities in Europe, Southeast Asia and the Arab world, especially Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia and consequently trained in Al Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan 
(Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 279). The attackers received orders from a central 
command and control structure of Al Qaeda’s establishment in Afghanistan, and 
logistical support from Al Qaeda’s sleeper cells in Europe and Southeast Asia 
(Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 279). This transnational organizational structure of 
Al Qaeda consequently enabled the attackers to coordinate information regard-
ing specific segments of the operation among independent cells in the country-
to-be-attacked.  
 
The centralized distribution of decision-making within Al Qaeda has been 
represented essentially by the recruitment supervision and continuous report 
provision to bin Laden by selected operatives from sleeping cells in Europe, 
                                                   
42 A “muscle hijackers” term denotes individuals who played central role in storming the cockpits 
and controlling the passengers during the 9/11 terrorist attacks., who were trained in the based 
in Afghanistan and consequently transmitted to the United States into independent operational 
cells. 
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which coordinated the commands from Afghanistan to individuals in United 
States.43  Mohammed Atta constituted a solemn link from the cells present in the 
United States to Al Qaeda’s organizational establishments in Europe, Middle 
East and Southeast Asia. The primacy of security of the plotted attacks, became 
the primary reason behind the representative allocation of information concern-
ing the attacks into individual cells, which of which only one individual held the 
information concerning another cell. The hijackers were primary assigned into 
appropriate training, yet without detailed information concerning their role in 
the attacks. The network structure of Al Qaeda enabled the organization to main-
tain its operational secrecy through sporadic linkages among attackers and trans-
formation of autonomy for decision-making regarding targets and time of the 
attack to the leaders of cells. Non of the assisting operatives which facilitated co-
ordinated transmission of attackers in U.S. soil were provided the operational 
details of the plan, while the “muscle hijackers” were given the details post-
training and post-arrival in the United States just days preceding the attacks en-
suring the efficient maintenance of the network structure.   
 
In summary, Al Qaeda’s organizational structure between approximately 
1998 and 2001 was comprised of networked links between organizational ele-
ments, peripheral decentralization with autonomous cells yet hierarchical com-
mand and control centre. The organization’s structure exhibited its adaptability, 
secrecy  and  survivability  apparent  in  the  formation  of  informal  network 
                                                   
43 Binalshibh was the primary linkage between bin Laden, KSM as operational supporter and 
Atta as a representative leader from cells in United States.  
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structures, with limited guides and formally established means for conduct of 
terrorist operations.  In respect of specialization Al Qaeda before 9/11 displayed 
a degree of specialization in respect of the specifically assigned roles, such as dif-
ferentiation among pilots and overtakes among “muscle hijackers.” Equally, in 
terms of professionalism, Al Qaeda’s provides essentially high levels of organiza-
tional operationalism of its structure, since it essentially provided a necessary 
training and education to future terrorists, without professional pre-
requirements for the recruitment. 
 
6.3. Al Qaeda’s Network after September 11. 
With the extensive counter-terrorist response following the attacks on World 
Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, the global Islamist terrorist threat changes 
the direction of its evolution. Following the attacks on the World Trace Centre 
and the Pentagon, Al Qaeda’s has been specifically targeted by the international 
community to dismantle and diminish its operational capabilities. The Operation 
Enduring Freedom commenced wherein the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in Octo-
ber 2001, that through air and land operations successfully destroyed terrorist 
training camps, enabled capturing and killing of Al Qaeda core leadership and 
subsequent cessation of terrorist activities both in Afghanistan and in other loca-
tions directed from Afghani terrorist bases. Within weeks U.S. forces and their 
Afghan allies removed Taliban forcibly from power and consequently caused ir-
reparable damage to al Qaeda’s sanctuaries, headquarters and training camps in 
Afghanistan, killing at least eight of the twenty Al Qaeda leaders (Conetta, 2002).  
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Equally, the Saudi authorities in cooperation with international efforts success-
fully targeted Al Qaeda’s finances and significantly disabled a range of al 
Qaeda’s activities. The monitoring of al Qaeda’s suspected and known members 
began to disrupt the communication within the organization, the further arrests 
and killing of al Qaeda’s core leadership provided for significant lessening of al 
Qaeda’s operational capabilities. Dishman (2005: 243) noted that in total “since 
September 11, Al Qaeda has lost roughly 70 percent of its leadership” and lost an 
affiliation with an explicit territory and institutional presence in Afghanistan, ne-
cessitating the organization to resort to drastic shifts in organizational structure 
and further improve its adaptability against the challenges of external environ-
ment. 
 
The successes of coalition’s counterterrorism in Afghanistan provide for the 
fact that Al Qaeda operates in significantly diminished capacity. Despite the chal-
lenges of external environment becoming more complex and unstable for al 
Qaeda, the organization managed to carry several bombings, including Tunisia 
synagogue bombing in 2002, Bali nightclub bombing in 2002, suicide bombing in 
Riyad in 2003, Casablanca targeting of foreigners in 2003, truck-bombs in Istan-
bul in 2003, Madrid train-bombings in 2004, London bombings in 2005 and many 
other. The operational success of the al Qaeda’s attacks resulted not from the in-
adequacy of counter-terrorist measures, but rather from changes in Al Qaeda’s 
organizational structure that provided the organization with ability to main its 
operational capacity. As Hoffman et al. (2005: 10) noted, “Al Qaeda has proved 
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itself to be a remarkably nimble, flexible and adaptive entity” as it rebounded 
from the complex environmental challenge to an extent that is rarely fully appre-
ciated from the structural point of view. It does not present itself structurally as a 
bureaucratic organization as it was in Afghanistan coherent to be defeated on the 
battlefield, neither as an entity structurally diverse yet centralized in decision-
making as it was in Afghanistan between 1998-2001. Al Qaeda’s organizational 
patterns go beyond those of modern terrorist structures, with its “amorphous, 
decentralized network of cells that spread and multiply in a way that in terms of 
organizational form closely resembles franchise business schemes” (Stepanova, 
2008: 133). The organizational innovative transnational, de-territorialized struc-
ture with loose communication and coordination transformed Al Qaeda’s into 
another entity presenting variety of themes of dynamism in form, rationales and 
spheres of influence. 
 
Remaining devoted to its essential objectives, namely a removal of all West-
ern presence from Muslim lands, reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate and es-
tablishment of rule of Islamic law in Muslim countries, Al Qaeda as an entity 
undoubtedly remains existent in restructured form, as noted by Etzioni (1964), in 
respect of its designed purposes.  In respect of Al Qaeda’s objectives, the group 
has essentially utilized its purpose for both inspirational as well as operational 
purposes (Corera, 2004). The continuously emergent proclamations and declara-
tions from Al Qaeda’s core leadership, point specifically at the fact that the orga-
nization  beliefs  it  is  at  war  and  it  is  a  duty  of  every  Muslim  to  participate 
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or support the efforts against Western powers. The purpose of the organization, 
therefore, appears to constitute an amalgam of political and religious legitimacy 
claims for which the organization appears to claim its success with expansion of 
support, organizational structure and operational capabilities. The consequent 
evaluation of Al Qaeda’s leadership patterns, its span of control, communication 
and recruitment provide for an overview of Al Qaeda’s structure and design that 
in its highest sophistication aims to support its core objectives and act upon 
them. 
 
6.3.1. Leadership 
A leadership in organization remains one of the most significant aspects of 
organizational context. Either serving the function of integrating and coordinat-
ing force facilitating an effective and efficient achievement of organizational ob-
jectives (Carlisle, 1976: 7) or as a force mobilizing and directing of individuals 
and their ideas (Kotter, 1990: 7), leadership becomes an important element upon 
which an organizational structure is based on. According to Kotter (1990: 8), 
“leaders establish direction by developing a vision of the future, align people to 
move them toward a shared vision,” an aspect which is particularly important in 
respect of Al Qaeda. As much as the “coordination” and “integration” aspect of 
the Al Qaeda organization remains questionable, due to its neutralized opera-
tionalism (Sageman, 2008b: 126), a terrorist coordination of affiliated groups and 
individuals was instead sanctioned with Al Qaeda’s inspirational leadership. The 
leadership  of  Al Qaeda  as  essentially  lacking  the  centralization  aspect  of  
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coordination and integration, presents its innovativeness and resourcefulness in 
providing a charismatic inspiration and guidance to the individuals and groups 
affiliated with its primary cause and objectives. Increasingly, many authors point 
out that the effectiveness of Al Qaeda leadership relies on its provision of inspi-
ration and motivation to all affiliated groups which develops into a complex 
network reliant on the ideological linkage to Al Qaeda’s extreme reverence  for  
the  leaders  (Sageman, 2008b).  An  increasing  portrayal  of  Al  Qaeda’s leader-
ship  as  a  greater  achiever,  symbol  of  a  cause  for  Islamic  extremists  (Mangi, 
2003: 124), further supported by the historical sophistication and success of bin 
Laden’s terrorist practices places the stress on Al Qaeda’s leadership as a core for 
organizational action. However, with “a core leadership constantly hunted, any 
communication or contact with them would increase their vulnerability and po-
tentially compromise the security of operation as well” (Borum and Gelles 2005: 
476), which necessitated moving operational decisions away from the core and 
into the field, laying ground for the increasing role of ideological and inspira-
tional stance of the leading masterminds of the organization. Importantly, how-
ever, the far reaching connections and global inspiration of Al Qaeda the organi-
zation cannot be simply assigned a label of leaderless, as apparent increasingly 
throughout the literature (Sageman, 2008a, 2008b, Springer et al. 2009), but rather 
recognition of a spiritual leadership of the organization, the clear boundaries of 
the organizational structuring would consequently reach beyond the core orga-
nizational structure and become thereof complex and interrelated to the external 
environment of the organization. As an icon, bin Laden appeals to a large portion 
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of Muslim extremists located in remote parts of the world, constituting a sym-
bolical presence and inspiration through reverence for his actions. Empirically, 
the effectiveness of Al Qaeda’s leadership should be measured in respect of or-
ganizational influence embracing leaders’ vision, strength and commitment to 
organizational cause, next to the traditional regard for leadership in terms of 
his/her competency in situational circumstances. The organizational structure of 
leadership of Al Qaeda provides increasingly for organization’s extensive flexi-
bility in face of new situations. 
 
Hence contemporary Al Qaeda’s leadership is relying on wider network to 
plan and execute operations with the support of its associate cells, groups and 
increasingly individuals, Al Qaeda’s organizational existence in reference to its 
inspirational  rather  than  coordinative  leadership  can  be  adequately  pre-
sented  with  the organizational theory coined by Kerr and Jermier (1978) regard-
ing the “substitutes for leadership.” This theory, suggests that the organizational 
characteristics, such as formalization, group cohesiveness, inflexible rules and 
organizational rewards may become effective substitutes for leadership, provid-
ing for efficient explanation of the lack of impact of leadership upon subordi-
nates in variety of situations (Miner, 2007: 169). According the substitutes for 
leadership theory, the substitution can manifest itself directly or indirectly, the 
former occurring when “subordinate is influenced by a leader behavior in and of 
itself,” while the latter, when a “subordinate is influenced by the implications of 
the leader behavior for some future consequence” (Miner, 2007: 170).  
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Since the substitution of leadership occurs when organization encounters 
problems with ineffective or weak leadership, the notions of shared leadership 
may serve as a substitute for a formally recognized leadership. Building upon the 
substitute for leadership framework of Kerr and Jermier (1978), Manz and Sims 
(1980) identified a notion of self-management or self-leadership as identifiable 
notion of organizational existence. The  theory  of  self-leadership  assumes  that  
“to  the  extent  that subordinates  are  knowledgeable  about  organizational  
need,  had  appropriate skills for the task at hand  and  are  motivated  to  engage  
in  productive activity,  self-leadership  could alleviate  the  need  for  close  su-
pervision,  direction  and  control” (Pearce and Conger, 2003: 11). Importantly, as 
Bass (1985) noted, the non-bureaucratic organizations are more likely to exhibit 
transformational behaviors of leaders in order to motivate the organization’s 
members to achieve organization’s objectives beyond expectation, and signifi-
cantly appear as less institutionalized substitutes for leadership. In this context, 
Al Qaeda being essentially a network organization appears to stress the motiva-
tion and ideological stand contributing to the substitution for leadership in a 
greater extent. 
 
In this respect, while the environmental complexity and uncertainly imposed 
on al Qaeda a transformation into essentially decentralized networked structure, 
allowing for self-recruited individuals to affiliate effortlessly with the organiza-
tion, the clearly delineated organizational mission of al Qaeda, shared vision and 
objectives and ideological value system become credible substitutions for the 
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formal leadership exercised by Osama bin Laden and his respective colleagues in 
al Qaeda Central.  
 
6.3.2. Al Qaeda’s Spam of Control 
The importance of evaluation of organizational structure of Al Qaeda lays 
precisely in its relation to organizational reliance on leadership structure and de-
cision-making. Yet as Stojkovic et al (2003) illustrates, the leadership alone does 
not become a solemn delineator of the extent of organizational structure, particu-
larly in circumstances of Al Qaeda’s decentralized form extends its leadership 
across the organization and its affiliates. Further alluding to organizational struc-
ture Stojkovic et al. (2003: 6) identified a significance of organizational “spam of 
control” as significantly impinging upon and resulting from the organizational 
need for structural alignment. In respect of the leadership characteristics of Al 
Qaeda and bin Laden’s spiritual influence, the organizational appears to have 
expanded since its existence in the pre-9/11 international environment.  Bin 
Laden’s decreased importance as a commander and coordinator (Corera, 2004), 
places Al Qaeda in a unique decentralization realm that represents an informal 
structure based on ideologue and propagandist activities, that permits for Al 
Qaeda’s core leadership to engage solely with the alignment of strategic objec-
tives leaving the decentralized local groups with autonomy to decide the time 
and place of the attacks. This division has been particularly apparent in the 
evaluation of structural consistency and components of Al Qaeda and defines the 
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organization’s span of control as underlining pillar of its organizational struc-
ture. 
 
One of the characteristic and expanding dimensions of today’s al Qaeda is the 
organization’s historic affiliation and association with variety of terrorist groups. 
Since, its establishment Al Qaeda has provided spiritual guidance and assistance 
in form of training, arms and fund to many terrorist and insurgent groups. “Dur-
ing his stay in Afghanistan, bin Laden strengthened the global reach of al Qaeda 
network, collaborating closely with terrorist groups in Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Somalia, as well as the Balkans, the Caucasus, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia, the Philippines and Kashmir,” (Gurule, 2008: 36) 
groups, which remained in their capabilities “to undertake attacks on al Qaeda’s 
behest or to provide essential local, logistical and other support to facilitate 
strikes by the al Qaeda “professional” [al Qaeda Central] cadre” (Hoffman, 2006: 
286). On this account, the structure of Al Qaeda encompasses “loose-kit, semi-
autonomous groups of Islamic fundamentalists, technologically tied together by 
global networks”(Aubrey, 2004: 152). Representing a global Jihadist network and 
embodying a highly diversified actors bound by shared ideological and political 
stands (Hegghammer, 2006: 15), Al Qaeda becomes  an  ‘enclave’ name  for  
many  independent,  remote,  collaborative  and worldwide spread cells around 
the world linked by a common purpose (Grudzewski, et al. 2008 :208). Contem-
porarily, the anatomy of the radical Islamic network structure embraces highly 
connected hubs, divided into Central Stuff, Core Arab, Core Maghreb Arab and 
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South-east Asian (Sageman, 2004: 137). Figure 6. below, represents the approxi-
mation of current terrorist networks associated with the new-generation terrorist 
organizations.  
 
 
Figure 6. Global Jihadist Network 
 
The illustration of the current global Jihadist network exemplifies the elastic-
ity and decentralization, with minimalistic hierarchy of organizational structure 
of the new-generation terrorism. Not only the visual complexity allows the audi-
ence to comprehend the loose composite of the current terrorist threat but also its 
practical dimensions necessitate a need to find effective measured countering the 
novel organizational structure of global terrorism. 
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Another organizational dimension of Al Qaeda’s span of control embraces Al 
Qaeda Locals, individuals who “are likely to have had some previous terrorism 
experience, [and] will have been blooded in battle as part of some previous Ji-
hadist campaign in Algeria, the Balkans, Chechnya and perhaps more recently in 
Iraq, and might have trained in some al Qaeda facility before 9/11” (Hoffman, 
2006: 287). This dimension of Al Qaeda’s organization includes the individuals in 
the environment outside of the actual organization, whose links with the Al 
Qaeda’s core structure and underlining often proves to be tenuous or dormant 
rather than active and direct. Due to the previous linkage to the organization, the 
Al Qaeda Locals constitute an al Qaeda-inspired adversary, who experienced the 
organizational capability of the organization but remain essentially independent 
from the financial and other support from Al Qaeda Central (Hoffman, 2006: 
287). 
 
Importantly, Al Qaeda’s newly emergent span of control comprises home-
grown Islamic radicals, self-recruited wannabes from Middle East, Maghreb, 
Asia, and diaspora communities in Europe, who find purpose in terror and com-
rades on the Internet, without displaying any identifiable connection to al Qaeda 
Central or al Qaeda’s affiliated groups. Marc Sageman (2008a: 39) noted that this 
new dimension of terrorist forms “fluid, informal networks that are self-financed 
and self-trained,” have  no  physical  headquarters  and  remain  largely  scat-
tered  and  decentralized terrorist force managing its existence in the virtual en-
vironment of the Internet. According to Hoffman (2006: 287) exhibit the loosely 
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knit nature of the network of home-grown terrorist, they nevertheless display a 
preparedness “to carry out attacks in solidarity with or support of al Qaeda’s 
radical Jihadist agenda.” Displaying the primarily cohesive force as united ideo-
logical stand, and perhaps grievance and disappointment towards the Western 
states, and United States in particular the self-recruited dimension of al Qaeda is 
often referred to as leaderless (Sageman, 2008b). Hoffman (2006: 7) noted that 
structurally the home-grown force comprises “small cells of like-minded locals 
who gravitate toward the cell to plan and mount terrorist attacks completely in-
dependently of any direction provided by Al Qaeda.” As Springer et al. (2009: 
108) noted, “under leaderless resistance scheme, individuals create small groups 
that engage in activity without central direction but follow a common inspiration 
that serves as their motivational ideal,” constituting for the structure of today’s 
Al Qaeda as an inner core entity of the multinational alliance of Jihadists. The 
emergent terrorist network organizations became increasingly amounted to a 
“set of diverse, dispersed cells who share a set of ideas and interests and who are 
arrayed to act in a fully internetted “all-channel” manner” (Arquilla and Ronfeld, 
2001: 7). 
 
Today, the presented network named al Qaeda, is characterized by the inde-
pendent hugs seemingly operating relatively independent from one another, 
with sporadic trans-hub communications (Hegghammer, 2006: 15). Sivan (2003: 
4) argues that the strength of this enclave “ensures a quality of status among  
members  without  hampering  decision-making…  [doing  so  by]  promoting 
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charismatic local figures.” This fact contributes to the hampering of repression 
and endowment of members with a sense of empowerment and group solidarity 
(Sivan, 2003: 4). This structure significantly bespeaks of an element of shared 
valued and belief systems that is not merely that of a single individual or single 
hub embodied within the structure of al Qaeda but represents a phenomenon of 
a group of like-minded individuals and/or independent organizations that are 
highly dedicated to the normative bonds shared within the structure of al Qaeda. 
The most prominent example of those new phenomena include the Moroccan Is-
lamic cell in Spain, which carried the March 2004 Madrid train bombings (Sage-
man, 2008a, 2008b). As Thornton (2005: 4) pointed out, “the bombing of a Madrid 
train by Al Qaeda in March 2004 shows that they are perfectly willing to conduct 
attacks against targets that are relatively minor in order to achieve their ends,” 
that is moving into a decentralized model that allows localized subgroups to ex-
ercise greater autonomy in decision-making and activities provides for Al 
Qaeda’s structural deviation from bureaucratic hierarchy with control of the un-
derneath levels of activities. 
 
To identify a comprehensive picture of Al Qaeda’s span of control, it is neces-
sary to identify the structural boundaries and characteristic of the organization. 
Stojovic et al (2003: 27) identified that organizational hierarchical structure can be 
differentiated among flat and tall hierarchies, as graphically representative of 
with the horizontal and vertical organizational structure. The flat hierarchies are 
“organizations with few levels of command [that] typically exhibit wide spans of 
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control and most level” (Stojovic et al, 2003: 27), presenting typically a wide dif-
ferentiation among departments. Al Qaeda’s structure in this respect appears to 
embrace the flat hierarchical alignment within its bounded organizational struc-
ture with relational connection to various dispersed networks, identified as tied 
to affiliated groups and sub-groups as well as home-grown terrorists as catego-
ries of organizational composition in respect to span of control. The graphical il-
lustration in Figure 7 below, presents the alignment of Al Qaeda in respect of its 
hierarchical composition, level of authority and relation to its organizational 
components. 
 
 
Figure 7. Al Qaeda’s Span of Control 
 
Importantly, Figure 7. not only represents an extent of Al Qaeda’s control but 
also identifies Al Qaeda’s relationship and extent of influence on its constituent 
parts. Often Al Qaeda’s flat hierarchy and sometimes only symbolic connections 
to those claiming associations with the leadership provide for often labeling of Al 
Qaeda as a social movement. Contrary, the dotted line represents inspirational 
linkages, such as those linking Al Qaeda’s ideology and objectives. On the two 
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extremes of the scheme, home-grown terrorists and Madrid bombers represent 
the informally constructed affiliation with Al Qaeda’s leadership through Al 
Qaeda’s inspirational mobilization (Sageman, 2008a: 31). The two affiliates on the 
right, represent a direct but rather looser tie to Al Qaeda. The Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan’s  and Abu Sayaf Group’s connection to Al Qaeda’s leadership is 
often identified as tenuous at best (Burke, 2003: 15-16), with a strong connection 
grounded in Al Qaeda’s inspiration rather than direct coordination and support. 
The two centre groups on the left, however, present more direct links with Al 
Qaeda, such as organization’s direct connection to Al Qaeda in Iraq. As Fishman 
(2006: 19) noted the connection between Al Qaeda in Iraq and Al Qaeda Central 
was established primarily through provision of tactical support, publicity and 
recruiting processes.44 Equally, a direct connection between Al Qaeda and Je-
maah Islamiyah Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate creating a “radical splinter group 
with the nebulous southeast Asian network” (Burke, 2003: 265) responsible for 
Bali bombings of nightclub in 2002. Although in each examples, links to Al 
Qaeda’s leadership prove to be looser than in strictly formal organizational de-
sign, Al Qaeda’s strong ideological background and enables the organization to 
exercise extensive span of control through motivational inducement of change. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
44 Abu Musab Zarqawi agreed to join Al Qaeda in 2004, 18 months following U.S. invasion of Iraq 
establishing Al Qaeda in Iraq affiliated organization (Fishman, 2006: 21).  
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6.3.3. Communications and Recruitment 
The historical examples of embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, 
as well as, the spectacular of September 11, 2001, presents sophistication and 
point undisputedly at the efficiency of secretive communications embodied in Al 
Qaeda’s organizational structure. However, in face of the dismantlement and de-
centralization following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the organiza-
tion has unaccustomedly transformed its communication patterns in order to 
meet the demands and challenges of external environmental setting for organiza-
tional survival. The primary aspect of communication within Al Qaeda, as pre-
sented above, reflects organization’s adaptability characteristic, with the prioriti-
zation of downward communication of spiritual encouragement that through 
clarification of organizational mission provide direction to its followers. The 
communication network, however, at closer look proves to identify a complex 
organism, where the communication became increasingly facilitated with orga-
nization’s re-formation into a horizontal communication structure, including 
both individual, affiliated groups and distinct organization with parallel ideo-
logical agendas.   
 
Although Al Qaeda’s ideology remains largely puritanical, the organization is 
essentially modern in respect of its recognition of the utility of modern technolo-
gies. Al Qaeda exploits up-to date technology relying on virtual activities regard-
ing radical Islamists enhancing and succeeding in the communication efforts. Re-
lying on Internet communication systems such as e-mails, chat rooms, encrypted 
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communication websites, Al Qaeda’s truly global reach was exemplified ena-
bling the organization to engage in sheer range of activities and construct ambi-
tions. The estimated number of terrorist websites that advocate or incite forms of 
political and religious violence has risen to approximately 4,700 to date (Ariza, 
2006: 19). With the ideologically strengthened incentives for violence in face of 
the ongoing political conflicts, the radicals are presented with a possibility to fa-
cilitated communication through the Internet, resorting to the means of virtual 
communication in an attempt to spread the message. Provided with an explicit 
information and easier means of communication, Al Qaeda essentially strength-
ened the pillars of its network by provision of flexibility and survivability of the 
organization. Sageman (2008b: 115) noted that interpersonal relationships that 
were developed and sustained by written means of communication differed from 
those dependent on oral means of communication, making people more intro-
spective.” Human relations within the organizational structure transform faster 
and to an ever-greater degree since the information revolution took its path.   
 
Significantly, it was the utilization of the virtual space and connectivity that 
enabled the autonomous attackers of Bali in 2002, Madrid in 2004, London in 
2005, where “the open anarchic structure of the Internet support[ed] this chaotic 
dynamics modus operandi as a way for militants to recruit new members and 
look for goals and inspiration” (Ariza, 2006: 19). The three attacks as examples of 
“a new form of terrorist attack … undertaken by much more locally rooted Ji-
hadis, acting in tighter ‘home-grown’ groups, with loose and difficult-to-trace 
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ties to the on-the-run Al Qaeda leadership” (Cruickshank and Ali, 2007: 2), sig-
nificantly enabled international community to become acquainted with commu-
nication patterns of Jihadist terrorists. The responsibility of Bali bombing on Oc-
tober 12, 2002 was assigned to Jemaah Islamiyah, an Islamist group led by radical 
cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, who is believed to be a close associate of Osama bin 
Laden. The attackers in Madrid bombing on March 11, 2004 had connections wit 
several leading European jihadis including members of the Moroccan Fighting 
Group inspired by Al Qaeda’s constituent past, and with significant financial aid 
from Abu Qatada, the spiritual leader of al Zarqawi’s terrorist group. The suicide 
London bombings on July 7, 2005 were initially reported to be linked to Al Qaeda 
through the leader Mohammed Siddique Khan45 with  operatives  associated  
with  the  organization  and  Al Qaeda’s  confirmation of responsibility (Cruick-
shank and Ali, 2007: 10). Importantly, the abovementioned terrorist cells in pro-
totype belonging to Al Qaeda’s Jihadist network were formed autonomously and 
connected to the core organization in common purpose and assistance to trans-
form it into acts of terror. Importantly, both elements of Al Qaeda organization 
“unhindered by bureaucratic inertia and unchallenged Western governments, 
have recognized their operations to take advantage of the Internet’s prosaic 
properties” (Kohlmann, 2006: 115). 
 
Technology enabled Al Qaeda to provide a general guidance to the partici-
pants  in  the  absence  of  physical  command  and  control  found  in  traditional 
                                                   
45 Mohammed Siddique Khan was filmed in an Al Qaeda video production. 
 160 
bureaucratic organizations. As Stepanova (2008: 133) noted, “Al Qaeda, in fact, is 
unique among all terrorist groups in this respect, from the start its leadership 
seems to have intuitively grasped the enormous communicative potential of the 
Internet and sought to harness this power both to further the movement’s strate-
gic aims and to facilitate its tactical operations.” In this respect, while Internet 
allows the organizational leadership to transform its strategic vision into a vir-
tual space, the Web provides operational and tactical cells with necessary infor-
mation concerning recruitment potential, availability of resources and knowl-
edge of infrastructure, weaponry etc. As Kohlmann (2006: 117) reminds, “terror-
ist groups also regularly distribute videos online explaining how to make rock-
ets, improvised explosive devices and even crude chemical weapons.”  
 
Al Qaeda’s loss of physical base extended the organizational communication 
into a virtual space, allowing Al Qaeda a successful transition into effective 
communication and recruiting system that proves to be difficult to defeat and 
disrupt by the law enforcement authorities around the world. As mentioned 
above, the primary function of the Internet is to provide an access to training 
manuals and handbooks to Jihadists around the world.  However, significantly, 
the other function of Internet is to “provide an interactive environment where 
people can discuss training-related issues, exchange personal experiences and 
communicate with online ‘trainers’ who can explain and clarify problematic sub-
jects” (Sternersen, 2008: 3). For instance, the volume on intelligence and security 
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contained in the Encyclopaedia of the Afghan Jihad, Al Qaeda’s Training Manual 
or Declaration of Jihad Against the Country’s Tyrants. 
 
Given the long-established sophistication of the organization’s propaganda 
methods and use of Internet, the organization’s choreography and dissemination 
opportunities for reaching masses is likely to get across the organization’s mes-
sage and provide its recruitment value (Hoffman, 2003: 5). Al Qaeda’s opera-
tional successes of the past have enhanced organization’s pool of recruits, with 
technological underpinnings playing an equally important role as in communica-
tion mechanisms. Al Qaeda’s uses websites for indoctrination and declarations, 
chat-rooms for ignition of personal attitudes towards certain direction and re-
cruitment videos openly extolling virtues of martyrdom, solicit new recruits into 
Al Qaeada’s cause. Al Qaeda uses Internet in order to recruit through creation of 
social networks, indoctrination and propaganda. 
 
Within the context of a social network, Al Qaeda’s recruitment appears to be 
qualitative in nature, not quantitative that enables the routes of recruitment to 
follow social contacts and trusted individuals, who serve as a role of linking the 
targeted population and the group. Al Qaeda’s recruitment aims at the personal 
engagement of  an  individual  in  the  struggle  ensured  of  Al Qaeda’s  ability  
to  carry  out  the struggle. Borum and Gelles (2005: 480) note that “recruiting en-
hancements have increased the size and quality of jihadists who might be mobi-
lized to participate in an attack.” Al Qaeda’s virtual means of recruitment and 
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training not only encourages individuals to join jihad but significantly encour-
ages formation of small cells as parts of the Al Qaeda diasporas. Milward and 
Rabb (2006) note that “experts are converging on a view that at the operational 
level the network consists of cells of a few individuals who are recruited by a cell 
builder, who recruits activates and the leaves. Form the on, contact with Al 
Qaeda is through the Internet.” In this means, technology again provides a mean 
of substitution for hierarchical structure, as Al Qaeda’s terrorism became largely 
conducted on a self-recruitment basis.  
 
The indoctrination and propaganda of Al Qaeda is conducted primarily 
through websites that present organization’s unremitting recruitment, communi-
cative and morale-strengthening efforts. The websites46 usually put forward a 
strong anti-American and anti-Western stand, with the image of the West as hos-
tile to Islam and call for the necessity of jihad as the only mean through which 
the West could be defeated. A detailed elaboration of jihad strengthened by ap-
peals to individual’s values concerning issues of personal commitment to the du-
ties dictated by the religion, provides a strong incentive to a wide range of indi-
viduals visiting the websites and affected by the political situation in the world 
(Hoffman, 2006: 226). A widespread availability of the sophisticated and inex-
pensive communication technologies, therefore, enables Al Qaeda to target the 
sympathizing audiences. 
                                                   
46 The first and one of the most prominent Al Qaeda website was www.alneda.com and served as 
a source of news and information over which the movement exercised its indoctrination and 
propaganda. 
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A careful examination of communications, recruitment and leadership would 
provide for a comprehensive inclusiveness of organizational constituency of Al 
Qaeda today. Significantly, as much attention as is contemporarily given to the 
external horizontal structure, linking a number of terrorist organizations, the in-
ternal structural underlining of Al Qaeda, should not be dismissed merely for its 
integration into an extended form. The structure of Al Qaeda fashioned by bin 
Laden, thus should be portrayed in respect of different realms of functionality, 
not merely as a name for network encompassing different fundamental Islamic 
terrorist organizations organized into cells, but also as an organization with 
structural underlining allowing for the management and coordination of “dis-
tinct recruitment, training and indoctrination divisions, operationally adopting a 
horizontal structure that mirrors the top Fortune 500 companies”47 (Aubrey, 2004: 
152).  
 
The lack of physical base contributed significantly to the undermined position 
of centralized decision-making body and the gradual de-stratification of the hier-
archy of authority. Al Qaeda with the loss of external base, lost the privilege to 
exercise essentially a strict centralized control over the subordinate cells. Signifi-
cantly, majority of descriptions of a home-grown terrorist phenomena associated 
with Al Qaeda point at the decentralized and inspirational attributes of the ad-
versary. In fact, the decentralization points to the reality of diminished influence 
                                                   
47 Fortune 500 is an annual ranking list of the top 500 largest corporations complied by Fortune 
magazine. Aubrey attempts to make an analogy between the network structure of Al Qaeda to 
increasingly apparent network structures of economic enterprises.  
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of Al Qaeda Central and increasing self-defining of targets, attack methods etc. 
Importantly, however, the  often-mentioned  leaderless  nature  of  the  new  di-
mension  of  Al Qaeda,  and reference to the common ideological stand of self-
recruited elements increasingly become referent to Al Qaeda as a social move-
ment rather than an actual organization. However, as Stepanova (2008: 132) 
noted Al Qaeda’s “go beyond those of standard modern anti-system network 
that, for instance, characterize the anti-globalist movements,” and the structural 
elements of al Qaeda delineated by Hoffman (2006: 285) point at the fact that Al 
Qaeda “retains some important characteristics and aspects of a more organized 
entity, mixing and matching organizational and operational styles as dictated by 
particular missions or imposed by circumstances.” Strengthened with the new 
organizational structure operating within a realm of collective belief system, the 
global lengthening of Al Qaeda and not only constitutes a novel form of organi-
zations but importantly becomes a model for organization of political violence 
for the next generations of terrorists. The following chapter attempts to bring the 
reader closer to the premises of cognitive theories and identify the structural in-
fluences on decision-making in a manner consistent with the spirit of the opera-
tional code analysis. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUBSUMING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE INTO  
OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
In order to advance the analysis further it is important to understand in full 
the theories of decision-making as they appear prevalently within fields of policy 
analysis and organizational theory. The primary purpose of this chapter, thus, is 
to present a preliminary formulation of analytical scheme, that would serve as a 
frame of reference for the study of operational code within decision-making 
paradigm. In face of theoretical requirements for subsuming prepositions about 
organizational structure into operational code analysis, it is particularly impor-
tant to distinguish a role of organizational structure for decision-making against 
the background of the theories on cognition.  In this manner, through the specific 
focus upon the premises of cognition-based approach to decision-making a fur-
ther problematic on the influences of beliefs about organizational structure can 
be identified. This scheme may be of sufficient substance and clarity to permit 
further investigations of operational code analysis in a manner that would con-
structively provide means for understanding of political actors’ behavior and 
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motivations. This is intended to suggest in a general way the nature of opera-
tional code analysis that is subjected to the reversionary inquiry of this thesis.  
 
7.1. Cognitive Approach to Decision-Making as Frame of Reference 
In order to address the notion of decision-making from the perspective of op-
erational code analysis it is important to describe and explain through providing 
definitions, categorizations and assignment of properties to the observed phe-
nomena. This is to categorize selected phenomenon within the framework of par-
ticular field of interest in a larger intellectual context. Therefore, decision-making 
in the context of international politics as an object of inquiry needs analysts’ at-
tention to its properties as a social phenomenon, concerned specifically with the 
political behavior in certain instances. Delineating clear boundaries for decision-
making studies constitutes for means of requirement as a prior condition for es-
tablishing a meaningful connection with related academic disciplines at large. 
This is to establish an organizing principle that would serve as a coherent frame 
of reference that ought to put the analysts on the qui vive to possible inconsisten-
cies of purposes (Snyder et al. 1962: 28). Different intellectual operations concern-
ing the problematic in question may result in different understandings of the 
subject inquired; thus while some frames of reference may accommodate for 
more comprehensive approach, other will not. It is important to point to the fact 
that the evaluation of decision-making process may not correspond to the at-
tempt to portray the world of decision-maker as it is perceived by him or her.  
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In this respect, it is necessary to account for the fundamental aspect of the 
field of decision-making, namely the concepts of objective and subjective realities. 
The fundamental distinction between the two postulations in embodied in two 
preliminary conceptualizations: 
 
I. Whether the decision-makers address perceives the reality objectively; 
that is independent of decision-makers’ perceptions; and that can be 
described by the analysts as real social world, or 
 
II. Whether, the decision-makers address themselves to the subjective re-
ality; that is represents merely his/hers image of the world; and that 
constitutes a social system in terms of which human behavior can be 
explained. 
 
In this manner, assuming an objective reality would merely set “limits to 
what can happen when the decision is executed” while assuming subjective real-
ity would delegate a frame of reference “to which an individual defined choices 
and makes decisions” (Sprout and Sprout, 1957: 314). However, assuming that 
the world is single and coherent within which an analyst interprets the decision-
making can underestimate the role of the way in which the decision-makers per-
ceives the problem or the situation. Although acknowledging the fact that there 
might be a set of objective factors that can affect the behavior of decision-makers, 
whether they realize it or not; the frame of reference of this thesis focuses upon 
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the notion of multiple realities in which there is no objective reality shared in all re-
spects among decision-makers. The decision-makers perceive and construct im-
ages of the world through which they define situations. Relating this conceptu-
alization into the primary focus of inquiry in this thesis, Snyder et al. (1962: 30) 
observed that: 
Anything the participants ignore is not a part of the situation, though any 
subjective efforts the participants make are… an objective situation is rec-
reated by the observer on the basis of what the participants tell him plus 
what he knows which they do not. In the other case, the situation is recre-
ated on the basis of how the participants each define it. 
 
Within this thesis, recognizing importance of decision-makers’ (shared) per-
ceptions upon the political behavior shifts the focus of reference into a cognitive 
realm. The non-cognitive aspects of factors affecting decision-making will not be 
evaluated in this thesis per se, although a preliminary review of literature ad-
dressing this subject will be provided. To initiate a designed discourse, focusing 
upon cognitive aspects of decision-making, it is important to identify in detail the 
nature and limitation of subjectivity as it presents itself to the decision processes 
of a political actor.  
 
7.2. Prevalent Approaches to Organizational Decision-Making 
The underlying assumption of prevalent approaches to organizational deci-
sion-making is the recognition of the limitations upon decision-making observed 
through propensities of the actor (the decision-making unit) and the properties of 
the system (organizational structure and processes). The first premise underlines 
subjective perceptions and interpretations of the decision-making reality in the 
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light of past experience (Sprout and Sprout, 1957). It is due course of decision-
making processes that these perceptions are afterwards applied rationally in 
choosing objectives and formulating means for their achievements. The second 
limitation as “traceable to organizational pathology suggest that decision-making 
can be constrained from the system” (Snyder et al. 1962: 103). Although it may 
appear as thought the limitations in the setting (structure and processes) are ob-
jective to the decision-maker it cannot be over-emphasized that the estimates of 
such limitations by the analysts and by decision-makers themselves may not be 
identical. Snyder et al (1962: 101) observed that “for the most of the part the deci-
sion-makers do not confront external limitations directly on a personal, face-to-
face basis, so to speak. Rather their perceptions and judgments result from their 
participation in a decision-making system.” The focus upon subjectivity of deci-
sion-making as a focus of this chapter, thus, conforms to the requirements for 
further progress of the inquiry. The most influential work that has been felt far 
beyond the study of decision-making was the Allison’s Essence of Decision Making 
(1971), which’s preliminary purpose was to chart a course for others to follow.   
 
7.2.1. Rational-Actor, Organizational and Governmental Politics Models of 
Decision-Making – Allison (1971) 
Allison (1971) offers three conceptual models that since have become the 
dominant frame of reference most analysts of decision-making processes use: the 
Rational Actor (Model I); Organizational (Model II); Governmental Politics 
(Model III) models of decision-making. Allison (1971) conceived these three 
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paradigms as alternative approaches for analyzing decision-making in that they 
emphasize different forces operating at the stages of decision-making namely 
formation, choice and implementation.  
 
Model I conceives that a decision-maker is a unitary and purposive actor that 
approaches the problem of decision-making in consistent and value-maximizing 
manner (Allison, 1971: 30). Allison’s (1971) Model I is similar to the models de-
veloped by Lindblom (1959) and Simon (1972) and it describes decision-making 
process of setting objectives, designing options, examining consequences and 
choosing the option that maximizes the value of the outcome (Allison, 1971: 24). 
Allison  (1971) contends that in general foreign policy analysts utilize Model I in 
order to draw attention to the evaluation whether the actor followed the best 
strategy or whether the decision-maker deviated from the course of a rational 
approach. The rational approach of the political actor, according to Allison (1971: 
18) is in itself constrained by the subjectivity of perceptions of the actor, a notion 
addressed in Allison’s study as a bounded rationality.  
 
Despite of the acknowledgement of the prevalence of Model I in analysis of 
decision-making, Allison (1971: 254) noted that: 
We [the analysts] are forced to recognize that in treating happenings as ac-
tions, and national governments as unitary purposive actors, we are ‘model-
ing.’ The fact that the assumptions and categories of this model neglect im-
portant factors such as organizational processes and bureaucratic politics 
suggests that the model is inadequate. 
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 Allison’s (1972) primary assumption rests upon the conclusion of Model I has 
to be supplanted by the findings from Model II and Model III. The crucial aspect 
in which Model II represents a revision of Model I is that organizational routines 
constrain decision-making behavior. On this account, Welsh (2001: 117) impor-
tantly noted that “ 
Model II does not operate at the moment of decision; rather it explains de-
viations from ideal rationality at the moment of decision by highlighting 
the ways in which organizational routines constrain formation of options, 
and it explains deviations from perfect instrumentality after decisions are 
made by revealing how routines affect implementation. 
 
 
In a similar manner, Model III supplants both, Model I and Model II, by 
stressing that decision-making results from “negotiating and sparring among the 
main actors” (Bernstein, 2000: 140). Model III  diverts  analyst’s  attention  to  the  
fact  that  the decision-making unit is not a monolithic or unitary actor and thus 
decision-makers within the unit, approach decisions “not by a single rational 
choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics” (Allison, 1971: 144). Welsh 
(2001: 118) argued that “Model III does not suppose that the individual players 
behave irrationally in the games in which they participate, merely that the net 
effect of those games is to deflect [decision-making] behavior from the course 
that would have been chosen by a unitary rational actor.” This is to divert the at-
tention of the analyst from assumption that premises governing decision-making 
in organization are essentially dissimilar to the decision-making of lone indi-
viduals. 
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Allison’s (1971: 400) conception of “lenses” through which an analyst can ap-
proach decision-making allowed researchers to fragment and thus observe selec-
tively and derive precise conclusions decision-making reality. Depending upon 
the chosen theory, the analysts were given a chance to focus upon specified as-
sumptions for rigorous inquiry. However, how to converge the conclusions of 
these three theory-driven models was not explicitly addressed by Allison (1971) 
and thus can be opened to question.  
 
 As the frame of reference for this thesis necessitates the inquiry into cognitive 
limitations upon decision-making, Allison’s (1971) Model I would present the 
closest resemblance to the purpose of this thesis.48  In this respect, it is important 
to further specify the underlining premises behind the Model I paradigm, as it 
was presented by Allison (1971) and proceed to address how the organizational 
setting, as embraced in Models II and III, can be converged into Model I.  For 
that, it is important to conceptualize in detail Allison’s (1971) referral to cognitive 
limits bounding rationality of the actor. 
 
7.2.2. Cognitive Limits On Decision-Making 
 
Traditional theory of rational choice, prominently presented by Mach and 
Simon  (1958:  137-138)  assumes  that  in  the  decision-making  situation,  the  
decision-makers face set of given alternatives from which the action is chosen.  
                                                   
48 This thesis does not aim to adopt Allison’s (1971) Model I as a framework for analysis; rather it 
aims to identify the notion of bounded rationality against the framework of Model I for the better 
understanding of the concepts in further analysis.  It is essential to note that Allison’s (1971) con-
ceptualization did not address in detail the implications of bounded rationality for collective ac-
tors, which is  a primary focus of this thesis. 
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Consequently, each of these alternatives becomes associated with a number of 
consequences in a manner that prescribe events, which will occur if that particu-
lar choice is taken. At the outset, the decision-maker engages in a “preference-
ordering” that “ranks all sets of alternatives from the most preferred to the least 
preferred” (March and Simon, 1958: 137). However, as the notion of the rational-
ity in objective terms would necessitate a reality in which options, consequences 
attached, and utilities for decision-making exist independently of the perceptions 
of decision-maker, it is necessary to account for rationality to exist within a frame 
of reference that is relative to decision-maker’s positioning both against the ex-
ternal environment and the setting of decision-making (Sprout and Sprout, 1957; 
March and Simon, 1958; Snyder et al. 1962). This frame of reference is deter-
mined by the limitations of the rational man’s knowledge that presuppose that 
all alternatives are not necessarily “given,” all consequences attached to each al-
ternative are not necessarily “known” and that rational decision maker cannot 
hold an utility-ordering function for all possible sets of consequences (March and 
Simon, 1958: 137). 
 
In this manner, the two primary prepositions concerning rationality would 
account for the reality of decision-making. The first preposition would indicate 
that the choice is always exercised with respect to a limited, approximate and 
simplified model of the situation embracing chooser’s definition of the situation. 
The second preposition would indicate that “elements of the situation are not 
‘given’  but  are  themselves  the  outcome  of  psychological  and  sociological 
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processes including chooser’s own activities and activities of others in his envi-
ronment” (March and Simon, 1958: 12). These two preposition account for sig-
nificant limitations on rational decision-making, as efforts achieving pure rational-
ity are subjected to constrains that limit political actor’s information about situa-
tions, his knowledge about end-means relationship which impinges upon the ac-
curate prediction on the consequences attached to specific course of action, and 
consequently limit the judgment whether the choice of alternative becomes the 
best option (George, 1969: 197-198). These circumstances result from the very fact 
that “humans, whether inside or outside administrative organizations, behave 
rationally, if at all, only relative to some set of ‘given’ characteristic of situation” 
(March and Simon, 1958: 150). Through the knowledge of the “given’s” an ana-
lyst can identify the situation as it appears to the decision-making actor, rather 
than specifying the objective reality, or situation as it appears to an outside ana-
lyst. 
 
The abovementioned observations account for a notion of bounded rationality, 
which fundamentally “recognizes inescapable limitations of knowledge and 
computational ability of the agent,” (Allison, 1971: 20). As March and Simon 
(1958: 151) observed the subjectivity of perceptions led to the conclusion that “for 
an actor [decision-makers] defining the situation in a particular way involves a 
complex interweaving of affective and cognitive processes.” Cognition refers to 
people’s understandings of their surroundings and the mind-sets, attitudes, be-
liefs,  expectations  and  representative  perceptions  that  form  through  their 
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experiences and acquaintance with the surrounding phenomena (Young and 
Schafer, 1998: 66). In this respect, focusing on the bounded rationality, an analyst 
does not merely assume that a comprehensive deduction of rational choice by an 
agent solemn information concerning agent’s goals and objective characteristics 
of the situation are sufficient. Rather the analyst “must know the choosing organ-
ism’s goals, the information and conceptualization it has of the situation, and its 
abilities to draw inferences from the information it possesses” (Simon, 1985: 294). 
Upon these conditions, operational code analysis comes of significance, address-
ing in particular the means through which a decision-makers cope with cognitive 
limits to rational decision-making, as they become filters of the information re-
ceived and communication distributed within the decision-making body. In or-
der to advance the analysis further it is important to understand, however, the 
nature of the passage from individual to organizational cognitive limits on ra-
tionality.  
 
7.3. Organizational Cognition 
The search for explanation of how organizations think leads ultimately to the 
factors, which determine choices made by them. Organizational theorists have 
often moved “from theories of individual cognition and choice to theories of or-
ganizational cognition and choice” (March and Shapira, 1982: 11). As noted be-
fore, most of the organizations, however, are characterized by multiple interac-
tions among individuals rather than independent action of a single decision-
maker (March, 1997). Thus a question arises whether the psychological activity of 
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individuals can be expanded to the level of organizations. A number of psy-
chologists have criticized the theories on organizational cognition on the grounds 
that it could not be studied with the same techniques as analysis of people’s 
thinking and behavioral patterns (Weick, 1979). In the spirit of this differentia-
tion, Walsh (1995) examined how organizational cognition is shaped through 
knowledge structures or schemas used by individuals. The argument stated that 
while thinking is a solemn property of individuals, the sources for developments 
of cognitive schemata and knowledge structures arise from environmental fac-
tors, such as organizational and social settings.  
 
This theory gave a rise to subsequent studies on organizational cognitions: a 
shared cognitions perspective and top management cognition perspective. The 
former perspective holds that organizations think through the spectrum of 
shared beliefs and assumptions (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Dutton and 
Durkerich, 1991) as well as, through the common culture and values (Schein, 
1985; Alvesson, 1995; 2002);.while the latter perspective sees organizational cog-
nition in terms of thinking processes of top managers (Fligstein, 1990; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). The two presented perspectives, however, are bounded by 
problems apparent in organizational structuring. Whereas in certain organiza-
tions the first perspective would not account for decentralized nature of informa-
tion processing (Radner, 1997); in other organizations, the second perspective 
would not adjudge the circumstances of highly diverse specialized units, groups 
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or individuals and thus importantly account for difference of opinion over orga-
nizational policies.  
 
At this point of analysis, it is important to identify the difference of opera-
tional code beliefs in instances as indicative of shared beliefs of organizational 
incumbents and the notion of organizational culture. Although the definition of 
organizational culture has been a source of scholarly discourse, to understand 
the concept this thesis employs definition provided by Schein (1989: 278):  
Organizational culture… is the pattern of basic assumptions that a given 
group has invented, discovered or developed in learning to cope with its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration – a pattern of as-
sumptions that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, there-
fore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, 
and feel in relation to those problems.  
 
 
Schein (1989: 279) further noted that organizational culture is about a “the prob-
lem of developing shared assumptions about the nature of the world in which it 
[any new group] exists, how to survive in it [the external environment] and how 
to manage and integrate internal relationships so it can operate effectively.” The 
question arises, what then differentiates operational code’s implicit assumptions 
of the operational code. To note the difference, it is important to recognize that 
operational code exists in much narrower actuality than organizational structure.  
Whether defined as “doctrinal” (Leites, 1953: 15), or indicated as embracing a 
“particularly significant portion of the actor’s entire set of beliefs about political 
life” (George, 1969: 197), operational code appears as much limited in conceptu-
alization  than  organizational  structure,  as  it  embraces  the  political  aspect  of 
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organizational being solely. George (1969: 197), significantly noted on this ac-
count that operational code does not attempt to address decision-maker’s ethical 
and normative beliefs, while organizational culture would embrace them not 
only in the context of ethics within politics (Schein, 1989: 281). Operational code, 
therefore, appears to be one of the constituents of organizational culture, yet 
cannot be in solemn correspondence to organizational culture itself. 
 
 The fundamental premises of studies on organizational cognition recognize 
that “it is meaningful to talk about an organization thinking in ways that cannot 
be reduced to the thinking of its individual member” (Ocasio, 2001: 41). The gen-
eral approach taken by organizational scientists is not only to delineate how in-
dividuals in organizations think but also how individual cognition is situated in 
organizations, how definition of situation is structured through organizational 
processes and how cognition and definition of situation are driven by the politi-
cal, social, economic and cultural circumstances surrounding organizational af-
fairs (Ocasio, 1997). Thus, according to theories of organizational cognition, 
thinking in organizations becomes an amalgam of individual cognition, as well 
as, organizational structuring, organizational environment as they bear in turn 
upon individual perception of the situation. These theories of organizational 
cognition assume incorporation of Allison’s (1971) Model II, as a variable con-
straining organizational cognition. 
 
 
 179 
The abovementioned reference to organizational cognition through references 
to non-cognitive aspects of organizational structure influencing the shared cogni-
tion of individuals as incumbents of the organization are advocated through 
theories of choice situation and choice processes (March and Olsen, 1976), envi-
ronmental enacting (Weick, 1979) and situated action and cognition (Ocasio, 
1997). The central argument of March and Olsen (1976) identified that decision-
making processes are concerned with choice situations (occasions for problem-
solving and individual preferences as well as delegation of power), as well as, 
choice processes (occasions for executing standard operating procedures, role 
expectations, commitments to organizational goals, socialization processes). 
March and Olsen (1976: 259) stated: 
We remain in the tradition of viewing organizational participants as prob-
lem-solvers and decision makers.  However, we assume that individuals 
find themselves in a more complex, less stable, and less understood world 
than that described by standard theories of organizational choice; they are 
placed in a world they often have only modest control 
 
Conversely, the fundamental characteristic of Weick’s (1979) theory relies 
upon the idea of organizational enactment of its environment. Enacting becomes 
an output of organizing activities, which command the conduct of organizational 
actors by distributing the cognitive schemata of individuals on the objects of ac-
tion.  
 
Into the bargain, Cohen et al. (1972: 4) summarize that the elements of organi-
zational structure influence outcomes of decision making by “affecting the time 
pattern  of  the  arrival  of  problem  choices,  solutions,  or  decision  makers…  
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by determining the allocation of energy by potential participants in the decision, 
and… by establishing linkages among the various streams.” In a similar manner, 
Ocasio (1997) links individual information processing and communication chan-
nels with attention on structural aligning, thus points out that organizations 
learn through noticing organizational decision-making, encoding, interpreting 
and focusing of time and effort on both issues and answers and embraces three 
elements: focus of information, situated attention and structural distribution of 
attention.   
 
A more comprehensive account on the role of organizational structure and 
cognition in decision-making processes was provided by Steinbrunner (1974), 
who identified that information channels, personnel’s background and level of 
organizational hierarchy significantly determine the cognitive experiences men will 
have in an organization. Steinbrunner (1974: 144) observed that natural informa-
tion channels refer to the “information input for the decision-maker,” personal 
background provides for the structure of memory, while level of organizational 
hierarchy determines “the range of decision problems which the decision-maker 
encounters” as well as “scope of those problems.” Identifying that sources and 
channels of information flow are restrained by the limited information-
processing capacity of real individuals, Steinbrunner (1974: 145) points out that 
they indispensably shape basic thinking processes. The decision makers starting 
point for these processes are uncertainty inherent in the decision-making space 
(Steinbrunner, 1974: 145). 
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 The abovementioned theories specifically recognize the role of organizational 
structure as it bares effect on decision-making. Specifically to the attention of the 
reader comes the fact that organizational structure influences decision-making by 
affecting communication and information. The relationship between cognition 
and organizational can be summarized in the statement by Fredrickson (1986), 
who acknowledges that  
Organization’s structure imposes ‘boundaries of rationality’ that accom-
modate members’ cognitive limitations. By delimiting responsibilities and 
communication channels, structure allows organization to achieve’ orga-
nizational rational outcomes’ in spite of their members’ cognitive limita-
tions 
 
 
This argument is also apparent in Bower’s (1977: 287) observation that when 
decision-makers choose “a particular organization form, it is providing not only 
a framework for current operations but also the channels along which strategic 
information will flow. The prevalent approaches to organizational structure, thus 
assume the role of organizational structure in terms of the framework for opera-
tions. The approach in this thesis proposes to identify the premises of organiza-
tional structure as they appear in the context of shared beliefs of organizational 
members and decision-makers in particular as so the organizational structure en-
ters the “systems for the organization of information, observation and thought in 
the process of individual and group problem-solving” (Bobbitt and Ford, 1980: 
17). 
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7.3.1. Organizational Cognition in Non-State Terrorist Organizations 
In general, researchers recognize that beliefs embraced within operational 
code construct are more likely to influence the decision-making particularly in 
situation of innovative, long-terms decision-making situations, decisions under 
ambiguous, complex and unanticipated conditions, decisions under stress; and 
decisions by individuals at the top of bureaucratic hierarchy (Holsti, 1976). Al-
though this range of situation is sufficiently broad for state-actors, as it necessi-
tates the researcher to reach beyond the knowledge of the situation into the at-
tributes of the decision-making bodies, the problem occurs in respect of structur-
ally more ambiguous non-state terrorist organizations. The nature of decision-
making in non-state terrorist organizations, the very idea of decision, when it is 
made and who makes it have all turned out to be problematic (McCormick, 
2003).  
 
Leader’s responsibility for shaping of organizational characters; infusing per-
ceptions and generating a sense of distinctive competence of organizational 
structure among members must retain in high correlation to the perceptions of 
individual members of the organization. In fact, specifically for terrorist organi-
zations, the interaction among constituent parts of the organization marshal into 
common purpose and objectives emanating from a sphere of strongly enforced 
shared principles, interests and goals that transverses all organizational parts to 
which individuals unequivocally subscribe. Within non-state terrorist organiza-
tions attempt to induce change so that individual organizational members’ own 
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internal values and work preferences are brought in line with the organization’s 
values and goals, reinforced essentially through the creation of strong collective 
identity within terrorist organizations. Post et al. (2003: 176) in their analysis of 
non-state terrorist organizations noted:  
As an individual succumbs to the organization, there is no room for 
individual ideas, individual identity and individual decision-making. As 
this occurs, individuals’ measures of success become increasingly linked 
to the organization and stature and accomplishment within the 
organization. Subjects are unable to distinguish between personal goals 
and those of the organization.  
 
As the dominant collective identity results in the reinforcement of the beliefs of 
the terrorist members regarding their organization and is further reinforced by 
the absence of competing belief structures tolerated within the organization. This 
increasing pressure for conformity and de-individualization results in a mono-
lithic belief-system. Strong leadership clarifies boundaries within which employ-
ees exercise their own knowledge and discretion, when no mechanisms for for-
mal control of action are established and the organization relies on shared values 
and trust among its members as mechanisms for controlling action. In this man-
ner, what was originally the founder’s individual view of the world leads to 
strongly reinforced shared perceptions among members of the organization. 
While individuals internalize the behavioral patterns, collective identity and sub-
sequently perception for organizational goals, the new character-within-structure, 
emerges providing foundations for the circumstances subjected to operational 
code analysis.  
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7.4. Towards a New Frame of Reference for the Study of Decision-Making 
within Operational Code Analysis 
Within the literatures on foreign policy decision-making and organizational 
behavior the postulates about organizational structure are described to pose non-
cognitive constrains on rationality. The majority of researchers who study deci-
sion-making and organizational behavior tend to argue that organizational struc-
ture becomes predominantly important for decision-making in that it affects a 
content of decision-making “at the moment of decision by highlighting the ways 
in which organizational routines constrain the formation of options” (Welsh, 2001: 
117). The general argument prevails that weight of the information input, and 
communication constrains on decision-makers tend to result fro m the structur-
ally determined constrains on the range and scope of decision-problems which 
the decision-maker encounters.  
 
This does not imply that the model of organizational decision-making necessar-
ily rejects rationality – though some of its proponents mistakenly treat organiza-
tional influences as opposed to assumptions of rationality. Taking upon this 
point, the focus of this study attempts to transform premises about decision-
makers’ perceptions of organizational structure as they blend into the concept of 
bounded rationality. Focusing on the notion of bounded rationality, an analyst 
does not merely assume that a comprehensive deduction of rational choice by an 
agent and solemn information concerning agent’s goals and objective characteris-
tics of the situation are sufficient. Rather the analyst “must know the choosing 
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organism’s goals, the information and conceptualization it has of the situation, 
and its abilities to draw inferences from the information it possesses” (Simon, 
1985: 294). Upon these conditions, operational code analysis comes of signifi-
cance, addressing in particular the means through which a political actor copes 
with the boundaries to its rational conduct of decision-making. In this respect, 
whereas organizational structure is generally perceived in respect of “action as 
organizational output,” the aim of this study is to construct a guide for system-
atic analysis of how beliefs about organizational structure affect the ‘acts’ and 
‘choices’ of a rational actor. It is important to note that the framework for ad-
dressing cognition assumes organizational level of analysis, where cognition is 
perceived in respect of a shared belief system, and thus constitute a constrain 
upon rational choices of the decision-making in organizations. Thus, this study 
attempts to highlight the ways in which perceptions on organizational structure 
constrain both the formation of options (in cognitive terms) as well as decision-
making performance at the moment of decision.  
 
7.4.1. The Role of Perceptions on Organizational Setting49 - Snyder et al. 
(1962)  
 As the primary purpose of operational code analysis is to identify why politi-
cal actors behave as they do, it is important to determine factors which determine 
constrains upon the choices made by the decision-makers. The first assumption is 
                                                   
49 Snyder et al. (1962: 72) identify that decision-making is affected by “combination of selectively 
relevant factors in the external and internal setting as interpreted by the decision-makers.” 
Within the work of Snyder et al (1962) for most part the factors that lie in the “setting,” under-
stood as internal environment, were differentiated from factors that lie in the “environment” as it 
exists outside the decision-making unit 
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that decision-making needs to be regarded in organizational context, in respect 
of the rules, activities and relationships among the decision-makers. Comple-
mentary to that assumption are three major determinants of action in decision-
system, as identified by Snyder et al (1962: 105), and they are: competence, com-
munications and information and motivation. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
factor that decisively affects the nature of operational code beliefs is the compe-
tence, as it directs the attention at the propensity of decision-makers in cognitive 
terms (Snyder et al. 1962: 106-124) in contrast to communication and information 
determinants that embrace non-cognitive propensities of the system (Snyder et al 
1962: 124-137), and motivation aspect that address psychological propensities of 
decision-maker (Snyder et al. 1962: 137-171). 
 
  The competence as defined by Snyder et al. (1962: 106) refers to “the totality of 
those of the activities of the decision-maker relevant and necessary to the 
achievement of the organizational objective.” The concept in itself does not re-
flect  a  direct  linkage  to  the  cognitive  aspect  of  decision-making;  therefore  a 
detailed inquiry is necessary to be presented, in particular consideration of the 
point of view of decision-making actor. Since the definition highlights the proc-
ess of decision-making rather than decision itself, it is important to perceive deci-
sion-makers’ competence through set of rules guiding the relationship of the ac-
tor to the other actors in the system, whether explicitly prescribed or implicitly 
accepted by that actor. Snyder et al (1962: 107) noted that “the rules guiding the 
activities that constitute the actor’s competence are subject to interpretation by 
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the actor.” This point is essential in the consideration of the delineation of the na-
ture of the patterns of action within the organization as: 
 
I. Prescribed Patterns of Action. In circumstances when explicit rules of 
the organization determine the pattern of decision-making activities, 
an analyst can predict with a high degree of probability decision-
makers’ behavior given the availability of information on the frame-
work within which the decision-makers operate, such as structure of 
authority, information flows, division of labor etc. (Snyder et al, 1962: 
107). 
 
II. Conventional Patterns of Action. As no organization can be planned a 
priori, “the planned or explicitly prescribed structure of the organiza-
tion is supplemented over a period of time by patterns of action estab-
lished and sanctioned by precedent, habitual ways of doing things” 
(Snyder et al. 1962: 108).50 
 
The two identifiable patterns of action represent a formalization aspect of or-
ganizational structure as they represent a guideline for a decision-making behav-
ior. The importance of formalization for the totality of organizational structure is 
particularly significant as it identifies the criteria for other structural dimensions, 
                                                   
50 Snyder et al (1962: 108) explicitly note that organizational structures that are essentially “infor-
mal” are characterized primarily through conventional patterns of action, which are necessary for 
the achievement of formal goals but not explicitly stated in formal writings of the organization. 
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such as complexity and centralization. The question arises at this point where 
does cognition enter into the consideration of the dimensions organizational 
structure? Snyder et al (1962: 109) provide an answer to that question by stating 
that an analyst “must consider not only the kinds of activities comprising it [the 
decision system], but also the way in which the actor interprets the rules relating 
to these activities.” At the centre of this argument lies an assumption, stated by 
Stebbins (1976: 149) that “the basic feature of the situation for any individual is 
how it will affect his orientations, for it is in these terms that certain situational 
elements become meaningful. These elements are selected out of the objective 
situation to become part of the subjective situation.” In this manner, in respect of 
organizational decision-making, it would be the perceptions on organizational 
structure, that describing the situational setting, would filter the information and 
communication patterns and allow the decision-makers to bypass existent con-
strains represented by the propensities of the system. 
 
7.4.2. Management Styles and Models – George (1980) 
Although George’s (1969, 1979) prominence in strengthening of operational 
code approach is indisputable, it was in his work entitled Presidential Decision 
Making in Foreign Policy (1980) where George acknowledged the perceptions on 
structuring of decision-systems. In the chapter entitled Presidential Management 
Styles and Models, George (1980: 145-168) discovers that presidents often reorgan-
ize of decision-making agencies according to the needs each individual feels to 
be necessary for effective coordination of decision-making processes. George 
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(1980: 146) noted: “each president is likely to define his role in foreign-
policymaking somewhat differently and to approach it with a different decision-
making and management style.” The individual leader’s learning process in re-
spect of the latter defining of his role in decision-making system, becomes the ini-
tiative step in consequent structuring of the system in practice. And this becomes 
the significant aspect of George’s (1980) theory. George (1980) identifies that 
management styles result from a cognitive style, sense of efficacy and competence and 
orientation toward political conflict of decision-maker. The first component refers to 
“preferred ways of acquiring information from those around him and making 
use of that information, and to his [the decision-maker’s] preferences regarding 
advisers and ways of using them in making his decisions” (George, 1980: 147). 
The second component relates to management and decision-making tasks inclu-
sive of “types of skills that he [the decision-maker] possesses and the types of 
tasks that he feels particularly adept at doing and those that he feels poorly 
equipped to do” (George, 1980: 148). The last component relates to the attitudes 
the decision-maker holds “toward interpersonal conflict over policy among his 
advisers” (George, 1980: 148).  
 
 While George’s (1980) theory appears elegant for operational code analysis, 
the author himself failed to incorporate the individual leader’s perceptions on 
his/ her decision-making system into the operational code approach. Although 
George’s (1980)  model  focuses  primarily  on  managerial  styles  of  individual 
decision-makers,  thus,  employing  individual  level  of  analysis,  important   
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observations need to follow from George’s (1980) acknowledgment of the role of 
structuring of decision-systems. Furthermore, if incorporated this model would 
serve not only as a mean for understanding decision-making of organizations per 
se, but would also constitute for greater anticipatory power in utilization of op-
erational code for individual leaders.  
 
7.4.3. The Organizational Structure Through Bounded Rationality 
 As the notion of boundaries upon rationality of collective actors assumes that 
decision-makers in organizations essentially approach the process of the decision-
making through shared perceptions of organizational structure rather than deals 
with the structure per se. That is to say, at any given time there is a significant 
amount of interaction between the decision-makers and their competences 
stemming from structural alignment of relationships. Snyder et al. (1962: 113) 
importantly noted: 
Any effort in the direction of scientific analysis assumes ex hypothese that 
the universe being treated is an ordered one, that there are no random 
elements in any absolute sense.  The assumption of order does not, how-
ever, carry with it any implication of omniscience on the part of the ob-
server, nor does it require that the model of the actor omit the possibility 
of his making choices.  
 
In the consideration of the above, since the decision-makers’ choices may be con-
cerned with the organizational structure, or at minimum may have consequences 
for at least one of the structural dimensions, the capacity to elucidate decision-
makers’ shared perceptions would seem to be required.  
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 The perceptions on organizational structure, however, are to be identified in 
consideration of the limits of decision-makers’ shared interpretation. The prob-
lem occurs when the decision-makers are given the possibility to unanimously 
interpret the organizational structure at its greatest latitude, in which the “orga-
nizational system would cease to exist or change into another unit because the 
authority relationships and the patterns of communication would be so altered 
that another type of unit would come into existence” (Snyder et al. 1962: 114). 
This statement identifies an important aspect of the role of shared perceptions of 
political decision-makers in respect of the organizational structure, as it exists 
within the framework of objectified reality. When the shared perceptions of the 
decision-makers change, the primary forces come into the existence recognizing 
the necessity for aligning organizational structure with the environment, which 
ignite the change in the beliefs. In this respect, the shared perceptions of deci-
sion-makers become primarily concerned with identifying a route diverting, 
avoiding or circumventing a problem that appears within the organizational en-
vironment or internal conjunctures.   
 
 Focusing upon the definition of the situation as the decision-makers define it, 
Britton (1973: 101) suggested that it embraces a “kind of shorthand summary of 
all the internal processes mediating between the impinging of situational stimuli 
and the selection and evocation of responsible lines of action.” It is that evocation 
that points to the fundamental fact that the nature of reality for political actor is 
grounded within the subjectivity of perceptions, including the saliency of the 
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role-identities the political actor brings into play in the situation. As the level of 
analysis in this study is organizational, the state of the organization becomes a 
compound of symbolic and effective sets, which together combine to give the or-
ganization its composition characteristics. Structuring becomes as one of those 
variables. To conclude it is essential to note that the organizational activity con-
sists of a meeting a flow of situations in which the organization has to act, and 
that its action is build on the basis of what it noted, how it assesses and interprets 
what is noted. This is to note, conversely to prevalent theories of organizational 
decision-making, that organizational structure leads the organization towards 
the direction of behavior rather than constitutes merely a tendency, which is 
supposed to casually push the organization to actions. 
 
7.4.4. Possible Advantages of the Present Scheme 
 The alternative approach for inclusion of premises about organizational struc-
ture within operational code analysis is designed to be more inclusive of cogni-
tive variables having significant implications upon the decision-making proc-
esses. It attempts to include a sole variable of beliefs about organizational struc-
ture for the operational code and to provide cues for the identification of key 
variables or factors, which serve as a representation of these beliefs within the 
conceptual framework of the operational code. Adopting cognitive-structural 
analysis makes it possible to emphasize that decision-making behavior is pur-
posive without assuming the deterministic nature of the process. Simply, the de-
cision-makers  in  organizations  are  viewed  as  operating  in  relation  to  dual 
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considerations: one that accounts for conceptions of their relationship with the 
outside world and another that establishes their conceptions for the action as it is 
governed from within the bounds of their organization in general and decision-
making unit in particular. In this manner apparently unrelated internal and ex-
ternal realms become related in the actions of the decision-makers. 
 
It is, therefore, suggested in this thesis that the role of cognition in decision-
making can be clarified by inquiry into interpretation of rules governing the 
paths of action for as well as propensities of the decision-maker. Operational 
code analysis as a methodologically sound approach if complemented with the 
premises about organizational structure appears to represent a sound technique 
for the examination of how relations among values, strategies and particular as-
pects of organizational setting are established by the decision-makers.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF OPERATIONAL CODE 
 
 
 
The foundation for the projected operational code was essentially built upon 
Leites’ (1951, 1953) original accountancy of cognitive premises concerning orga-
nizational structure and methodological soundness of applied unit of analysis 
embodied in, what George (1969: 196) have defined a “tightly knit set of beliefs 
about fundamental issues and questions associated with the classical problem of 
political action.” The proposed revision of operational code analysis, thereof, is 
structured to include five questions, “answers” to which provide for efficient ac-
countancy for structural beliefs analogous to the ten-question construct of 
George (1969). The structural content of an operational code analysis refers to the 
identification of beliefs about organizational structure, as they are, for the pur-
pose of preliminary inquiry extracted from the available writings, statements and 
declarations of Al Qaeda’s most prominent  ideologists  and  strategic  thinkers.51 
                                                   
51 The primary sources include contemporary writings of Al Qaeda’s ideological thinkers among 
all Azzam and al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s strategic thinkers among all Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu 
Bakr Naji, as well as, historical writings of ideological thinkers influencing Al Qaeda’s ideology 
such as Sayd Qutb. 
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It is of outmost importance to note that the proposed additional codification of 
the research approach on operational code does not encourage future researchers 
to provide the exact answers to the  questions  and  to  solemnly  delineate  the  
structural  foundation  of  a  studied organization, but to recognize its political 
implications and dimensions of the structure upon which the conceptions of po-
litical strategy are formed. That is to say, the factual representation of the struc-
tural context can be extracted from primary sources on Al Qaeda, while present-
ing it within the construct of operational code methodology requires for an in-
sightful inquiry examining on how does the structure presents itself of impor-
tance to the rules of conduct within an organization and upon the shared beliefs 
of its members. 
 
8.1. The Structural Query of an Operational Code Construct 
The indirect influence of operational code belief system upon decision-
making can be identified through analysis of information-processing tasks that 
pave the way and accompany the decision-maker’s choice of action (George, 
1979). Depicting information-processing tasks in standard terminology are char-
acterized in substantive terms and embrace fundamentally the “definition of the 
situation,” and “option-development;” in a corresponding manner, the func-
tional classification of information-processing tasks identifies the search, evalua-
tion and choice phrases of decision-making (George, 1979: 101).52 In the face of 
                                                   
52 Within the literature on strategic decision-making, Minzberg et al (1976) anatomize strategic 
decision-making into three central phases (identification, development and selection), three sup-
portive routines (decision-control, decision-communication and political) and six dynamic factors 
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above considerations, what emerges is the evaluation of structural content of op-
erational code in respect of their utility in information-processing tasks, consti-
tuting an evidence for their effect on decision-making within cognitive frame-
work. 
 
Due to the profound effect of the abovementioned structural dimension on 
strategic decision-making, the structural query needs to be inclusive of their con-
sideration. Questions II, III embrace the centralization and formalization aspects 
of organizational structure respectively while questions IV and V of the query 
relegate the separate attention on the complexity dimension of organizational 
structure. An additional question for the query (Question I) is formed addressing 
the communication element among the constituent parts of the organization, 
with the particular focus upon the element of information. 
 
Question I - How are information flows into and within organization controlled most 
efficiently? What is the degree of desirable openness or secrecy vis a vis the external 
environment? 
 
Theme: Availability of specific modes of communication and information 
channels presents a capability to determine, in large part, the way in which deci-
sion-making  functions  and/or  is  distributed  throughout  the  organization  for 
effective  achievement  of  desired  objectives  (Simon, 1976).  Elements  of  the 
                                                                                                                                                       
(interrupts, scheduling delays, feedback delays, timing delays and speedups and comprehension 
cycles). Due to the fact, however, that this composition of strategic decision-making is not pro-
vided in the light of information-processing per se, the model will not be utilized for the purpose 
of this thesis. 
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information control in structural terms are reflected in the differences in the 
structure of organizational units providing for greater security of information. 
Establishments of minimal or easy connections with other parts of the network 
constitute for the primary attribute of this question. The general image of the de-
pendency upon secrecy encourages the actor to define situations of inter-
organizational and outer-organizational relations as a mean for achievement of 
security or, in extreme cases, survival. At every opportunity an organization 
would prioritize the efforts to conceal the whereabouts, activities and detailed 
responsibilities of the members of the organization. Encountering discrepant in-
formation that challenges a belief concerning secrecy would be dismissed as lack-
ing conformity with the formal goal of the organization. This notion would pri-
marily result form the fact that the achievement of a formal objective would ne-
cessitate the organization to display efficiency and effectiveness of their strate-
gies. Contradicting the fundamental aspect of the belief that secrecy is necessary 
would relegate the conflicting information to the consideration of counter-
efficiency and counter-effective strategic delineations, particularly when the or-
ganization depends upon secrecy for survival. 
 
Definition of Situation: The particular definition of a new situation formu-
lated by decision-makers may come influent into decision-makers’ response to 
that situation. This is due to the fact that this definition bares significance upon 
elimination or favoring of certain action stemming from decision-making consid-
erations in respect of perceived availability of options. The presented assumption 
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is that decision-makers’ shared attitudes towards openness or secrecy is particu-
larly important in shaping the definition of situation particularly in respect of the 
assessment of threats and opportunities available within its environmental set-
ting.  
 
A general perception of a need for rigorous control of information as requir-
ing fundamentally secure organizational setting, both directed internally and ex-
ternally, prompts the decision-makers’ to define situation of interaction with ex-
ternal environment and other incumbents of the organization as potential of pos-
ing survival-threatening circumstances. This is due to the fact that ambiguities 
and uncertainties stemming from the environmental setting are essentially per-
ceived as threatening; thus among the decision-making stimuli, the actor would 
prioritize the perceptions of threat to those of opportunities. This is not to say 
that opportunistic behavior would not be present; rather until the decision-
makers would not structurally secure the organizational setting, the perceived 
necessity for countering threats would either take primacy, or attempt to offset 
the threat through aggressive opportunity search.  
 
 Option-Development: An actor’s operational code structural belief concern-
ing control of information also influences the focus and extent of the search and 
evaluation aspects of information processing. Thus if the decision-makers share a 
view concerning high level of security as a prerequisite for organizational action, 
it is likely that they will engage in more extensive research for opportunities. 
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 This view, conversely, raises the likelihood that the organization can com-
promise its pursuit of objectives through innovative means that cannot be de-
tected with the security mechanisms of its opponents, proving the organization 
with a possibility that causes the organization to respond to opportunities and 
depends the search for them in the environment.  
 
 Choice: In addition to the diagnostic propensities of decision-maker’s in ac-
cordance with the rigid control of the information, operational code belief system 
can also introduce inclinations towards certain choices into information process-
ing. Choice can be affected by the shared belief in the need for covertness in a 
sense that if the organization is perceived to survive essentially through secre-
tiveness, it is more likely to display a pro-active behavior towards achievement 
of the goals and is thus likely to pursue knowingly a high-risk options.  
 
Question II - What is the structure for most efficient distribution of authority and 
power in organization? Should the right to make decisions and evaluate activities be 
concentrated or dispersed? 
 
Theme: As mentioned earlier, centralization denotes the concentration of the 
right to make and enforce decisions. Centralization importantly relegates the 
knowledge regarding likely implications of opportunities and limitations and 
through reciprocation of hierarchy of authority it delivers decision-making 
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authority to the top-level executive unit. 53 Conversely, decentralized structures 
encompass learning dynamics with most effective use of local knowledge and 
provide greater motivation factor for peripheral units. Decentralization requires 
a strong incentive initiatives, alternative means of coordination and information 
sharing (Brickley et al., 2002: 73). 
 
Definition of Situation: Approaching the shared perceptions on centraliza-
tion/decentralization of authority as essentially encourages the decision-making 
unit to omit certain decision-making criteria and paying particular attention to 
others within the lines of the approved action. The perception on the utility of 
decentralization would encourage decision-makers to perceive a broader deci-
sion-making realm. Broadened organizational setting is perceived as posing con-
strains on coordination of the organizational action. The increased amount of in-
formation in decision-making process is likely to be interpreted as overabundant 
and risky, thus, is likely to promote strengthening of alternatives substituting the 
role of leadership in the organization. The primacy of leadership would be main-
tained strong, yet means through distribution of leadership will be emphasized 
throughout organizational realm. This belief introduces another diagnostic pro-
pensity of the perceived utilization of centralized/decentralized system in in-
formation-processing. 
 
                                                   
53 Since individual solely cannot control all strategic processes due to their complexity, even in 
highly centralized organizations the decision-making rests with a coalition of decision-making 
individuals (Mintzberg, 1979). 
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Option-Development: The choice of decentralization or partial decentraliza-
tion promotes real-time information mode of organizational decision-making by 
accommodating cognitive limitations of organization’s members through dis-
persing decision-making responsibilities (March and Simon, 1958). The search 
and evaluation in respect of information-processing acquires a greater potential 
in decentralized system, where the shared assumption prevails that any level of 
organization is permitted to participate in decision-making process. Holding a 
belief that opening information-processing to accommodate for greater amount 
of decision-making stimuli can exert significant degree of progress and effective-
ness is more likely to undertake extensive search and development of option rou-
tines. This raises the likelihood that option search and development are not ho-
mogenous throughout the organization. 
 
Choice:  To illustrate choice propensities of a shared perceptions on efficiency 
of centralization/decentralization it can be noted that if there is a strong belief in 
the efficiency of decentralized authority, the organizational decision-making is 
likely to or even give incentive to pursue more ambitious objectives. The organi-
zation may perceive greater effectiveness of action from broadening decision-
making realm rather than settle for control of high-risk behavior prescribed by 
other alternatives. 
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Question III - What is the nature of processes for the control of activity? Is the con-
trol formalized or characterized by informal relationships? What is acceptable degree 
of self-regulation? 
 
Theme: Structural formalization refers to the presence of standardized rules 
and procedures that influence decision-making behavior. Welker (2004: 39) iden-
tified formalization as a “degree to which decisions, activities and working rela-
tionship are controlled and coordinated by formal, explicit rules and proce-
dures.” Rules and procedures of formalized system provide for development of 
explicit response repertoire of decision-making responsiveness. The structural 
dimension of formalization is tightly knitted to the competency of the decision-
makers (Snyder et al. 1962).  
 
Definition of Situation: A general image of the organizational system as be-
ing fundamentally governed by explicit rules and regulations, without a room 
for the interpretations of the decision-makers’ prompts decision-makers to share 
a definition of the situation concerning the interaction with the external world, 
and governing rules within organization as highly constrained. Constraining the 
organizational activities may be perceived as threatening the effectiveness and 
efficiency of any political action if the constrain impinge upon the availability of 
opportunities for and threat to the advancement of desired objectives.  
  
Option-Development:  Search and evaluation can be affected by the shared 
belief of how much formality is necessary for monitoring of organizational       
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action. If the organization perceives the formalization merely as a constraint, a 
search and evaluation of options would be encouraged to reach beyond the pre-
scribed search and evaluation spheres of information processing. The informa-
tional requirements of the decision-makers who share a beliefs in the effective-
ness of informality are thus greater than those of a decision-maker unit that per-
ceives it can do little to seek for opportunities and counter threats due to the 
formal constrains.  
 
 Choice: A political decision-makers who share a believe that formalization is 
a necessary requirement for organizational management are likely to engage in a 
reactive behavior rather than proactively seeking new opportunities for organi-
zational action. Belief that formal rules bounding the behavior of organization’s 
incumbents are indispensable leads further to more emphasis on complying with 
the rules rather than advancing a political action regardless of means assigned.  
Choice is also likely to be influenced by shared beliefs regarding formalization in 
a manner that perceiving the priority of formal rules over the objectified ends 
may impinge upon the aspect of the continuity of goals in the long-term. 
 
Question IV - What is the acceptable degree of horizontal and vertical differentiation 
of the organization? 
 
Theme: As the intra-component of complexity dimension of organizational 
structure, the horizontal and vertical differentiation becomes indicative of the or-
ganizational division of labor, the number of organizational levels and broad 
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span of intra-organizational control (Fredrickson, 1986). High horizontal and ver-
tical differentiation promotes and selectively distributes different responsibilities 
and interests among organizational units. The division of labor promotes the 
structural binding of rationality of organizational members through delineating 
boundaries of their specialization. 
 
Definition of Situation:  Complementary to the shared belief concerning de-
centralized distribution of decision-making in the organization, another collec-
tive belief concerning minimal specialization can significantly affect decision-
makers’ cognitively constructed definition of the situation. Perceiving organiza-
tional incumbents as evaluating situational stimuli through highly specialized 
lenses of competence may significantly impinge upon the perceived homogene-
ity of organizational action. The multiplicities of discrepancies of information 
that challenge the unity of goals and commitment may introduce significant di-
agnostic predispositions into information-processing of the decision-makers. 
 
Option-Development: The consideration for specialization may introduce 
search  and  evaluation  propensities  into  decision-making  unit’s  information 
processing. If the decision-makers unanimously perceive organizational envi-
ronment as benefiting from specialization, they are more likely to avoid know-
ingly the reliance upon the notion of talent or inherent predispositions while 
searching and evaluating possible options for the action. That is, sharing a per-
ception that human capacity can handle a variety of complex phenomena at the 
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same time allows decision-makers to utilize a greater number of individuals 
rather than constitutes a constrain on search and evaluation to the few of exper-
tise. 
 
Choice: Amplified perception advocating high degree of specialization may 
constitute constrain on the decision-making routine of choice. A prevalent be-
lieve in the necessity to disperse specialization among the greater number of in-
dividuals is more likely to influence the mechanisms through which risks are 
controlled. The risks in this instance are connected to the lack of the agreement 
upon the means; thus informational requirements of the denunciators of speciali-
zation are greater as they necessitate single-objective-driven propensities.  
 
Question V - What is the optimum level of organization’s spatial dispersion? 
 
Theme: Organization’s special dimension refers to the outer-organizational 
realm and organizations multiplicity of geographic locations.54 This realm of or-
ganizational structure pertains to the perception on the utility of organizational 
units in various geographical locations (inter-organizational dispersion) (Fry, 
1982; Hall, 1987). Organizations disperse specially in the recognition of the need 
to service different  geographical  location  and  it  is  thereof  important  for  un-
derstanding  of intricacies of design and limitations of these organizations in re-
spect of decision-making implications. 
                                                   
54 Traditionally, special dispersion reflected the distribution of operating sites of an organization 
(Blau and Schenherr, 1971). 
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Definition of Situation:  A general image of the need for spatial dispersion 
stems from the fundamental belief of the universality of organizational objective. 
The sharing of this belief in turn announces to organizational member a necessity 
of universal commitment to the cause and is likely to be interpreted as evidence 
of solidarity. Discrepant information that challenges this belief in unity of com-
mitment regardless of geographical boundaries is likely to be discounted, and 
therefore introduces the diagnostic predispositions into information-processing 
of decision-making unit. 
 
Option-Development: Evaluation and search for options can be affected by 
this structural belief in a manner that, if organizational doctrine holds that the 
organization manifest universal capability, the organizational members are likely 
to engage in extensive analysis of the possible consequences of various decision-
making options, as to find possible means of exploring this universality. 
 
Choice: A final illustrative example of the choice propensity of this collec-
tively  constructed  structural  belief  holds  that,  if  within  the  conceptions  of 
political strategy the decision-makers collaboratively assume the necessity for 
spatial dispersion in order to increase the effectiveness/pay offs of actions, the 
organization is more likely to pursue ambitious objectives by means of controlled 
risk that trade-off the possibility of high-value returns in preference to alterna-
tives that entail low risk.   
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8.2. Reinforcement of Other Operational Code Beliefs 
Operational code beliefs of a political actor cannot be classified merely as an 
unconnected collection of code beliefs but are said to comprise rather a belief sys-
tem. That is, the beliefs are bound together by some form of functional interde-
pendence (Converse, 1964 in George, 1979: 100). The internal consistency of the 
beliefs must hold not only within their specified categories but also for the en-
tirety of the operational code. In other words, there must be a visible intercon-
nectedness among all of the structural beliefs as well as proven effect of their in-
fluence upon philosophical and instrumental beliefs of the code. In this instance, 
operational code evidences the supposed interconnectedness in the sense that a 
change in the dominant belief (S-1) and, related to it, the image concerning de-
gree of secrecy – seems to require a compensating change in the status of other 
beliefs within the configuration. As the belief for maintenance of high degree of 
secrecy persists, the individual member’s isolation from the external environ-
ment promote the comparison between the group-members and directly relevant 
out-group environment. The exemplified distinction between us and them further 
grounds in the negative portrayal of the enemy (Crenshaw, 1986), thus affecting 
the first philosophical belief related to the image of the opponent. 
 
To give another example, a belief concerning centralization/decentralization 
aspect of organizational structure would significantly reinforce directly the en-
tirety of the instrumental belief system. A general image of the utility of central-
ized/decentralized system (S-1) encourages the actor’s approach for selecting 
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goals or objectives for political action (I-1) through defining of the actors initiat-
ing the process of decision-making. Decentralized structures are perceived as 
more ambiguous for decision-making yet more receptive to the environmental 
stimuli (opportunities and limitations). Then, political actor’s approach to the 
maximization of receptiveness from environment (S-I) is more likely to influence 
that actor’s search, development and choice of options that offer preference or-
dering for optimization of strategic outcome (I-I).55  
 
8.3. The Specification of Beliefs About Organizational Structure for Al 
Qaeda 
Variety of terms used to denote the structure of Al Qaeda has ranged from a 
“terrorist group to ideological movement, from a ‘brand identity’ for Jihadist ter-
rorist to a ‘global tribe” (Jackson, 2006: 242).56 In order to establish a connection 
between the analytical framework and practical demands of assessing a non-state 
terrorist organization it is necessary to identify, which complexity of organiza-
tional design is appropriate to be a subject of the examination?57  
 
                                                   
55 As George (1969: 208) noted “The optimizing strategy provides an opportunity to achieve 
maximum payoff in a given situation, but should that prove infeasible or emerge as too costly or 
risky; it will enable one to settle, if necessary, for one of the lesser of the graduated objectives.” 
56 The linguistic variety of descriptions of Al Qaeda stem necessarily from the transformation of 
its terrorist activities into a relatively uncontained, amorphous and decentralized structure as 
compared to relatively well-defined and stable terrorist organization in the past. 
57 Approaching Al Qaeda as an adversary in practical realm, key political and counterterrorism 
questions would receive different answers depending upon the specific labels that are attached to 
it, as “preventing a clear and systematic way of articulating important differences between these 
labels” (Jackson, 2006: 242) 
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Anticipating Al Qaeda as an organization in this regard, the delineation of the 
scope of beliefs about organizational structure necessitates identification of the 
boundaries of the organization as a referent object of analysis. The nature of deci-
sion-making in non-state terrorist organizations, the very idea of decision, when it 
is made and who makes it have all turned out to be problematic, thus, identify-
ing Al Qaeda in its broadest context would provide for the significant emphasis 
on the strategic elements of an organizational decision-making as it exists in all 
levels of the organization. The element of focus on strategic aspect of the group 
importantly shifts the focus of emphasis on the political driving forces for the 
movement, unlike the specific tactical and operational model. The political ele-
ment of broadening of the classification of Al Qaeda is of direct relevance to the 
contextualized construct of operational code developed by George, which aims 
primarily at the understanding of political beliefs and forces according to which 
choices are selected from the response repertoire. Since operational code analysis 
attempts to analyze the potentiality of threat stemming from political action of an 
adversary, a highly inclusive model of Al Qaeda would provide a framework for 
encompassing threat in its entirety of action, strategic underlining and structural 
predispositions for enlargement of a group. 
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CHAPTER IX 
OPERATIONAL CODE OF AL QAEDA:  
STRUCTURAL CONTENT 
 
 
 
 This chapter presents a portion of the finding of the political strategy of Al 
Qaeda and is based on the writings of Al Qaeda’s primary strategists, among all 
Abu Mus’ab Al Suri, Abu Bakr Naji, Ayman Al Zawahiri; and Islamic ideological 
thinkers, among all Sayid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam. The chapter is limited to a 
formulation of strategic content of the operational code of Al Qaeda. Evidences 
for the conceptions of political strategy in respect of perceptions on organiza-
tional structure have been found within the writings and accordingly the exam-
ples of the evidences have been presented. 
 
9.1. System of Action 
The conception of political doctrine held by Al Qaeda is a relevant and direct 
avenue to the delineation of Al Qaeda’s spirit – a conclusion that is not surpris-
ing to the reader who realizes that, to Al Qaeda, political action is an all-
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consuming activity, a way of life. Abu Mus’ab Al Suri in 2004 conveyed the par-
ticular place of military in Al Qaeda’s political doctrine stating: 
… in general, political success is connected to factors… which are con-
cerned with the military performance (2004: 363) 
 
 
Al Qaeda’s doctrine alludes that the “organizational machine” is strictly sub-
jected to the changes of the environment, 
The times have changes, and we must design a method of confrontation, 
which is in accordance with the standards of the present time (Al Suri, 
2004: 359) 
 
 
The element of environmental determinism in Al Qaeda’s doctrine states that: 
 
We live in an unstable international situation or more correctly in a transi-
tional period to which the rules applied in normal conditions do not ap-
ply. It also does not have the prerequisites to survive for long (Center for 
Islamic Studies and Research, 2003 in Aaron, 2008: 126). 
 
 
Al Qaeda’s doctrine does not attribute an absolute value to particular organi-
zational structure; rather Al Qaeda perceives its importance as a mechanism for 
political strategy that can be subjected to adjustment in times of change:  
It is for certain that the weakness is not in the machine, because it is per-
fect and suitable for working in its time, but the new surrounding condi-
tions have made it outdated, and its natural place has become the mu-
seum (Al Suri, 2004: 365). 
 
 
Discontinuity of organizational structure in the transition from the past to 
contemporary period, according to Al Qaeda’s doctrine, is identified through a 
belief in a systemic character of organizational structure at any given time. Al Suri 
inaugurated this belief with explicit call for: 
 212 
… building the cells of the Resistance units as a ‘system of action’ (nizam 
al-‘amal) and not as ‘a secret organization for action’ (tanzim lil-‘amal) 
(2004: 393). 
 
Explicit reference to a system indicates that Al Qaeda’s decision-makers hold a 
belief that their organization constitutes an unbreakable and perhaps complex 
whole through which the human relationships are interconnected, organized and 
ordered. 
 
9.1.1. Preeminence of Effective Organization 
 
According to Al Qaeda doctrine, all organizational activities must be made 
and kept in line with organizational ends. Dedication to organizational effective-
ness rather than efficiency, thus, not only permits but also requires certain indul-
gences concerning a degree to which an organization achieves its goals. Al-
though sharp dispositions towards prioritization of means over ends is felt as ab-
sorbing and defeating the organizational existentiality, Al Qaeda does not disre-
gard the importance of means through which organizational energy is directed to 
the cause. Illustrating this conception of political strategy, Ayman Al Zawahiri 
wrote in 2001: 
Liberating the Muslim nation, confronting the enemies of Islam, and 
launching jihad against them require a Muslim authority, established on a 
Muslim land, that raises the banner of jihad and rallies the Muslims 
around it. Without achieving this goal our actions will mean nothing more 
than mere and repeated disturbances that will not lead to the aspired goal, 
which is the restoration of the caliphate and the dismissal of the invaders 
from the land of Islam… This goal must remain the basic objective of the 
Islamic jihad movement, regardless of the sacrifices and the time involved 
(in Aaron, 2008: 111). 
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 Al Suri expressed the acute approach of Al Qaeda to the primacy of organiza-
tional goals and moderation in choice of means: 
As we are obliged to build up the Resistance forces and to spread its 
Units, we are also obliged to tear down, destroy and remove the impor-
tant bases of the opponent’s forces in our midst, as long as it does not di-
vert our attention from our main focal point for strategic attack, namely 
resisting the occupation and the foreign enemies (Al Suri, 2004: 423) 
 
 
 In the esoteric doctrine of early Jihadist writings, the requirement for effec-
tiveness was displayed through different argumentative logic. Historically, Ji-
hadist scholars implicitly attributed effectiveness with the presence of the moral 
values. To the dedicated Jihadist, the purpose is indubitably meaningful through 
spiritual rather than material dedication, apprehended by Jihadists as efficiency- 
driven behavior.  In 1949, Sayid Qutb said: 
Islam has always represented the highest achievement in universal and 
comprehensive social justice; European civilization has never reached the 
same level, nor ever will.  For it is a civilization founded on pure material-
ism, a civilization of murder and war, of conquest and of subjugation (1949: 
202). 
 
 
In 2004, immorality of materialism resurfaced in Abu Bakr Naji’s writings: 
 
The aim which motivates the enemies is a material aim… Their principle 
absolutely does not submit to any moral value; rather, all the other princi-
ples are subordinate to it – friendship or enmity, peace or war – and are all 
determined according to self interest (2004: 88) 
 
 
Thus, in Al Qaeda’s doctrine effectiveness is the only perfect motivation for po-
litical action not only in the content of organizational objectives but also in its 
form embracing moral values and implicit code of behavior. 
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 In the face of the ethicality and invaluableness of effectiveness in action Al 
Qaeda must assure success of organized procedures. Naji expressed Al Qaeda’s 
tendency to believe in the need for more effective administrative efforts and fo-
cus upon organizational structure as strategically significant element:  
By the grace of God, the organized Islamic work is beginning to be man-
aged on the highest\administrative level in our Islamic world, especially 
the jihadi organizations.  However there still needs to be more mastery, 
general training, and advancement in order to encompass the greatest 
amount of the sectors of the Islamic movement, especially since we are 
approaching… a stage in which our administrative needs will be ex-
panded in what we have called the stage of the administration of sav-
agery, where we will mix with hundreds of thousands of people and they 
will require the administration of regions from us as diminished govern-
ments.  If we are not prepared to deal with that, we will face dangerous 
problems, to say nothing of the harm (that results from) random behavior 
or (from) a rigid management organization, which stops action by its in-
flexibility and prevents development and advancement.  Therefore, the 
numerous small and medium jihadi groups, which upheavals have cre-
ated and which have appeared, by the grace of God, in every part of the 
Islamic world, must begin to abandon random behavior from now on and 
also administrative rigidity (2004: 54). 
 
 
 In the transition of organizational structure, the estimate of both the impor-
tance of abandoning both uncoordinated activities the administrative skillfulness 
came to be viewed as crucial. Correspondingly, Al Suri wrote: 
Structuring an organization requires a lot of thought and foresight, it 
should take into account the nature and strengths of the enemy, the type 
and strengths of its security system, the geographical nature of the coun-
try, what has worked and what has failed in similar situations.....etc. the 
particular conditions on the ground should determine the best structure 
for the organization (2002: 29). 
 
 
In effort at unmasking the most efficient organizational structure, Al Qaeda 
historical condition of outlawry and creation of organization’s central theme that 
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by all means contributed to Al Qaeda’s tendency towards gaining insight into its 
organizational design. 
 
 9.1.2. Danger of Being Infiltrated 
 
The Al Qaeda’s doctrine holds that the organization should enhance its secu-
rity through which it can strenuously resist the enemy’s attempts to penetrate its 
network. The success of the enemies in penetrating the organization would 
threaten Al Qaeda’s obliteration, and in the absence of solicitous structuring 
against infiltration Al Qaeda would be substantially penetrable and its survival 
would thus be threatened. Al Suri expressed the Al Qaeda’s tendency to believe 
in the omnipotence of secrecy: 
Creating a method for sacred action in which we are able to overcome the 
problem of security weakness inherent in the traditional secret organiza-
tions where the whole organization is destroyed when some of its mem-
bers are arrested, are tortured, and are pursued by security services across 
international borders after security coordination moved from a national 
level up to the international level (2004: 420). 
 
 
According to Al Qaeda’s attitude the danger of being infiltrated expresses the 
role of organizational structuring, and leads to the insistence on the role and pur-
suit of minimal links among organizational units. This is illustrated through the 
evidence in the writings of Al Suri: 
Our secret organizations were defeated in terms of security, their cells 
were exposed and disbanded, and the attempts to build them were 
aborted. The security system of the enemy reached a level where even at-
tempts to build cells were subjected to abortive strikes, before they were 
founded, or at their embryonic stage… in the end, and due to the complete 
failure in the details, the complete failure manifested itself in the inability 
to realize the goals of the general project (2004: 354-5). 
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This statement’s implication is pointing at the fatality of reality in which Al 
Qaeda would be exposed to the penetration of its organizational domain; and 
thus this statement illustrates a shared belief that any structural predispositions 
for enhancement of security is highly desirable for Al Qaeda. 
 
9.1.3. Defense Against Being Infiltrated 
 
Al Qaeda’s doctrine urges the decision-makers to establish as system in 
which an internal control information flows is secured, in order for its enemies to 
be isolated from the knowledge of whereabouts and activities of the organiza-
tion. This conception becomes a preliminary rule of conduct to the organizational 
security against the enemies. Al Suri conveyed this point through the reference to 
the invincibility of communications: 
Communications could be the weak link and expose the mujahideen to the 
enemy… Communication on all levels is a vital role of this fight, it should 
be researched and studied, and solution should be found (2002: 23). 
 
 
Importantly, against the vice of those groups belonging to the school of tan-
zim58 who presented great deal of hierarchy, centralization and regionalization as 
organizational values, Al Qaeda evolved to continue the tradition of secrecy 
through other means, a tradition that embraced, in Al Suri’s statement:  
… [a method] which enemy has no way of aborting,… susceptible to self-
renewal and to self-perpetuation as a phenomenon after all its conditions 
and causes are present and visible to the enemy itself… [a method] of in-
dividual terrorism jihad (jihad al-irhab al-fardi) and secret operational ac-
tivity of small units totally separated from each other (2004: 371, 420). 
                                                   
58 Al Suri uses the word tanzim in reference to secret military organizations such as EIJ, JI, LIFG, 
GIA etc referring to specific regional, secretive and hierarchical characteristics of these organiza-
tions.   
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For Al Qaeda the idea of individualism – particularly with reference to opera-
tional activity – is not new. While, in a sense, organizationally individual initia-
tive has not been employed as a prevalent tactic, ideologically Jihadist writings 
were keen on emphasizing it. Al Suri limited the analytical link of individual ter-
rorism to ideological position through the reference to Qu’ran: 
“thou art held responsible only for thyself” (An-Nisa 4: 82 in al-Suri, 2004: 
455). 
 
 
The esoteric ideological foundation influencing individualism in Al Qaeda 
doctrine,, however, was conveyed before Al Suri’s writing, by Qutb in 1949: 
Thus rank or upbringing, origin or class should not stand in the way of 
any individual, nor should anyone be fettered by the chains which shackle 
enterprise (1949: 49)\ 
 
 
A number of consecutive Islamic scholars further strengthened the fundamen-
tal belief that of individual obligation to wage Jihad (Faraj, 1979: 200; Azzam, 
undated: 102; Al Zawahiri, undated: 192).  
 
The primary value of individual jihad against the danger of penetration be-
came yet another aspect of Al Qaeda’s doctrine, namely, the advantage of ‘spon-
taneity.’ In Al Suri advocated this belief:   
They [individual jihadists] have not transformed into a phenomenon, be-
cause they are spontaneous, and nobody had occupied themselves with 
making them part of a program and presenting them as a strategic opera-
tional method (2004: 391). 
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9.1.4. Danger of Isolation from the Public  
 
In keeping with the points discussed, according to Al Qaeda’s doctrine, a se-
cure communication between the organization and the external world would en-
hance the effectiveness of its actions. Particularly, Al Qaeda’s doctrine combats 
the tendency of negligence of contact with the public. Al Zawahiri in 2001 made 
an overall statement favoring contact with the public as gesture of general and 
philanthropic assistance:  
The jihad movement must come closer to the masses, defend their honor, 
fend off injustice, and lead them to the path of guidance and victory. It 
must step forward in the arena of sacrifice and excel to get its message 
across in a way that makes the right accessible to all seekers and that 
makes access to the origin and facts of religion simple and free of the 
complexities of terminology and the intricacies of composition (in Aaron, 
2008: 202) 
 
 
And in 2005 he expressed the utility value of communication with the public for 
the organizational effectiveness:  
But you and your brothers must strive to have around you circles of sup-
port, assistance, and cooperation, and through them, to advance until you 
become a consensus, entity, organization, or association that represents all 
the honorable people and the loyal folks in Iraq. I repeat the warning 
against separating from the masses, whatever the danger.” (in Aaron, 2008: 
252)  
 
 
However, Al Qaeda’s doctrine holds that the organization should engage in 
contact with the public only to the extent required for its effectiveness. Naji 
wrote: 
Masses are difficult factor… our meaning is not that we make our move-
ment dependent on them… (as for) whoever ignores the masses and pre-
sumes expects that they will (represent) the majority, the role… is to gain 
their sympathy, or at least neutralize them…(2004: 52) 
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 The requirement of Al Qaeda, is thus, to cautiously and, to a limited extent, 
openly communicate with the public. In 1964, Qutb displayed considerate atten-
tion to potential problem of communication with the public: 
This movement uses the methods of preaching and persuasion for reform-
ing ideas and beliefs; and it uses physical power and Jihad for abolishing 
the organizations and Jihaad for abolishing the organizations and authori-
ties of the Jahili system. (in Aaron, 2008: 60). 
 
 
In 1979, Faraj limited his own advocacy of total openness with the public by 
identifying interferences into communication: 
 
But then, how can (nonviolent) propaganda be widely successful when all 
means of (mass) communication today are under the control of the pagan 
and wicked (State) and (under the control) of those who are at war with 
God’s religion? (1979: 186) 
 
 
Even in situations which seem particularly favorable for establishment of un-
limited communication with the public, Al Qaeda’s doctrine assumes that the or-
ganization needs to employ a variety of mechanisms for propaganda embracing 
“a comprehensive jihadi, behavioral and educational doctrinal method” (Al Suri, 
2004: 445) without details of operational characteristics of its activities. As to the 
propaganda-oriented contact with the public, Al Qaeda’s doctrine would hold a 
proclivity towards polarization of masses and upholding of a negative image of 
the enemy.59  
 
 
 
                                                   
59 This notion is brought by identifying present enemy with the enemies of the past, such as refer-
ring to the United States and its allies as Crusaders , who conducted an onslaught of Muslim 
lands in the twelfth century. 
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9.2. Loyalty and Separation 
 
Al Zawahiri in 2002 introduced a scholarly doctrine of ‘loyalty and separation’ 
(al-wala wal-bara) which became a polemical tact grounding Al Qaeda’s shared 
belief  that  all  Muslims  should  remain  ‘loyal’  to  one  another  and  refuse  any 
dealings with non-Muslims. Al Zawahiri supporting this doctrinal statement 
quoted Quranic verses: 
Let not the believers take for friends or helpers Unbelievers rather than 
believer: if any do that, in nothing will there be help from God, except by 
way of precaution, that you may Guard yourselves from them (3:28 in Al 
Zawahiri, 2002: 209) 
 
 
The intense indoctrination of Al Qaeda displays a continuous application of 
the belief in ‘loyalty and separation.’ Implicitly, this doctrinal statement can be 
distinguished in its application to organizational structure in the writings of Al 
Suri, who said: 
… no organizational bonds of any kind between the members of the 
Global Islamic Resistance Units, except the bonds of a ‘program of beliefs, 
a system of action, a common name and a common goal (2004: 422). 
 
 
Al Qaeda’s doctrine serving its ultimate objective assumes a tendency to re-
duce the amount of operational links and continuation of organizational activi-
ties that strengthen other means of organizational coordination of members 
working towards a desired end; this is believed to rely upon the loyalty to orga-
nizational cause. 
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9.2.1. Preeminence of Leadership 
 
According to Al Qaeda’s doctrine leadership is a core of political action. Based 
on this belief, Al Qaeda’s doctrine holds that homogeneity and continuity of 
leadership are necessary condition for effectiveness of action. Al Zawahiri said:  
Loyalty to leadership and acknowledgment of its primacy and merit are 
confirmed duties and fundamental values.  But if loyalty to leadership 
reaches the point of sanctification, and if the acknowledgment of its pri-
macy and merit lads to claims that it is infallible, the movement will suffer 
from methodological blindness. Any leadership flaw could lead to a his-
toric catastrophe, not only for the movement but perhaps also for the 
community as a whole (2001a: 195).60 
 
 
This belief has a cornerstone in the writings of Qutb, who in 1964, alluded to the 
historical role of Islamic leadership: 
Islam is again to play the role of the leader of making, then it is necessary 
that the Muslim community be restored to its original form (in Aaron, 
2008: 60). 
 
 
Al Zawahiri further emphasized the general point on leadership, yet, ex-
pressed a characteristic dismay concerning a guiding-role of the leader:   
The importance of the issue of leadership in Islamic action in general and 
jihad in particular, and the community’s need for an educated, militant 
and rational leadership that can guide it toward its goal through storms 
and hurricanes, with awareness and wisdom, without losing its way, 
striking out blindly, or reversing its course (2001a: 196) 
 
 
The particular stress upon qualities of leadership affirms Al Qaeda’s belief 
that leadership is chosen selectively. This belief is grounded in the ideological 
writings of Qutb who wrote in 1964: 
                                                   
60Al Zawahiri was aware at that point of the upheaval that the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan 
would entail for Al Qaeda. 
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The leadership of mankind by Western man is now on the decline, not be-
cause Western culture has become poor materially… but because it is de-
prived of those life-giving values which enabled it to be the leader of man-
kind (in Aaron, 2008: 161). 
 
 
 The same belief, however, does not seem to hold true organizationally. The 
sober and proud acceptance, in Al Qaeda’s contemporary doctrine, of the pri-
macy of leadership forms a contrast to the operational distress of centralization 
of authority as it is expressed emphatically in Al Qaeda’s strategic literature. This 
point is vindicated in A Suri writings: 
Spreading the legal, political and military and other sciences and knowl-
edge that the Mujahidun need in order to carry out Resistance operations, 
without this being in a direct way that leads to a series of arrests in the 
network, as happened in the centralized organization (2004: 392). 
 
 
9.2.3. Substitution for Leadership 
 
Disclosing the desire and fear behind the centralized leadership, Al Qaeda’s 
doctrine preserves the centralization in different operational realm, the realm of 
commitment and shared values. Al Suri embraced that thought pinpointing ad-
vantages of a structure that comprises: 
… a form of centralism on the level of commitment, slogans, symbols and 
ideas on the one hand, while at the same time avoiding links to a central-
ized authority, so that it cannot be aborted security-wise, on the other 
(2004: 420). 
 
According to Al Qaeda’s doctrine, this method allows for a coordination of 
organizational efforts in order to combine their result in a mechanism, which 
confuses the enemy. 
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The required Al Qaeda sentiment seems similar to that expressed by Qutb (in 
Azzam, 1987) in that it links the authority with the concept of values: 
Hence, certainly there must be Jihad . . . assuredly in every form. Unques-
tionably, it should begin in the realm of ideas, and then appear in and per-
vade the world of truth, reality and experience. . . . Undoubtedly, armed 
Evil must be taken on by armed Good. . . . Falsehood strengthened by 
numbers must be confronted by Truth garbed with preparation . . . 
otherwise it would be suicide, or jest not befitting Muslims (in Aaron, 
2008: 61). 
 
 
Dedication to the organizational principles does indeed imply sever restriction 
on the notion of leadership in operational sense and a mere substitution of lead-
ership with an ideology. Al-Suri identified Al Qaeda’s requirement for “program 
of beliefs, a system of action, a common name and a common goal” (2004: 422) as 
the essential denominators of the decentralization of authority. Al Suri said: 
Spreading the ideology of resistance, its programme, its legal and political 
bases and its operational theories so that they are available for the Islamic 
Nation’s youth who strongly wish to participate in the Jihad and Resis-
tance (2004: 392) 
 
 
9.3. Guidance  
 
Al Qaeda tends to view all political relations from behind the curtain of se-
crecy and deception. It applies to its political doctrine the view that “what can’t 
be seen, can’t be known.” This belief displays Al Qaeda’s search for effectiveness 
in informality. Against the danger of disorder and unreliability, however, the Al 
Qaeda’s doctrine requires guidelines, education that if firmly-rooted within or-
ganizational realm yet undetectable from the outside. 
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9.3.1. Danger of Programmed Behavior 
 
Al Qaeda’s whereabouts, actions and exact responsibilities must never be visi-
ble to the enemies; the organization must remain in the shadows of informality, 
which would provide it with certain degree of invisibility. Al Suri warned over 
the danger of programmed behavior when he wrote: 
We also observe that the ones performing these operations are not pro-
grammed [i.e. part of an organized program] in order to become a phe-
nomenon for the sake of setting an example, pushing the Islamic Nation’s 
youth to follow it, and building upon it. They are merely emotional reac-
tions (2004: 391) 
 
 
Naji wrote about a specific operational tactic that alluded to the notion of 
autonomy and toleration of self-regulatory behavior: 
Frequently, the way of infiltrating and reaching a good center for gather-
ing information requires a long period of time so that he can master his 
role in the institution which he is infiltrating.  In that situation, it is possi-
ble to give the freedom of action to the member after giving him a long 
(educational) program on movement, the particular kind of information 
that is required, how to compile it and preserve it until the time when it is 
requested from him or how to communicate it quickly if it is critical in-
formation that cannot be delayed (2004: 122) 
 
 
Thus Al Qaeda’s doctrine holds that the organization must resist means through 
which it can be visible, and also leave its operational domain to the interpretation 
of the independent organizational units, which are implicitly coordinated 
through ideological guidelines in belief system.  
 
9.3.2. Common Method and Common Program 
 
As illustrated above, according to Al Qaeda’s doctrine the conduct of the or-
ganization at any given time must be determined in accordance with the loyalty 
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to the common cause and in view of shared values. The belief concerning the 
effectiveness of informal links requires in a similar manner for organization to: 
… regulate and correct these efforts with a common method and a com-
mon program, in order to achieve the result (Al Suri, 2004: 432) 
 
 
The particular emphasis of Al Qaeda’s doctrine is given to the means of edu-
cation. Al Suri wrote that leader’s inspirational role must embrace a general 
guideline for the organization that enables it to transmit “educational styles, the 
methods of ideas, thinking and operations in a correct manner” (2004: 444). Al 
Suri said: 
… we will set forth the idea and spread it in full, with whatever requires, 
if God the Supreme permits, and make it available in every way, directly 
of through correspondence, or through communication networks, the In-
ternet, and the different means for spreading it, in written, audible and 
visual formats… (2004: 425) 
 
 
9.4.  Autonomy and Continuity 
  
 Al Qaeda’s shared belief system appoints the organization to do all that en-
hances the autonomy but that at the same time preserves the continuity of its 
power; for Al Qaeda is the primary instrument for the realization of the Islamic 
state, which is the primary objective. Thus, in pursuing its goals, the only condi-
tion is that the pursuance of objectives is maintained until reached. Al Qaeda 
doctrine assumes that the organization continues emphasis on its survival be-
comes strongly reflected in its conceptions of political strategy and interpretation 
of organizational foundation and constitution. 
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9.4.1. Danger of Specialization 
 
According to Al Qaeda’s doctrine, the organization should not strive to 
achieve high levels of specialization of its organizational units, unless such a re-
quirement is necessary for the realization of organization’s objectives. Naji said: 
… it is necessary that each individual be trained in all or a large part of the 
branches so that it is possible to pass on skills, according to need, from one 
place to another (2004: 55) 
 
 
In a similar manner, Al Suri observed the fundamental aspect of Al Qaeda’s 
belief that an individual is limited in his specialization only to the extent of his 
capabilities, rather than preferences: 
… expanding your understanding of the doctrinal program and imple-
ment its educational program and gong by it according to the extent of 
your capabilities… preparing yourself and those with you to the extent of 
your capabilities (2004: 438). 
 
 
9.4.2. Primacy of Continuity 
 
The premises of Al Qaeda’s doctrine recognize that the mechanism for coun-
teraction against the danger of departure from the ultimate goals would require 
an organization to maintain its operational continuity. Naji alluded to that belief 
saying: 
The most important skill of the art of administration that we must use in 
learning how to establish committees and specialization and dividing la-
bor so that all the activities do not fall on the shoulders of a single person 
or small group of people, in addition to training all of the individuals and 
passing on practical knowledge until (the point is reached) that if one 
manager disappears another will rise (to take his place) (2004: 55) 
 
 
This belief is ideologically grounded in the writings of Al Zawahiri who in 2001 
pinpointed the necessity for continuity and persistence of goals: 
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The persistence of the resistance will keep the volcano in a state of contin-
ual eruption and ready to blow up at the least provocation. The persis-
tence of the resistance will transfer the popular wrath from one generation 
to another and keep the desire for revenge alive in the people’s souls. In 
contrast, the spread of the concepts of conciliation, acquiescence, and ac-
ceptance of the facts will make our generation leave a legacy of despair 
and a willingness to surrender to the next generation (in Aaron, 2008: 71). 
 
 
 Thus, according to the perceived dangers of specialization, the Al Qaeda must 
maintain  its  continuity  through  a  low  degree  of  vertical  and  horizontal   
differentiation so as to prevent the disturbances in their activities which would 
come with their exposure to complicated and uncertain environment, now re-
served for the entirety of the organizational realm. 
 
 
 9.4.3. Talent for Terrorism 
 
 With these challenges, however, there is an unvarying Al Qaeda’s position: 
the organizational members, next to acquired skills and preparation, must dis-
play a degree of knowledge, information and the general terrorist culture, what 
is considered by Al Qaeda as a talent for terrorism: 
A talent for terrorism when it comes to selecting targets and the operation’s 
nature, the ability to execute them, to meet the requirements, assess their 
impact and consequences from political, security-related and other perspec-
tives (Al Suri, 2004: 434) 
 
 Al Qaeda’s expected degree of expediency of organizational members in de-
ciding whether means should be adopted would necessitate a ‘terrorist’ to hold a 
general knowledge regarding all possible contingencies, which are the essence of 
organization’s political strategy. According to the implicit point of Al Qaeda’s 
doctrine, which comes into view in here, a true ‘terrorist’ is indeed a skilful in 
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himself. Thus professionalism becomes associated with individual characteristics 
in much the way that if one presents a natural aptitude for ‘terrorism’ one avoids 
the ineffectiveness of the ‘terrorist’ actions. 
 
 
9.5. Unity and Universality 
 
Al Qaeda’s doctrine holds that the organization must be prepared to operate 
in any region in the world if it is displays the characteristic of expediency for the 
organizational cause. Al Suri wrote: 
… a method should therefore guide the Muslim who wants to participate 
and resist, to operate where he is, or where he is able to present in a natu-
ral way (2004: 393). 
 
 
This advocacy of limitless spatial dispersion of the Jihadist struggle was al-
ready advocated by Qutb: 
 
Islam grew up in an independent country owing allegiance to no empire 
and to no king, in a form of society never again achieved. It had to embody 
this society in itself, had to order, encourage, and promote it. It had to order 
and regulate this society, adopting from the beginning its principles and its 
spirit along with its methods of life and work. It had to join together the 
world and the faith by its exhortations and laws. So Islam chose to unite 
earth and heaven in a single system, present both in the heart of the indi-
vidual and the actuality of society, recognizing no separation of practical 
exertion from religious impulse (1949: 26-7). 
 
 Setting precedent for the willingness of individuals to participate in call for 
action, the Al Qaeda’s doctrine holds that the organization demands unity of 
struggle and universality of commitment.  
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 9.5.1. Unity of Struggle 
 
 Al Qaeda’s beliefs system embraces a premise that in order to have an over-
reaching influence, the organization must assume the unity of struggle, as to en-
able the structural enlargement and its utilization in respect of the goal achieve-
ment.  Al  Suri  recalls  the  verses  of  Qu’ran  to  clarify  further  the  Jihadist 
idea behind the concept of unified struggle:  
What we now need to establish in the minds of the Mujahidun who are 
determined to fight, is the sense of belonging and commitment, which is 
according to the words of the Almighty: Verily, this brotherhood of yours 
is a single brotherhood (2004: 368). 
 
 
 Despite the ideological underpinnings of the unity aspect in Al Qaeda’s 
doctrine, Al Suri provides the evidence for operational effectiveness: 
Coordinating a method in which all efforts are joined, in order to combine 
their result in a mechanism which confuses enemy, exhausts him and 
heightens the spirit of the Islamic Nation so that it joins the Resistance phe-
nomenon (2004: 93). 
 
 
Thus unity becomes regarded as a strategic value and constitutes for a general 
quality of the organization. The belief in unity has its roots in the historical expe-
rience of Muslims as recalled by Qutb: 
Islam grew up in an independent country owing allegiance to no empire 
and to no king, in a form of society never again achieved.  It had to embody 
this society in itself, had to order, encourage and promote it. It had to order 
and regulate this society, adopting from the beginning its principles and its 
spirit along with its methods of life and work… So Islam chose to unite 
earth and heaven in a single system, present both in the heart of the indi-
vidual and the actuality of society, recognizing no separation of practical 
exertion from religious impulse (1949: 26-27). 
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 9.5.2. Universal Commitment 
 
 According to Al Qaeda’s doctrine, the unity of struggle displays yet another 
dimension and quality of organizational structure. To the dedicated Al Qaeda 
member, a universal commitment equates with the feeling of brotherhood a 
point emphasized by al-Qaradhawi in 2001: 
Islam treats Muslims everywhere as one nation, and it does not recognize 
geographical borders or [differences of] race, color and language.  It sees 
Muslims as one nation in Dar Al-Islam, united in Islamic beliefs and Mus-
lim brotherhood (in Aaron, 2008: 76). 
 
 
And Al Suri added: 
 
This helps those who are not supported by belief and understanding, to 
move towards this universal (ummami) thinking, which is among the fun-
damentals of our religion … it is absolutely necessary to have a sense of 
commitment to the Islamic Nation and its world, in the geographical, politi-
cal and military dimensions and in every field (2004: 369-70). 
 
 
 Qutb emphasized the strategic importance for the upsurge of movements 
driven by universality of perceived values: 
 
Islam reckons itself to be a worldwide region {sic} and a universal religion; 
therefore, it could not confine itself to the limits of Arabia, but naturally de-
sired to spread over the whole world in every direction (1949: 198). 
 
 
 Al Qaeda must do all that enhances its power and extensiveness of its strug-
gle; for Al Qaeda the insinuation of its activities in the maximum scope becomes 
a powerful organizational tool in the realization the effective alignment of its or-
ganizational structure with the environment, and so through structural means it 
ensures a protection of the message so that it reaches and becomes clear to eve-
ryone.
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This study has formulated and illustrated that operational code analysis as an 
enduring mean for understanding of motivations and behavior of political deci-
sion-making bodies provides an important input needed for systematic analysis 
of political entities threatening international peace and stability. The basic pur-
pose of this study is to demonstrate that operational code construct as restricted 
primarily to studies of state institutions, has been inadequate in its methodologi-
cal design to provide a useful extension for studding of non-state actors within 
international arena. In light of the positive potential of operational code analysis 
for systematic studying of non-state adversaries pressurizing violence upon civil 
societies around the world, this study puts forward an idea for adjunction of 
structural content to operational code analysis for further consideration or dis-
cussion by others.  In reference to studies of political collectives, this proposition 
relies fundamentally on the observation that the term operational code has been 
misemployed following the work of George (1969), in its reference to studies of 
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organizational decision-making and embraced instead a set of beliefs about na-
ture of politics and political action held by individual leaders.  
 
As study presented, the initial understanding of operational code belief sys-
tem provided by Leites (1951, 1953) aimed at delineation of conceptions of political 
strategy for a collective political actor, as reflective of shared beliefs about the na-
ture of politics and notions of correct strategy and tactics, as well as, beliefs about 
governing relations within the decision-making unit. The proposed designation 
of the concept of operational code stems from the fact that Leites’ understanding of 
the concept aimed to embrace participants in a system of action, rather than ad-
dress their personality and historical experience instead. 
 
Primarily, since its first surfacing (Leites, 1951, 1953), operational code ap-
proach represented an inconsistent and unstructured methodology for studying 
of political elites.  This was significantly reflected in the absence of similar-
design-driven research and thus impinged upon perceptions on the utility of op-
erational code analysis for comparative studies. The initial approach, however, 
unlike it consequent successors, constituted a comprehensive framework, collec-
tive in its level of analysis and inclusive rules of conduct existing within an orga-
nization. As presented in the Table 1 on the following page, Leites’ Model (1951, 
1953) comprised beliefs through which the decision-making unit addressed itself 
to the external world and internal realm.  While the external influences account 
merely for the image of the outside world, the internal relations provided a mean 
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of acknowledgment of decision-maker’s interpretations of internal behavioral 
aspects affecting the processes of policy formulation. Shifting the frame of refer-
ence into cognitive realm, allowed Leites (1951, 1953) to divert the attention of 
the analysis to the sphere of subjectivity, through which the decision-making 
constrains are formed. 
 
Table 1. Leites’ Model of Operational Code. 
 
Leites’ Model (1951, 1953) provides for an accurate illustration of actor’s concep-
tion of political strategy thus holds a predictive function on actor’s decision-
making activities. The utilization of Leites’ Model (1951, 1953) would constitute a 
constructive  account  on  limits  on  actor’s  rationality  as  one  of  the  important 
 
Operational 
Code  
Analysis 
 
Leites’ Model (1951, 1953) 
Governing  
Relations With 
the Outside 
World 
 
  Identifies the relation between studied entity and the out-
side world. 
  
Allows capturing actor’s image of outside world and in re-
spect delineating rules of conduct an actor believe to be neces-
sary for effective political action in respect of that image. 
 State  
Actors/Non-
State Terrorist 
Actors 
Governing  
Relations 
Within the Or-
ganization 
 
 
Identifies the alignment of internal relationships among con-
stituent parts of an organization.  
 
Allows capturing of the image of the governing relations 
within the organization and delineating rules of conduct an 
actor believes to be necessary for effective action in respect 
of that image.  
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inputs needed for behavioral analysis of political decision-making and leader-
ship styles. 
 
Attempting to systematize Leites’ Model, George (1969) constructed a set of 
philosophical and instrumental questions allowing for an identification of the set 
of beliefs and strategies underlining the premises of political action. The devel-
opment of operational code approach into a structured technique, however, pro-
vided for an important omission of the internal context of the Leites’ Model 
(1951, 1953). The applicability of the Georges’s Model (1969) to variety of actors, 
whether collective or individual, state or non-state have not been questioned 
adequately, while the evolving model did not account for differences in the deci-
sion-making of various groups. The primary purpose for utilization of opera-
tional code in Leites’ Model (1951, 1953) was to conduct a study into the political 
orientation of an adversary towards an opponent as well as internally defined 
political action and change; George’s (1969) philosophical and instrumental ques-
tions, however, focused on the former aspect of operational code, while signifi-
cantly omitted the means for extraction of the latter.  
 
Table 2, presented on the following page attempts to visualize George’s 
Model (1969) closely in order to understand that omitting internal influences and 
diversifying solely external influences becomes the primary weakness of the 
model and its consequent evolutions. As indicated in the table, operational code 
analysis  in  George’s  Model  aims  to  evaluate  the  belief  system  of  individual 
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leaders, rather than organizations. The shift of the level of analysis form that of 
Leites (1951, 1953) does becomes problematic in organizations that are display a 
well-built belief system that has a potential to substitute for the operational role 
of leadership, such as the case in terrorist organizations. That is to say, in circum-
stances where the leadership within the organization holds merely an inspira-
tional role, rather than directly authorizing and coordinating political action, 
George’s Model (1969) proves to be inapplicable as a mean of measurement of 
the governing rules of organization’s conduct. 
 
 
Operational Code 
Analysis 
 
George’s Model (1969) 
Philosophical 
Questions 
 
Identifies relation between the state and the outside world 
in respect of beliefs about the nature of politics. 
 
Constructs diagnostic propensities of actor’s cognition by 
identifying actor’s diagnosis of the situation in certain di-
rections 
 Political  
Leaders   
Instrumental 
Questions 
 
Identifies relation between the state and the outside world 
in respect of beliefs about the effective strategies. 
 
Constructs choice propensities of actor’s cognition by 
identifying the means through which an actor favours 
certain types of action alternatives over others 
 
 
Table 2. George’s Model of Operational Code 
 
Significantly, George’s Model (1969) of operational code analysis presents a 
disputable utility in political forecasting. Despite the systematization of George’s 
(1969) construct as restricted or limited to individual level of analysis, it proves 
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inadequate for studying of organizations, and anticipate the conceptions of po-
litical strategy through which an actor decides to act one way rather than the 
other. 
 
The model proposed in this thesis, attempts to adjust George’s Model (1969) 
as to account for differences between varieties of actors.  This study attempted to 
identify the structural content of the organizational decision-making as an inte-
grator of the rules governing actor’s relation with the outside world and within 
the organization. Significantly, adopting the technique of systematization and 
coding of operational code into a query, the Prospective Model becomes aca-
demically sound and permissive of studies for comparison and contrast pur-
poses.  
 
Recognizing a “pressing need for a more nuanced approach by experts in or-
ganization theory in their study of the structures of underground terrorist and 
other anti-system actors” (Stepanova, 2008: 127). Operational code analysis 
would efficiently provide for valuable contribution to analysis of the rules of 
conduct, embracing influences upon decision-making insofar as it would encom-
pass, alongside the spectrum of beliefs about political nature and effective strate-
gies, the aspect of the organizational design within which decision-makers oper-
ate; and which would significantly contribute to the advancement of the in-
tended objectives of the political actor. With the recognition of strategic impor-
tance associated with the perceptions on organizational structure, the proposed 
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model of operational code analysis would provide for a differentiation of the 
conceptions of effective political actor between state and non-state terrorist ac-
tors, since they present different conceptions of organizational structures that 
come into influent contract with behavioral patterns in organization. As states 
and non-state terrorist organizations are likely to attach different utility values to 
organizational structures, a premise stemming from an argument that state insti-
tutions are essentially bureaucratic, the structural context becomes indispensable 
for utilization of operational code for non-state terrorist organizations. In this 
manner, the utility of the Proposed Model, would not only effectively reflect the 
Leites’ (1951, 1953) initial idea of operational code, but also would effectively 
provide for technical and methodological means for its applicability to diversity 
of actors unlike the preceding George’s Model (1969). Constituting, a preliminary 
proposal for an incorporation of the context of organizational structure into op-
erational code analysis should be useful for delineation of the rules of conduct 
and their reflection upon a leadership styles and its enactment in the realm of 
real-life political action. 
 
The Proposed Model of operational code allows capturing actor’s perceptions 
of outside world and identification of cognitive limits on rationality inclusive of 
organizational structure account for the anticipation of political actor’s definition 
of the situation. In the exploration of actor’s leadership style through examina-
tion of the political actor’s perceptions and structuring of political world to 
which  he  relates,  and  within  which  he  attempts  to  operate  thus  addresses 
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accurately the actor’s problem of making casual inferences from decision-makers 
beliefs and from environmentally constrained behavioral patterns to the actions 
of the organization.  In this respect, in search for solutions associated with theory 
development and description, the Proposed Model proves its theory-building 
utility as inclusive not only of its revised applicability to variety of actors, but 
significantly involving an appraisal of its enhanced forecasting effectiveness.   
 
 
Operational 
Code  
Analysis 
 
Proposed Model 
Philosophical 
Questions 
 
Identifies relation between the state and the outside world 
in respect of beliefs about the nature of politics. 
 
Constructs diagnostic propensities of actor’s cognition by 
identifying actor’s diagnosis of the situation in certain di-
rections 
 
Instrumental 
Questions 
 
Identifies relation between the state and the outside world 
in respect of beliefs about the effective strategies. 
 
Constructs choice propensities of actor’s cognition by iden-
tifying the means through which an actor favours certain 
types of action alternatives over others 
 
State Actors/ 
Non-State Ac-
tors 
Structural 
Questions 
 
Identifies the relation between the constituent parts within 
an organization capturing the decision-making properties  
 
Constructs the option propensities of actor’s cognition by 
identifying the means through which actor interprets deci-
sion-making setting in order to increase the effectiveness of 
the action. 
 
 
Table 3. Proposed Model of Operational Code 
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On that account, I have argued in this thesis that the knowledge of the orga-
nizational structure provides an important differentiating input needed for com-
prehensive analysis of political decision-making in non-state terrorist organiza-
tions as contrary to those of state institutions.  Consequently, I have attempted to 
codify  the  unaccounted  for  constituent  of  operational  code  analysis,  having 
existence in Leites’ (1951, 1953) construct, consisting of general issues and ques-
tions around which an organization is structured.  
 
Since operational code construct finds it best utilization in studies essentially 
focusing on the understanding of an adversary for that reason among the non-
state actors the focus of this study has been given to terrorist organizations. The 
choice of Al Qaeda has been intended to specifically reflect the differences be-
tween the structural pillars of state and non-state terrorist organizations. Pro-
vided with an extensive background on Al Qaeda’s organizational structure, the 
consequent analysis of an organization according to the additional structural 
context represent importantly an essential link between beliefs about politics, 
perception and alignment and efficiency of organizational structure influencing 
political action.  Al Qaeda example significantly establishes importance of orga-
nizational structure in decision-making by presenting that an image of an oppo-
nent may play a less central role in the belief system, particularly when other 
non-state organizational share Al Qaeda’s image of opponent and ideology, yet 
attempt to influence international scene without resorting to the means of vio-
lence,  or  unable  structurally  to  pursue  its  objectives.  In  this  respect,  while 
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the image on an opponent presents a somewhat different role, other elements of 
operational code will be structured with greater emphasis. Encountering these 
circumstances, the example of Al Qaeda presents that it is important to increase 
the attention to structural context of organizational influences within the frame-
work of the philosophical and instrumental context of operational code analysis. 
 
One limitation associated with the construction of an operational code stems 
from the question concerning methodology employed and data used for the re-
search.  This aspect has not been undertaken within the focus of this thesis, yet 
represents a recommendation for continuation of a study-subject of operational 
code touched upon this thesis.  As this thesis did not aim at the actual construc-
tion of an operational code but utilization of its construct for efficient construc-
tion of such code in the future, the following guidance concerning its methodo-
logical aspects would help future scholars in a formulation of comprehensive op-
erational construct for designed studied-subject, whether state or non-state. I 
would suggest that the selection of data and methodology of inquiry could be 
selected upon individual pragmatism and assorted preferences of a researcher, 
therefore. Operational code analysis presents a preliminary construct setting the 
choice of methodology open to research depending on the studied political en-
tity. The researchers could utilize the proposed operational code analysis merely 
as guidance for undertaking a provisional research, attempt to identify a unique 
code employing qualitative methods modeled by Leites (1951, 1953) or construct 
a  quantitatively  identified  rules  of  conduct  for  future  comparative  purposes. 
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In respect of the use of materials, researchers could employ already available 
data or when circumstances permit could attempt for systematic acquisition of a 
new data sets contributing to the construct of a code. Substantially, however, the 
fact that operational code is a unique construct in itself, the importance of the ac-
quirement of an understanding particular to the studied organization becomes 
an essential part for the construct of the operational code of that entity due to the 
fact that operational code does not merely signify a presentation of hard facts of 
the organizational rules of conduct but incorporate the construct it into a cognitive 
forces translated into motivational and behavioral factors. On this account, this 
thesis provided a sample of operational code analysis in respect of its structural 
content, as employing the qualitative technique of content analysis and evalua-
tion. 
 
 To the attention of consequent scholars of operational code analysis should 
come another limitation. Reaching back to the historical evolution of an opera-
tional code, an analyst should take into account that operational code represents 
a specific approach to study of political behavior. It is important to note that as 
much as the term operational code may appear as a set of repertoires for political 
action, the term signifies factors that constitute an influence upon a decision-
maker rather than conclusively determining unilaterally resolution of a question 
in consideration. The extraction of beliefs and the structurally defined behavior 
pattern represent a significant portion of the influences on a political actor upon 
its actions. Not only not all the beliefs can be extracted by operational code, as 
the construct does not account for ethical and normative behavioral underlining, 
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but also it is hard to differentiate between the behavior constituent of operational 
code and one resulting as a part of it.   
 
Deriving from the assumptions and premises of the thesis recognizing the ne-
cessity for incorporation of the context of organizational structure for effective 
utilization of operational code analysis for non-state actors, I hope that this pre-
liminary project will encourage and facilitate systematic research of variety of 
non-state actors, particularly those perceived representing a threat to national or 
international stability. The extended contextual composition of the operational 
code represents but a preliminary project for the potential operational code con-
structs, and with all the necessary elements for the applicability of operational 
code analysis for non-state, in particular terrorist organizations, I believe that this 
approach merits consideration for future studies of elaboration on and construc-
tion of an operational code analysis in its greatest explanatory capability.
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